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Abstract 
Climate change mitigation constitutes a social dilemma, a conflict between personal 
and collective outcomes. Behaviours that result in personal benefits (e.g. travelling quickly, 
conveniently and cheaply by plane) also result in a collective cost in the form of climate 
change. Behavioural theories and evidence suggest this social dilemma structure significantly 
influences behaviour. This thesis aims to understand how the social dilemma structure of 
climate change mitigation affects people’s personal actions to address climate change. The 
first empirical study explores whether people perceive decisions with emission consequences 
as social dilemmas. Findings show that making salient the effected collective or the pro-
social nature of the decision increases awareness of the social dilemma structure. A second 
set of empirical studies, using quantitative and qualitative methods, further demonstrate that 
there are two sets of considerations to the climate change mitigation dilemma: 1) non-
cooperative considerations (e.g. a focus on immediate personal benefits or a temptation to 
free-ride) which are linked to a decrease in actions on climate change, and 2) cooperative 
considerations (e.g. a focus on outcomes for others or fairness considerations) which are 
linked to an increase in actions on climate change. Results also show that people apply 
cognitive strategies to counteract the discouraging effect of non-cooperative considerations. 
A third set of empirical studies tested whether communication massages based on cooperative 
considerations can increase personal actions to address climate change. Findings suggest that 
especially framing a message based on the collective outcome can increase actions, but 
careful consideration of the audience and the situation is required. Overall, this thesis makes 
the important contribution of demonstrating that the social dilemma structure of climate 
change mitigation does not necessarily discourage actions to address climate change, but also 
offers an encouraging perspective through a focus on the collective outcome.
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1. Introduction 
1. Introduction 
Climate change mitigation has widely been acknowledged as a pressing global issue. 
Leaders from different parts of the world express a clear urgency and responsibility with 
regards to climate change and climate change mitigation (Cameron, 2014, Ki-moon, 2014, 
Obama, 2014). This is underpinned by the latest science. The IPCC’s fifth assessment 
confirms the pressing need for actions based on the knowledge that humans are contributing 
to the observed changes in our climate (IPCC, 2013, IPCC, 2014a, IPCC, 2014b). The 
assessment report specifically names individual changes in behaviour as one of the essential 
factors to enable successful climate change mitigation. Behavioural changes are key in order 
to reduce energy demand in areas like homes and transport systems (IPCC, 2014b). Dietz and 
colleagues (2009) calculated the potential emission savings resulting from individual 
behaviour changes in homes and non-business travel in the US (e.g. changing to a fuel 
efficient vehicle, carpooling, reducing thermostats, and line drying instead of tumble drying). 
Adopting available sustainable technologies and behaviours could lead to a 20% emission 
reduction in the US household sector, or a 7.4% reduction of total US emissions (Dietz et al., 
2009). Another study estimated the potential emission savings from energy efficient 
household behaviours at 22% of household emissions in the US, with the highest potential 
reductions coming from changes in personal transport (Laitner et al., 2009). Additionally, 
changing dietary choices to a low-meat diet also results in substantial benefits for climate 
change mitigation (Stehfest et al., 2009). 
A sense of urgency with regards to climate change mitigation is also apparent in 
public opinion polls. In general, people across countries are aware of and concerned about the 
issue of climate change (Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2014). A 2012 survey across thirteen 
countries confirmed that over 80% of people are worried about the possible consequences of 
14 
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climate change and see human activity as the main cause of climate change. A recent review 
showed that despite an observed slight decrease in public concern in recent years, a clear 
majority of people in many countries still express high awareness and considerable concern 
about climate change (Capstick et al., 2015). A Swedish study also indicates a shift in opinion 
about how climate change can be addressed: while participants of a 2005 survey 
predominantly thought that it will be addressed through the development of new 
technologies, in 2010 participants believed that behaviour changes would play a major role in 
climate change mitigation (Von Borgstede et al., 2013). 
Despite the high public concern and awareness, we do not currently observe a 
significant, concerted behavioural change by individuals to contribute to successful climate 
change mitigation. The changes required to achieve the potential 20-22% reductions in 
household emissions are not taking place (Dietz et al., 2009, Laitner et al., 2009, Stehfest et 
al., 2009). The UK remains a car dependent nation, particularly for commuters (Goodman, 
2013). International air travel by UK residents has increased by over 1.8 million flights to 
over 46 million flights a year from 2011 to 2013 (Office for National Statistics UK, 2013). 
Similarly, UK per capita expenditure on purchasing meat and meat products has seen an 8.6% 
increase from 2010 to 2013 (DEFRA, 2013). Numerous behavioural studies also lead to the 
conclusion that concern about environmental issues such as climate change often does not 
translate into a change in behaviour. For example, Anable and colleagues (2006) published a 
review on the link between people’s attitudes towards climate change and their personal 
transport behaviour. The review showed that despite public concern about climate change, 
environmental issues play only a very small part in car-purchasing behaviour, which is 
predominantly determined by financial and performance criteria (Anable et al., 2006). In a 
Canadian survey 72.3% of respondents reported a gap between their intention to act in an 
environmentally friendly manner and their actual behaviour (Kennedy et al., 2009).  
15 
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In light of the urgency to promote a change in behaviour it is necessary to understand 
the barriers to personal actions on climate change. Research especially in the field of 
environmental psychology suggests a variety of reasons for the observed gap between 
concern about climate change and environmental issues and personal actions to address these 
problems. Factors internal to a person (e.g. motivations or values) as well as external to a 
person (e.g. economic or cultural factors) play an important role in explaining this observed 
gap (Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002). Lorenzoni and colleagues identified situational barriers 
such as a lack of sustainable alternatives or infrastructures that support a change in behaviour 
(Lorenzoni et al., 2007). They further list other societal factors such as a perceived lack of 
actions from politicians and businesses. Gifford identifies 29 “psychological barriers to 
behaviour change” (Gifford, 2011, p.290). These include different characteristics of human 
cognition (e.g. a tendency to undervalue distant or future risks), ideologies (e.g. a strong 
belief in a technological solution to climate change), social norms that prevent actions on 
climate change, and a tendency to deny the problem in order to reduce fear. He also points 
towards the strong force of habit as a barrier to behaviour change and the personal risks and 
costs involved in taking actions.  
A major barrier to individual behavioural change is that climate change mitigation has 
the characteristics of a social dilemma. Climate change mitigation has been widely 
acknowledged as a social dilemma, a collective action problem. The IPCC’s fifth assessment 
states: “Effective mitigation will not be achieved if individual agents advance their own 
interests independently. Climate change has the characteristics of a collective action problem 
at the global scale, because most greenhouse gases (GHGs) accumulate over time and mix 
globally, and emissions by any agent (e.g., individual, community, company, country) affect 
other agents.”(IPCC, 2014b, p.5). The social dilemma structure is important for 
understanding climate change mitigation from an individual perspective. This thesis aims to 
16 
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understand how the social dilemma structure of climate change mitigation affects personal 
actions to address climate change.
17 
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2. Social dilemmas 
2.1. Definition 
Picture a pasture that is used by a group of herdsmen to feed their cattle. The pasture 
provides a limited amount of grass for the cattle and replenishes every year. The rational 
herdsman tries to increase the number of cattle he owns in order to increase his profit. But if 
all herdsmen increase their number of cattle the pasture will soon be overgrazed and cannot 
replenish. Ultimately, the pasture will no longer provide food for the cattle which results in a 
loss for every herdsman’s livelihood (Hardin, 1968). 
The situation pictured above is known as a social dilemma. In a social dilemma 
individual outcomes are in conflict with collective outcomes (Kollock, 1998). Each 
individual in a social dilemma can opt for a cooperative or non-cooperative choice. In the 
herdsmen example the cooperative choice is to keep a smaller number of cattle which the 
pasture can sustain. The non-cooperative choice is to increase the number of cattle beyond a 
sustainable number.  
Much contemporary literature concerned with social dilemmas adopts Dawes’ (1980) 
definition which sets out the following characteristics of social dilemmas: 1) For the 
individual, a non-cooperative choice always results in a higher personal payoff than a 
cooperative choice, regardless of the choice the other actors involved in the dilemma situation 
make; 2) but all individuals would be better off if everybody involved made a cooperative 
choice. Therefore a social dilemma has a socially optimum outcome, the best for all, which 
can be achieved through mutual cooperation.  
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Social dilemmas are socially interdependent situations (e.g. Messick and Brewer, 
1983). An individual’s decision not only results in consequences for themselves, but for all 
other people involved in the social dilemma. At the same time, the outcome for each 
individual is not only dependent on their own decision but also on the decisions of all others 
involved in the social dilemma. The amount of people involved in a social dilemma – the 
collective - can stretch from two people to larger groups, and even to the entire human race 
(Horton and Doron, 2011, Kollock, 1998, Van Vugt and Shakespeare, 1998).  
Generally an individual’s decision in a social dilemma can result in both positive and 
negative personal payoffs (Dawes, 1980). These personal costs and benefits can be of 
monetary or material nature, but they can also relate to convenience, social recognition and 
status, or negative and positive feelings. The sum of negative and positive payoffs resulting 
from a decision is termed the ‘overall payoff’ or ‘outcome’. Individual rationality favours 
decisions which lead to the highest possible positive outcome for the individual. 
In a social dilemma the non-cooperative choice results in higher positive payoffs for 
the individual regardless of what the other individuals involved in the dilemma are choosing 
(Dawes, 1980). Therefore non-cooperation is called the dominating strategy (Dawes, 1980). 
When opting for non-cooperation the individual receives the full personal benefits (e.g. the 
benefits of increasing the number of cattle), while only bearing a fraction of the resulting 
collective costs (the additional usage of the pasture) (Hardin, 1968). In addition non-
cooperation of a single herdsman is unlikely to threaten overgrazing of the pasture, if other 
herdsmen cooperate. Therefore the individual perceives a strong temptation to ‘free-ride’: 
making a personal non-cooperative choice and profiting from other people’s cooperative 
choices. If the other herdsmen opt for non-cooperation, a cooperative choice of a single 
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herdsman will not protect the pasture from overgrazing. Again the individual herdsman is 
better off not cooperating and receiving the personal benefits from non-cooperation. 
Dawes’ definition falls short of two features that are found in most real world social 
dilemmas. Firstly, in his definition the choice between cooperation and non-cooperation is a 
true binary one. In many real world social dilemmas different degrees of cooperation or non-
cooperation exist (Van Lange et al., 2002). Secondly, most real world social dilemmas 
include a temporal dimension (Hendrickx et al., 2001, Van Lange et al., 2013). Often the 
conflict presenting itself in a social dilemma is one between immediate self-interest and long-
term collective interest. 
Social dilemmas are diverse and abundant in real life, including examples like 
overfishing, choosing what to eat with an equally split restaurant bill, and mitigating climate 
change. They have been extensively studied by a large number of disciplines, including 
economics and psychology (Van Lange et al., 2013). Much of our knowledge about 
behaviour in social dilemmas is based on controlled laboratory experiments or formalised 
‘games’ (Newell et al., 2014). In addition psychologists have assessed people’s behaviour 
and reasoning through interview and questionnaire studies (e.g. Aitken et al., 2011, Horton 
and Doron, 2011). Field studies exploring real world social dilemmas have further added to 
our understanding of the effect of specific characteristics of the dilemma situation as well as 
potential approaches to resolve social dilemmas and avoid a high collective cost (Ostrom and 
Hess, 2007, Ostrom et al., 1999). 
Social dilemmas have to be distinguished from both decision problems and 
distribution problems. A decision problem is a situation without social interdependence. Thus 
the consequences of a decision will solely be borne by decision makers themselves and are 
independent of other people’s decisions (Tenbrunsel and Northcraft, 2010). A distribution 
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problem does imply social interdependence. But while in a social dilemma a non-cooperative 
or cooperative choice alters the collective outcome, in a distribution problem the collective 
outcome stays unaltered (Fennell, 2004). The problem focuses on changes in the distribution 
of the collective outcome. 
Two decision making situations – the chicken dilemma and the assurance dilemma - 
are sometimes included in the classification of social dilemmas, although they do not possess 
a dominating strategy and therefore lack one of Dawes’ defining characteristics (Kollock, 
1998, Van Vugt and Shakespeare, 1998). The name of the chicken dilemma is derived from 
the situation in which two drivers head towards each other and whoever swerves first loses 
the game. Both drivers prefer the non-cooperative choice (not to swerve) but non-cooperation 
does not lead to the highest individual outcome, regardless of what the other driver does. If 
both drivers chose non-cooperation, there is a high chance that they both die, not a favourable 
outcome for the drivers compared to cooperating and losing the game. The essence of the 
assurance dilemma is that an individual is willing to cooperate if assured that the other 
decision makers will cooperate as well. In the assurance dilemma cooperation actually results 
in the highest benefits not only for the collective, but also for the individual. Non-cooperation 
usually occurs for one of two reasons: 1) One decision maker perceives a higher value in 
beating the other decision makers compared to benefitting both themselves and the collective. 
2) One decision maker expects the others will chose non-cooperation (Van Lange et al., 
2013). 
In this thesis I will focus on social dilemmas with a dominating strategy, as they are 
the situational structures applicable to climate change mitigation. 
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Amongst those situations that are characterised as social dilemmas with a dominating 
strategy and involve more than two people, two different types can be distinguished: the 
public good dilemma and the common resource dilemma (Kollock, 1998). 
The public good dilemma is also called a social fence (Van Vugt and Shakespeare, 
1998). The individual is presented with a situation in which an individual contribution creates 
a collective benefit - a public good that everyone can access. A pure public good is non-
excludable, once it is provided everyone can benefit from it - contributors and non-
contributors. The temptation to free-ride is to make use of a public good without contributing 
to its provision. A pure public good is also non-rival, once it is provided, one person’s use of 
the public good does not reduce its availability for others. The attributes of being non-
excludable and non-rival are often only fulfilled to an extent in real life public goods 
(Kollock, 1998). An example for a public good is a public firework display (Van Lange et al., 
2013). People who do not contribute to funding the fireworks can still enjoy watching it. 
They free-ride on the cooperation of others who contribute towards funding the fireworks. 
Another key feature of public goods is their ‘production function’. This describes the size of 
contributions needed to provide and maintain the public good over time (Kollock, 1998). 
Many public goods have a defined threshold included in their production function. This 
threshold defines the amount of contribution needed to provide the public good in the first 
place (Kollock, 1998). Experimental research on public good dilemmas uses ‘give-some 
games’ as a means to research choice behaviour (Fleishman, 1988). In give-some games 
participants typically receive money or points to start with. They can then decide how much 
of this initial endowment they would like to contribute to a public good and how much they 
would like to keep for themselves. If too little is contributed by all participants and the public 
good is not provided, contributions are lost. However, if the public good is provided the pot 
of contributed money is usually doubled and evenly distributed amongst participants 
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(regardless of how much they have contributed). A meta-analysis of public good experiments 
shows that the average contribution rate to the public good across decision rounds is 37.7% of 
the original endowment participants receive (Zelmer, 2003). 
The second type of social dilemma is the common resource dilemma, also known as 
the tragedy of the commons or a social trap (Hardin, 1968, Kollock, 1998). The herdsmen 
situation is an example of a common resource dilemma in which choosing a personal benefit 
results in a collective cost (Hardin, 1968). A common resource, in contrast to a public good, 
is rival, a feature known as the ‘subtractability’ of benefits (Kollock, 1998): the grass eaten 
by one herdsman’s cow cannot be eaten by other herdsmen’s cows. This feature becomes 
crucial once the replenishment rate of a common resource (also known as the carrying 
capacity) is exhausted through the sum of individual harvesting choices. The replenishment 
rate defines the effect of a certain amount of harvesting on the common resource. It also 
includes thresholds (tipping points) that mark the diminishment of the common resource. If a 
tipping point is reached the resource fails to replenish and cannot be maintained (Kollock, 
1998). A common resource dilemma can take two forms (Hardin, 1968): 1) a valuable 
resource can be taken out of a common resource pool, such as the grazed grass in the 
herdsmen dilemma; 2) something harmful is put into the system, such as toxic chemicals 
released into a lake. Choices in common resource dilemmas are prominently studied through 
‘take-some games’ (Fleishman, 1988). In laboratory take-some games a common resource 
exists, for example a common pot of money. In each round of the game participants can 
decide how much they want to take out of the common resource and keep for themselves. 
After each round the common resource replenishes, but if the resource decreases beyond a 
tipping point it can no longer replenish, the game is over and participants can no longer take 
out money for themselves. Ahn and colleagues (2010), for example, conducted a number of 
common resource experiments where the socially optimum outcome can be achieved by 
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taking out an average of nine tokens from a common resource in each decision round. 
Participants in these experiments took an average of 17.1 tokens, thus exceeded the amount at 
which the resource can replenish
 
2.2. Theories explaining behaviour in social dilemmas 
2.2.1. Rational Choice Theory 
According to Rational Choice Theory people weigh up costs and benefits and make 
choices in order to increase their immediate personal benefits (Boudon, 2009). Humans are 
understood as “self-interested, short-term maximizers” (Ostrom, 1998, p.2). Rational Choice 
Theory predicts that people in a social dilemma will always opt for the dominating strategy of 
non-cooperation and be tempted to free-ride, as it results in the highest personal benefits 
(Dawes, 1980, Dawes and Thaler, 1988). Social dilemmas are thus viewed as situations 
which result in collective costs and the inability to achieve socially optimum outcomes 
(Hardin, 1968, Olson, 2009). Rational Choice Theory has been highly influential in 
researching human behaviour in social dilemma situations (Ostrom, 2014). Research on 
experimental social dilemmas shows that the prediction of no individuals choosing to 
cooperate is not in line with empirical results. For example, 60% of participants in a public 
good experiment initially cooperated, but this cooperation rate deteriorated to low levels in 
subsequent rounds (Isaac and Walker, 1988). In another public good experiment ‘dangerous 
climate change’ was simulated, which could occur with a given probability. Participants had 
to reach a fixed sum through monetary contributions to avoid ‘dangerous climate change’ 
which would result in the loss of all their remaining money. When the probability and 
therefore the risk for ‘dangerous climate change’ was low, groups generally didn’t achieve 
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the target sum. In a high risk scenario half of the groups managed to reach the required target 
sum (Milinski et al., 2008). Real world social dilemmas similarly consist of stories of success 
as well as failure to provide a public good or sustain a common resource. Resource problems 
such as overfishing and overgrazing seem to confirm that social dilemmas can end in a high 
collective cost (Clark, 2006, Doran et al., 1979). Nevertheless other observations from real 
world social dilemmas demonstrate that people can refrain from choosing the dominating 
strategy and instead show cooperative behaviour (Ostrom, 2014). Berkes and colleagues 
(1989) outline a number of case studies where communities managed to sustain a common 
resource through traditional sustainable hunting, fishing and timbering regimes. These 
examples challenge Rational Choice Theory as a sole predictor of decisions in social 
dilemmas. Alternative behavioural theories were needed to explain non-cooperation resulting 
in a high collective cost, as well as the achievement of the socially optimum outcome through 
mutual cooperation. Interdependence Theory and the Appropriateness Framework provide 
two such alternatives to Rational Choice Theory. 
2.2.2. Interdependence Theory  
Interdependence Theory (Kelley and Thibaut, 1978) provides a framework to 
understand human interactions in socially interdependent situations in a broader sense - not 
only restricted to social dilemmas. Interdependence Theory highlights the structure of a 
situation as being important. This situational structure forms the reality in which people act 
upon their motives and cognitions and in which interactions take place (Van Lange and 
Rusbult, 2012). Kelley and colleagues (2003) analysed different possible situational 
structures and created an atlas of 21 types of interpersonal situations. Social dilemmas 
involving more than two people form one of these types of interpersonal situations. As 
outlined before this social dilemma structure is characterised by a socially optimum outcome 
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(achieved through mutual cooperation), non-cooperation as a dominating strategy and the 
social interdependence of the situation. The theory further states that it is not only important 
what the objective structure of the situation is, but also what people perceive the situation to 
be. This is captured in the transformation process. The transformation process describes how 
people can transform a ‘given situation’ into an ‘effective situation’. The ‘given situation’ 
describes the immediate personal costs and benefits of a decision for the decision maker 
(ignoring other people’s interests or long term interactions). This ‘given situation’ can be 
transformed, for example, by taking outcomes for others into account. The resulting 
‘effective situation’ determines behaviour (Rusbult and Van Lange, 2003). Figure 2.1 
illustrates this transformation process: 
 
Figure 2.1: The transformation process (Rusbult and Van Lange, 2003). 
The transformation process describes how people frequently take into account 
considerations beyond the immediate effects a choice has for themselves. Thus, in contrast to 
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Rational Choice Theory, Interdependence Theory predicts that cooperation in social 
dilemmas can occur despite the fact that immediate personal benefits are highest when opting 
for non-cooperation. The transformation process is guided by interpersonal dispositions, 
relationship specific motives and social norms. These dispositions, motives and norms can be 
both pro-social (e.g. altruism or equality) or pro-self (e.g. a competitive motive – striving to 
increase the difference between one’s own and other people’s outcomes). Research on social 
dilemmas has especially focused on those dispositions, motives and norms that guide a pro-
social transformation and therefore increase cooperation. Interpersonal dispositions have 
frequently been studied as ‘social value orientations’. Social value orientations describe 
people’s preference for how outcomes should be distributed amongst themselves and others. 
Pro-social value orientations have been found to promote cooperation in social dilemmas (De 
Cremer and Van Vugt, 1999, Gärling, 1999, Van Lange et al., 1992, Van Lange et al., 1997, 
Van Vugt et al., 1995, Van Vugt et al., 1996). Relationship specific motives have been 
studied in relation to reciprocity in social dilemmas. This is discussed further below in the 
context of strategic approaches to managing social dilemmas. Other research has focused on 
transformation processes involving temporal considerations in which the ‘given situation’ is 
transformed to focus on longer-term consequences. ‘Consideration of future consequences’ 
(CFC) is a trait that has received attention in social dilemmas with a temporal dimension. 
People high in CFC are more likely to opt for cooperation (Khachatryan et al., 2013, 
Kortenkamp and Moore, 2006). Social norms to cooperate have also been shown to play an 
important role in explaining cooperation in social dilemmas (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). 
All these factors impact on emotions, cognitions and habits which stimulate and guide the 
transformation process (Rusbult and Van Lange, 2003). Interdependence Theory thus outlines 
the importance of considerations and emotional responses to a social dilemma situation which 
ultimately determine whether a person will cooperate. For example the emotion of guilt as a 
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response to a social dilemma has been shown to increase cooperation (Bowles and Gintis, 
2002, Ketelaar and Tung Au, 2003), while a  assessing one’s own potential cooperation as 
insignificant decreases cooperation (Kerr, 1996). The theory also acknowledges that the 
transformation process does not necessarily result from conscious cognitions and emotions, 
but can also be habitualised and thus driven by habits as a reaction to repeatedly encountered 
situational structures (Rusbult and Van Lange, 2003). 
2.2.3. Appropriateness Framework 
The Appropriateness Framework is characterised by a particular focus on the context 
in which a decision is being made (March, 1994, March and Olsen, 2004, Messick, 1999, 
Weber et al., 2004). It describes three different factors that influence behaviour in decision 
making situations: 
o 1) How an individual defines a situation. This determines whether the 
individual regards it as a cooperative task, a moral situation, or something 
else. The individual asks the question: “What kind of situation is this?” 
(March and Olsen, 2004, p.690). 
o 2) The individual’s identity. For example, the individual may or may not 
strongly identify with the collective in the social dilemma situation. Here the 
individual asks: “What kind of person am I?” (March and Olsen, 2004, p.690). 
o 3) Which rules or heuristics the individual applies. Rules and heuristics allow 
a person to decide and react in an effective and quick manner (Mosler and 
Brucks, 2006) and play a crucial role in explaining behaviour. 
Together these three factors influence how the individual answers the question 
fundamental to the Appropriateness Framework: “What does a person like me do in a 
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situation like this?” (Van Lange et al., 2013, p.129). People may choose to cooperate in social 
dilemmas, as the scope of this question considers factors beyond the question that would be 
predicted by Rational Choice Theory: “Which option yields the highest immediate personal 
benefits?” 
Separate factors of the Appropriateness Framework have been found to be influential 
in understanding people’s behaviour in social dilemmas. Framing the social dilemma 
situations differently to alter the interpretation of the situation has been shown to explain 
differences in behaviour. Students to whom a social dilemma game was introduced in an 
economic context (decisions to invest in a joint investment fund) showed lower levels of 
cooperation compared to students to whom it was introduced in a non-economic context 
(decisions to contribute to a social event) (Pillutla and Chen, 1999). The situation can also 
determine which identity is viewed as appropriate: “If the situation is defined as an economic 
transaction, for example, an individualistic orientation may appear reasonable, whereas a 
cooperative orientation may be more reasonable when the situation is defined as an ethical 
dilemma” (Tenbrunsel and Messick, 1999, p.687). Identity has been further demonstrated as 
important in social dilemma research. As examples, identifying with one’s ingroup (Chen et 
al., 2007, Kramer and Brewer, 1984) or pro-social social value orientations (Balliet, 2009, 
Bogaert et al., 2008) help explain cooperation in social dilemmas. 
 
2.3. Cooperation in social dilemmas 
Research on experimental and real world social dilemmas shows that people don’t 
always opt for the dominating strategy and thus non-cooperation, as predicted by Rational 
Choice Theory. Much research has been dedicated to understand the circumstances and 
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factors that result in people opting for cooperation instead. These circumstances and factors 
form the basis of a number of approaches that help increase levels of cooperation and 
therefore achieve the socially optimum outcome in social dilemmas. These approaches fall in 
one of three broad distinctive groups (Kollock, 1998): motivational, strategic and structural.  
2.3.1. Motivational approaches  
Motivational approaches lead an individual to weigh the collective outcome more 
strongly without changing the actual payoffs in the dilemma. The assumption behind these 
approaches is that individuals consider outcomes beyond their own immediate benefits, as 
described in the transformation process of Interdependence Theory (Rusbult and Van Lange, 
2003). If people weigh the collective outcome more strongly, they are motivated to increase 
collective benefits which increases the likelihood for cooperation (Dawes, 1980, Kollock, 
1998, Van Vugt, 1998). The positive effects of the motivational approaches outlined below 
are consistent with both Interdependence Theory and the Appropriateness Framework. 
2.3.1.1. Pro-social orientations  
Pro-social orientations can be assessed through different measures. Two of the most 
prominent measures are social value orientations and Schwartz’s self-transcendence values. 
Social value orientations describe “preferences for a particular distribution of outcomes to 
oneself and others” (Van Lange et al., 1992, p.19). A social value orientation which favours 
high outcomes for others (pro-social value orientation) increases the likelihood of cooperative 
choices in social dilemma situations (Bogaert et al., 2008). This was confirmed by a meta-
analyses of 82 studies on the relationship between different social value orientations and 
cooperation in social dilemmas (Balliet, 2009). The analysis further found that the positive 
effect of a pro-social value orientation is more pronounced in give-some games and if 
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participants are not paid for taking part in a study. Schwartz’s self-transcendence values 
describe a person’s tendency to value outcomes beyond the self, including outcomes for other 
people, and have been shown to increase cooperation in social dilemmas (Karp, 1996, Sagiv 
et al., 2011). However pro-social orientations are relatively stable (Bogaert et al., 2008) and 
difficult to alter. Although they are positive predictors of cooperative choices in social 
dilemmas, it is difficult to increase people’s pro-social orientation as an approach for 
achieving socially optimum outcomes. 
2.3.1.2. Group identity  
Strong group identification with the collective is also associated with higher levels of 
cooperation (Chen and Li, 2009, Chen et al., 2007, Kramer and Brewer, 1984) as it promotes 
the valuation of the collective outcome (De Cremer and Van Vugt, 1999). Group identity is 
fostered through either perceived similarities between oneself and other group members or 
perceived dissimilarity between one’s ingroup and an outgroup (e.g. Hogg and Knippenberg, 
2003). Thus group membership plays a vital role in group identity. Goette and colleagues 
(2006) conducted a real world experiment to test the impact of group membership on 
cooperation in social dilemmas. Results show that Swiss Army officers were significantly 
more likely to cooperate with members of their own platoon compared to out-group 
members, a clear effect of group membership (Goette et al., 2006). Eckel and Grossman 
(2005) investigated the effect of experimentally induced group identity and differences 
between weak and strong group identities. Creating a weak group identity by simply 
assigning different colours to teams did not alter levels of cooperation in a subsequent social 
dilemma game. But when a strong group identity was created through team building tasks, 
significant positive effects of group identity on cooperation were observed. 
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2.3.1.3. Moralization  
Dawes (1980) advocated moralization as a motivational approach to increase 
cooperation in social dilemmas (see also Hine and Gifford, 1997). Moralization results in a 
perception of non-cooperative choices as being immoral (because they create negative 
outcomes for others) and cooperative choices as being moral (Markowitz and Shariff, 2012). 
A number of studies have shown that free-riding in a social dilemma, or merely opting out of 
cooperation (without benefiting from the created public good) is moralised by others involved 
in the dilemma (Cubitt et al., 2011, Delton et al., 2013). These moral judgements and 
consequential punishments can change free-riding behaviour and thus increase cooperation in 
a social dilemma (Fehr and Gächter, 2000, Fehr and Gächter, 2002, Kiyonari and Barclay, 
2008). Moralization can also be a means to cooperation in itself, without the mechanism of 
punishment. In an early experiment Dawes and colleagues (1976) were able to demonstrate 
that emphasizing the moral and ethical implications of different choice behaviours in the 
instructions of a social dilemma game significantly increased cooperation. Since then a 
number of studies have confirmed the positive effect of accentuating moral considerations 
and the perception of ethical decision making in a social dilemma (Batson and Moran, 1999, 
Biel and Thøgersen, 2007, Tenbrunsel and Messick, 1999). However moralization might not 
increase cooperation for everyone. Smeesters and colleagues (2003) found that moralization 
in a social dilemma backfired for people with a consistent pro-self social value orientation 
(preferring a higher distribution of outcomes to themselves). Morality primes reduced 
cooperation amongst these individuals. 
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2.3.1.4. Communication  
A consistent finding within the social dilemma literature is the positive effect of 
communication between group members on cooperation (Balliet et al., 2009). 
Communication between group members may promote group identity and give the 
opportunity for moral persuasion, both motivational strategies which elicit positive effects on 
cooperation (Kollock, 1998).  
2.3.2. Strategic approaches  
In contrast to motivational approaches, strategic approaches for achieving socially 
optimum outcomes draw on the individual’s desire to maximise personal benefits. However, 
these personal benefits do not reflect the immediate outcomes described in Rational Choice 
Theory or as the ‘given situation’ in Interdependence Theory. Rather, they relate to long-term 
benefits and outcomes expected from long-term interactions and so reflect a transformation to 
an ‘effective situation’ (Rusbult and Van Lange, 2003). Like motivational approaches they do 
not require a change in payoffs (Kollock, 1998). 
2.3.2.1. Reciprocity 
Three conditions are necessary for reciprocity to occur: a) people involved in a social 
dilemma are faced with multiple interdependent interactions, either through multiple 
‘decision rounds’ in the same dilemma or through the prospect of interaction in future social 
dilemmas; b) identifiability of the individual decision maker (the possibility of public 
decisions and the association between decision and decision maker); and c) information about 
others’ past behaviour (Axelrod, 1984). Given those three conditions, individuals can expect 
others to reciprocate personal cooperation as well as personal non-cooperation in subsequent 
interactions. Therefore cooperation receives positive reinforcement from others, which 
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increases its relative attractiveness (e.g. Milinski et al., 2002b). Conversely, conditions that 
prevent reciprocity decrease cooperation. Kerr (1999) showed that anonymity of decisions 
(absence of condition b) decreases cooperation in situations where 1) a social expectation to 
cooperate exists; 2) others are perceived to be willing and able to sanction (reciprocate) non-
cooperation; and 3) decision makers want to avoid this sanction. Scholars distinguish ‘direct’ 
from ‘indirect’ reciprocity. Direct reciprocity is present when the same two individuals 
encounter each other in more than one decision. Individuals are thus able to directly 
reciprocate the other person’s behaviour in a past encounter. In indirect reciprocity the same 
two individuals need not encounter each other again. Instead past behaviour is translated into 
a reputation of being a non-cooperative or cooperative person. A bad reputation leads to 
others’ non-cooperative behaviour, a good reputation to cooperative behaviour (Nowak and 
Sigmund, 1998, Nowak and Sigmund, 2005). The potential for reciprocity has been shown to 
increase cooperation in social dilemmas (Carpenter and Matthews, 2004, Komorita et al., 
1991, Komorita et al., 1993). Milinski and colleagues (2002a), for example, were able to 
show that donating to a charity as part of a computerised social dilemma game resulted in 
indirect reciprocity. Donators received higher income from other players and their status 
increased. 
2.3.2.2. Communication  
Communication has already been listed as a motivational approach to increase 
cooperation through strengthening group identity and moralization. Communication between 
decision makers can further promote cooperation through sharing a successful solution and 
stating commitments to cooperate (Bornstein, 1992). Individuals may not be aware of the 
social interdependence, the threat of collective costs and the potential to achieve the socially 
optimum outcome through mutual cooperation. Through communication this awareness can 
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be increased, which can boost cooperation (Dhont et al., 2012). Communication further gives 
the opportunity to get a large majority to commit to mutual cooperation in order to achieve 
the socially optimum outcome (Bornstein, 1992, Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994). Thus a 
social norm to cooperate is created (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). But voluntary 
commitments without any monitoring and sanctioning system and with the attribute of 
anonymity carry the disadvantage that they are not binding. Individuals may even be more 
tempted to free-ride because all the others have committed to cooperate (Dawes, 1980). 
Despite this caveat the positive effect of communication on cooperation in social dilemmas is 
well documented and a meta-analysis found that face-to-face communication is superior to, 
for example, written communication and the communication-cooperation relationship is 
stronger for larger groups (Balliet, 2009). 
2.3.3. Structural approaches 
Structural approaches rely on a change in the objective payoffs for the individual in a 
social dilemma, either by increasing the benefits of cooperative choices or decreasing the 
benefits of non-cooperative choices (Kollock, 1998). Structural approaches are based on the 
assumptions of Rational Choice Theory that people want to increase their immediate personal 
benefits. 
2.3.3.1. Incentives and disincentives 
Individual payoffs in a social dilemma can be changed by creating incentives for 
engaging in cooperative behaviour (Dawes, 1980, Martichuski and Bell, 1991, Stern, 1976, 
Van Vugt, 1998). Through incentives the personal benefits of cooperative behaviour and thus 
the probability to opt for the cooperative choice increase (Kollock, 1998). Incentives can be 
of various forms: monetary, social status and reputation, convenience or positive feelings.  
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Whereas incentives aim to increase the attractiveness of cooperative choices, 
disincentives decrease the attractiveness of non-cooperative choices (Dawes, 1980, Hardin, 
1968, Perino et al., 2011, Van Vugt, 1998). In most real life cases they are monetary (e.g. 
Sterner, 2007). A study on water usage showed that a fixed water tariff, where the costs are 
paid by the collective, resulted in higher water usage compared to a variable tariff. A variable 
tariff creates a monetary disincentive to water usage as consumers pay the increased water 
costs themselves (Van Vugt, 2001). Disincentives can also take the form of social shame and 
loss of status or increased inconvenience of the non-cooperative behaviour (Ouwerkerk et al., 
2005, e.g. Verhoef et al., 1995). Hardin (1968) strongly advocated for the implementation of 
disincentives such as taxes. 
The problem with both incentives and disincentives is their financing. To encourage a 
majority of people to cooperate through incentives is a very costly undertaking (Dawes, 
1980). Disincentives such as taxes require costly monitoring and sanctioning systems 
(Kaplow, 1990). For that reason the provision of incentives and disincentives have been 
described as second order dilemmas (Van Vugt and Shakespeare, 1998, Yamagishi, 1992), as 
financing these measures resembles a social dilemma in itself. 
Furthermore, the psychological literature emphasises that the effect of incentives and 
disincentives may only last for the duration of their presence (Van Vugt, 1998, Kohn, 1999). 
So while these measures might be feasible in situations where a single cooperative decision is 
required, they might be less viable for influencing repeated choices. In addition, external 
incentives and disincentives may risk undermining internal motivations to cooperate (Bowles, 
2008, Mulder et al., 2006, Perino et al., 2011). Incentives can also backfire and decrease 
cooperation if they signal self-interested behaviour as appropriate or suggest distrust or 
disrespect (Bowles, 2008). Perino and colleagues (2011) showed that this motivational 
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crowding out is specifically elicited through monetary disincentives in social dilemma 
situations. Additionally, disincentives may promote an individual perspective of the problem 
(e.g. “It is ok to overuse the resource because I am paying an adequate penalty for it”) (e.g. 
Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000). Disincentives (‘push’ measures) are less popular and 
considered less acceptable than incentives (‘pull’ measures) by the public as they are seen as 
more intrusive and coercive (Cherry et al., 2012, De Groot and Schuitema, 2012, Van Vugt, 
1998). 
The experimental social dilemma literature has found that punishment (disincentives) 
is generally more effective than rewards (incentives), but a combination of rewards and 
punishments is even more successful in promoting cooperation (Milinski and Rockenbach, 
2012, Sefton et al., 2007, Sigmund, 2007). 
2.3.3.2. Privatization 
Another approach to common resource dilemmas is the privatization of the resource 
(Hardin, 1968, Kollock, 1998). Every person involved in the dilemma receives a share of the 
resource and is then responsible for its maintenance. Privatisation is reflected in individual 
property rights, where an individual holds all rights to a resource and can exclude others from 
using this resource (Ostrom et al., 1999). If people deplete their personal share of the 
resource, they cannot harvest anymore. Property rights prevent them from harvesting other 
people’s private resources. Privatization of the resource ends social interdependence and thus 
the social dilemma (Van Vugt, 1998). The privatization approach can also be subject to 
problems (Kollock, 1998). The assignment of the resource share can cause problems if the 
resource is not homogenous. The enforcement of private property rights requires a costly 
monitoring and sanctioning system. Sometimes privatization is not an option because the 
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resource cannot be divided amongst individuals, as in the case of fish that move around in the 
sea (Hardin, 1968).  
2.3.3.3. Rules and regulations 
Another option to govern a common resource are rules and regulations (e.g. Ostrom, 
1999), such as prohibiting non-cooperative behaviour as illegal, rationing the resource, or 
establishing quotas (determining the amount of the resource that everyone is permitted to 
harvest). A real world example is in Marine Protected Areas, where fishing is not permitted 
to ensure replenishment of fish stock (Roberts et al., 2001). These coercive measures require 
a monitoring and sanctioning system to impose the rules. Sanctioning systems are another 
measure advocated by Hardin (1968) and he promoted it together with taxes as the way to 
avoid collective costs in common resource dilemmas. While Hardin (1968) saw “mutual 
coercion, mutually agreed on by the majority of the people affected” (Hardin, 1968) as the 
only way out of the tragedy of the commons, Dawes (1980) spoke strongly against the 
introduction of coercive measures because of the cost intensiveness of required sanctioning 
systems. Additionally he suspected that they may elicit motivations to get around them. Both 
Hardin and Dawes expressed concern about the power handed over to the authority in charge 
of monitoring and sanctioning.  
Ostrom’s research highlights that no single rule or regulation fits all social dilemmas 
(Ostrom et al., 1999). She saw every policy, rule or regulation to govern a common resource 
as an experiment. Based on extensive field research she concluded that the effectiveness of 
any rule or regulation is increased if it originates from within the collective rather than being 
superimposed by an authority (Ostrom, 1999). In many real world social dilemmas, people 
affected by the outcome of the dilemma have created their own community based solutions 
(communal ownership patterns) to achieve the socially optimum outcome (Ostrom et al., 
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1999). Ostrom thus showed that “private ownership or central governmental control are not 
the only means for solving [social dilemmas]" (Ostrom, 1985). Experimental evidence 
confirms that structural approaches may be especially effective when administered by 
members of the collective, in contrast to an authority (Balliet et al., 2011). 
Ostrom and other scholars also broadened the scope of their research to global social 
dilemmas such as climate change mitigation (Dietz et al., 2003, Ostrom et al., 1999). This 
research recognises the complexity of dilemmas at a global scale while drawing on lessons 
learnt from successful governance systems for local and national dilemmas. Ostrom argued 
that global dilemmas require a ‘polycentric’ approach: structural governance approaches to 
increase cooperation on multiple levels, from small (local) and medium up to global (Ostrom, 
2009).
 
2.4. The social dilemma of climate change mitigation 
The previous sections have provided an overview of social dilemma definitions, 
behaviour in social dilemmas, and approaches for achieving socially optimum outcomes. This 
thesis focuses on one specific social dilemma: the social dilemma of climate change 
mitigation. 
Mitigating climate change has been identified as “a social dilemma on an 
unprecedented scale” (Hasson et al., 2010, p.331). Anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse 
gases are the major cause of climate change (IPCC, 2013). Climate change is predicted to 
result in highly negative consequences for a majority of people on earth through an increase 
in weather extremes, causing flooding and droughts; and a rise in sea-levels, increasing the 
flood and erosion risk of coastal areas (IPCC, 2014a). To avoid the collective cost of a 
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warming planet, mitigation is required by different actors at different levels, including 
personal actions by individuals (e.g. Hillman, 2004, IPCC, 2014b). From an individual’s 
perspective the mitigation of climate change exhibits all outlined characteristics of a social 
dilemma (e.g. Milinski et al., 2006). In the mitigation dilemma a non-cooperative choice 
takes the form of high emission behaviours (not taking action to address climate change), 
whereas the cooperative choice means engaging in low emission behaviours (taking action to 
address climate change) (Horton and Doron, 2011, Raihani and Aitken, 2011). Non-
cooperative behaviours, such as air travel, car driving, home heating or meat consumption, 
result in immediate benefits for the individual. For example, they may be more convenient or 
more subjectively pleasant than the cooperative alternative. Non-cooperation thus represents 
the individually rational choice. At the same time it contributes to a negative collective 
outcome in the form of climate change. The outlined social dilemma perspective presents a 
simplification of choices with emission consequences: as mentioned in chapter one many 
other factors influence these choices. The presented perspective specifically highlights the 
social dilemma structure of climate change mitigation. 
The climate change mitigation dilemma has been described in different forms in the 
relevant literature. The main differences lie in definitions of the collective and whether it is 
outlined as a common resource or a public good dilemma. 
Three different definitions of the collective exist: 1) the collective as the world 
population, therefore a collective of over 7 billion decision makers (Goeschl and Perino, 
2012, Horton and Doron, 2011, Milinski et al., 2006, Staats et al., 1996); 2) a collective of 
companies as decision makers (Tsur and Zemel, 2008); 3) a collective of countries as 
decision makers (Barrett, 2013, Hasson et al., 2010). In the first two definitions the 
cooperative choice equates to personal or corporative actions to address climate change. In 
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the third definition decisions are made on a political level focusing on environmental policies 
and international negotiations. Here signing a binding climate change treaty or implementing 
stricter climate change policies classify as cooperative choices. 
 Various authors formulate climate change mitigation as a public good dilemma. Here 
the cost of mitigation is the monetary or legislative contribution that has to be made and 
climate change mitigation is the public good that needs to be provided (Goeschl and Perino, 
2012, Hasson et al., 2010). Contributions could be investments in technologies such as 
carbon capture or in incentives for mitigation efforts. This public good interpretation is most 
suitable to describe the political level of climate change mitigation. Others have offered a 
common resource dilemma interpretation of climate change mitigation (Horton and Doron, 
2011, Lozano, 2007, Raihani and Aitken, 2011, Staats et al., 1996, Tsur and Zemel, 2008). In 
this interpretation the common resource can be defined as the emission budget available to all 
humans. The emission budget represents the amount of greenhouse gases we can emit when 
aiming to limit global warming to 2 °C throughout the twenty-first century (Meinshausen et 
al., 2009). With every behaviour that emits further greenhouse gases into the atmosphere we 
‘harvest’ from this common resource. Framing climate change mitigation as a common 
resource dilemma may have beneficial effects on cooperation, as cooperation is at least 
initially higher in common resource dilemmas as compared to public good dilemmas 
(McCusker and Carnevale, 1995, Sell and Son, 1997). The common resource interpretation is 
better suitable than the public good interpretation to describe an individual’s perspective of 
climate change mitigation. Not all of the literature on climate change mitigation as a social 
dilemma clearly distinguishes between a public good or common resource definition (Hasson 
et al., 2010, Milinski et al., 2006, Newell et al., 2014, Santos and Pacheco, 2011).  
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2.4.1. Characteristics of the mitigation dilemma 
The climate change mitigation dilemma has a variety of distinctive characteristics that 
often add to the difficulty of achieving mutual cooperation. 
1) Avoiding a loss. In the mitigation dilemma mutual cooperation does not result in an 
additional gain, but provides the collective with the socially optimum outcome of avoiding a 
loss (Hasson et al., 2010, Ostrom, 2009). While cooperation in the mitigation dilemma may 
result in other potential gains for the collective, the central positive outcome of mutual 
cooperation will be to avoid losses created by dangerous climate change. According to 
prospect theory people tend to overvalue losses and undervalue comparable gains (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979). The emphasis on loss avoidance may therefore be a factor fostering 
cooperation in the climate change mitigation dilemma (Raihani and Aitken, 2011).  
2) Emissions as a by-product. One distinct characteristic of the mitigation dilemma is 
that ‘harvesting’ from the emission budget is not the objective but occurs as a by-product of 
behaviour that pursues other objectives (Horton and Doron, 2011). When people take a flight, 
they don’t aim to ‘harvest’ from the emission budget, they simply want to get to a distant 
place quickly, cheaply and conveniently. People may not even be aware of the effects of their 
choices on the collective outcome with regards to climate change. Gifford (2011) identifies 
this lack of awareness - in his terms ignorance - as one of the barriers to actions on climate 
change. Burke (2001) argues that most people are not well enough informed about the 
collective cost in the climate change mitigation dilemma to be aware of the social dilemma 
structure. The situation may be perceived as a pure decision problem without any social 
interdependence (Burke, 2001). Therefore people may be less likely to transform the ‘given 
situation’ of immediate outcomes for themselves into an ‘effective situation’ (including 
others and more long-term outcomes) or to identify the situation as being moral. 
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3) Size of the collective. The collective in the climate change mitigation dilemma can 
be countries, companies or individuals. On the individual level the collective encompasses all 
human beings (Horton and Doron, 2011, Milinski et al., 2006, Staats et al., 1996). The 
emission budget is accessible for any person on earth to ‘harvest’ from. A large number of 
studies have shown the important role of the size of the collective for cooperation in social 
dilemmas. Although studies find that cooperation decreases with group size, it is often not a 
straight forward effect of the number of people involved, but depends on the specific 
characteristics of a social dilemma (Franzen, 1994, Isaac and Walker, 1988, Oliver and 
Marwell, 1988, Poteete and Ostrom, 2004). The size of the collective may have important 
implications for group identity, which forms a motivational approach to increase cooperation. 
An experiment by Ellemers and colleagues (1999) showed that participants identified more 
strongly with a smaller minority group, compared to a larger majority group (Ellemers et al., 
1999). However this finding (like other findings on group size) comes from an experiment 
comparing very small groups (group size of eight for large groups). The large and diverse 
collective in the mitigation dilemma underlies several of the characteristics outlined below: it 
increases anonymity and social uncertainty, personal insignificance, the social trap and social 
distance.  
4) Anonymity of the decision makers. Anonymity of decisions decreases cooperation 
under certain conditions as it prevents direct or indirect reciprocity (Kerr, 1999). In the 
mitigation dilemma many decisions are made in private and are thus anonymous. How much 
meat we eat or how much energy we use in our homes is largely private, a characteristic that 
is likely to decrease cooperative behaviour. 
5) Social uncertainty. Due to social interdependence in social dilemmas, personal 
outcomes depend on the choices of others. Those choices and therefore the likelihood of 
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achieving a socially optimum outcome cannot be predicted with certainty. Thus social 
dilemmas are subject to high social uncertainty (Aitken, 2009, e.g. Raihani and Aitken, 
2011). In the mitigation dilemma social uncertainty is especially high due to the large size 
and diversity of the collective. Social uncertainty increases the likelihood of opting for the 
non-cooperative choice (Biel and Gärling, 1995, Staats et al., 1996). Communication between 
decision makers is an approach to decrease social uncertainty (Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland, 
1994), but is difficult to apply in the mitigation dilemma due to the large collective. 
6) Personal insignificance. Choices made by a single individual have a negligible 
influence on the world’s climate. If a single individual decides to cooperate and take actions 
to address climate change, he or she will not make a significant difference in terms of 
mitigation outcomes (Aitken et al., 2011). Thus the mitigation dilemma is particularly 
characterised by personal insignificance. This has been shown to decrease cooperation in 
social dilemmas (De Cremer and van Dijk, 2002, Kerr, 1996). One social dilemma game 
found that the smaller a person’s possible contribution to a public good, the less likely it 
became that they cooperated and contributed to the public good (Kerr, 1992).  
7) Spatial trap. A further characteristic of the mitigation dilemma is that tangible 
collective costs are more likely to occur in places spatially distant from the decision makers. 
This is known as the spatial trap (Osbaldiston and Sheldon, 2002). The highest per capita 
emissions are from industrialised countries (e.g. Olivier et al., 2012) while the most severe 
negative consequences of climate change are expected to occur initially in subtropical 
developing countries (IPCC, 2014a). The spatial trap promotes free-riding and therefore non-
cooperation, as decision makers in developed countries bear an even smaller fraction of the 
collective cost (Lorenzoni et al., 2007). Additionally distant risks are known to be 
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undervalued (Gifford, 2011). Thus a potential distant collective cost will be perceived as a 
lower risk compared to a potential collective cost in close proximity. 
8) Temporal trap. Although the consequences of a warming climate can already be 
observed today, more severe negative consequences are predicted to occur in the future 
(IPCC, 2014a). The conflict arising in the mitigation dilemma is therefore expanded to one 
between short term personal outcomes and long-term collective outcomes (Osbaldiston and 
Sheldon, 2002). The temporal trap also promotes non-cooperative decisions (Horton and 
Doron, 2011, Kortenkamp and Moore, 2006, Lorenzoni et al., 2007). Temporal discounting 
means outcomes in the far future are discounted in terms of their personal payoffs (Frederick, 
2006, Gifford, 2011). In the climate change mitigation dilemma the temporal trap can even 
mean that collective outcomes will affect future generations rather than the individuals 
making cooperative or non-cooperative decisions in the present. 
9) Social distance. As a result of the spatial and temporal trap, those bearing a higher 
fraction of the collective costs are socially distant from the decision makers in industrialised 
countries creating those costs (Spence et al., 2012). Social distance in turn encourages 
psychological discounting: less importance is given to the outcomes for the collective and 
others (Jones and Rachlin, 2006). The resulting lower value assigned to the collective and 
others’ outcomes leads to a decrease in cooperation (e.g. Kollock, 1998). 
10) Environmental uncertainty. The collective cost in the mitigation dilemma refers to 
negative consequences of climate change. Many aspects of this collective cost are subject to a 
high amount of uncertainty and the exact consequences of a changing climate, regional 
impacts and time scales are difficult to predict (Lorenzoni et al., 2005, Maslin and Austin, 
2012). In addition the avoidance of climate change through mitigation efforts can only be 
predicted probabilistically (Meinshausen et al., 2009). Environmental uncertainty increases 
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the rationale for non-cooperative behaviour (Van Vugt and Shakespeare, 1998). In summary 
non-cooperation is promoted as a) the collective cost is highly uncertain; b) the collective 
cost may not be tangible within an individual’s lifetime (see also temporal trap); c) it is not 
clear if mutual cooperation can ensure the socially optimum outcome (Hasson et al., 2010, 
Horton and Doron, 2011, Staats et al., 1996). 
11) Heterogeneity in ‘harvest rates’ (the amount of CO2 emitted = the amount 
‘harvested’ from the emission budget). The ‘harvested’ amount of the emission budget is 
highly heterogeneous, both between countries (Olivier et al., 2012) and between individuals 
within countries (Gough et al., 2011). Differences in ‘harvest rates’ between decision makers 
can form the basis for reciprocity, moralization and punishment - high emitters can be 
sanctioned by low emitters. The application of these approaches depends on a reference point 
perceived by others involved in a social dilemma. Compared to high emitters in industrialised 
countries individual choices may be perceived as highly cooperative, but compared to per 
capita emissions in many developing countries, the same choices may be perceived as non-
cooperative. 
2.4.2. The social dilemma structure of climate change mitigation and actions to 
address climate change 
The social dilemma structure of climate change mitigation has been argued to 
discourage actions to mitigate climate change as these are inconsistent with self-interested 
(non-cooperative) responses to the dilemma. Tavoni and colleagues (2011) describe 
international efforts to contain “the rise in global mean temperature” as a public good and 
state the “disconnect between individual and collective interest is a prime cause of public 
goods underprovision.” (p.11825). Similarly, Wood (2011) and Raihani and Aitken (2011) 
identify free-riding incentives as a major difficulty with regards to global cooperation to act 
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on climate change. Irwin (2009) describes the pessimistic view that due to the social dilemma 
structure of climate change mitigation “national governments acting in the interests of 
rational and self-interested citizens seem unlikely to do much to reduce emissions in their 
respective countries.” However, he notes that voluntary actions to address climate change by 
individuals, businesses and countries as well as research on social dilemmas in general show 
that cooperation in these dilemma situations does occur. Irwin explains cooperation (in the 
absence of structural approaches) through a combination of direct and indirect reciprocity and 
cooperative norms. Staats and colleagues (1996) evaluated a 1990 Dutch climate change 
mass media campaign. The media campaign aimed to increase problem awareness and 
knowledge of climate change as a means of increasing actions to address climate change and 
the perceived necessity for climate change policies. The researchers used a pre-post 
questionnaire design to assess people’s views before and after the campaign was run. The 
questionnaire contained a number of items derived from a social dilemma perspective of 
climate change mitigation. These items focused on people’s contributions to climate change 
mitigation and their perception of others’ contributions. The study found the campaign to be 
ineffective in increasing actions and policy approval. Staats and colleagues interpret the 
failing of the mass media campaign from a social dilemma perspective: “If it remains 
uncertain whether other parties contribute to help preventing the greenhouse effect, people 
will see their own efforts as wasted. It is unlikely that citizens will be willing to sacrifice 
some of their personal comfort if not only the collective goals to strive for (i.e. the prevention 
of ecological disaster) but also the contributions made by other parties are surrounded by so 
much uncertainty.” (Staats et al., 1996, p.200). 
Two studies directly tested this argued negative effect of the social dilemma structure 
on actions to address climate change. Aitken and colleagues (Aitken et al., 2011) identified 
the social dilemma structure and related feelings of powerlessness as psychological barriers 
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to individual action. They asked members of the public in New Zealand to fill out a paper-
based questionnaire assessing knowledge and perceptions of climate change as well as 
actions to address climate change (“Have you changed your actions partly due to 
considerations of climate change?”). The questionnaire then asks about the importance of 
different factors in shaping actions on climate change including personal costs, perceptions of 
powerlessness (e.g. “The feeling that my contribution is just a drop in the ocean and so is 
insignificant”), and perceptions related to the commons dilemma (e.g. “Unfairness associated 
with bearing the cost of change while others do not”). Results revealed that perceptions of 
powerlessness and the commons dilemma predicted low levels of action on climate change. 
Franzen (1995) analysed data from survey in Germany that assessed different forms of pro-
environmental behaviour as well as perceptions of the social dilemma structure of climate 
change mitigation. Franzen combined items asking about perceptions of powerlessness and 
the free-rider problem to a dilemma awareness scale. This dilemma awareness had a small 
negative effect on pro-environmental behaviour. In contrast to this negative effect of dilemma 
awareness participants predominantly (83%) agreed with the statement that they would act 
environmentally friendly, regardless of what other people do. 
These questionnaire studies confirm the argument that the social dilemma structure of 
climate change mitigation discourages actions to address climate change. However, the 
questionnaire items make the social dilemma structure salient to participants, increasing the 
awareness of this structure. Qualitative studies that explore people’s perceptions and actions 
on climate change without making social dilemma characteristics salient suggest a more 
complex effect of the social dilemma structure. 
A number of these qualitative studies suggest that people are not always aware of the 
social dilemma structure of climate change mitigation, especially in the domain of travel 
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behaviour. Through focus groups Hares and colleagues (2010) explored people’s awareness 
of the impacts of travel decisions on climate change, thus the collective cost of individual 
travel decisions. Findings suggest that collective cost of climate change is rarely considered 
in holiday planning: “Even though climate change was clearly the main topic of discussion, 
not one of the participants identified climate change, or even environmental concerns in 
general, as a factor they consider when making decisions about their holidays.” (Hares et al., 
2010, p.3-4). Predominant considerations are personal costs and benefits such as cost and 
travel time. At some point researchers instigated a discussion about the effects of travel 
behaviour on climate change. Participants only then justified their high emission behaviour 
with a notion of powerlessness (amongst other justifications), therefore relating to the social 
dilemma structure of climate change mitigation. Line and colleagues’ (2010) focus group 
study on travel intentions of young people (aged 11 – 18) produced similar findings. Young 
people’s focus is on individual benefits of travel behaviour. The desire to drive and issues 
around self-image, identity and social recognition dominate behaviour intentions. The link 
between travel behaviour and the collective cost of climate change was little understood by 
participants. Higham and colleagues (2014) explored people’s awareness of climate change in 
three different European countries (Norway, United Kingdom and Germany). The researchers 
were especially interested in the “flyers dilemma”, the conflict between personal benefits and 
collective, climate related, costs of leisure flights. Qualitative interviews with participants 
revealed that people are aware of the collective climate costs of individual domestic 
behaviour such as driving and heating, although not all participants perceived a personal 
responsibility to change these actions in order to address climate change. A common theme 
was a feeling of insignificance of personal actions for the mitigation of climate change. A 
general view was that actions to address climate change on a daily basis had to be 
“convenient and cost effective” (Higham et al., 2014, p.15), highlighting the need for actions 
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on climate change to align with personal interests. With regards to the “flyers dilemma”, 
Higham and colleagues found that especially UK participants were happy to ignore and deny 
the collective costs of flying given the large personal benefits.  
These findings from qualitative studies suggest that people may not necessarily be 
aware of the collective costs of emission behaviours, when these collective costs are not 
made salient. Viewing this argument in the light of Interdependence Theory, people may fail 
to transform the ‘given situation’ into an ‘effective situation’ in which the collective cost is 
taken into account. 
Two qualitative research studies explored the role of the social dilemma structure of 
climate change mitigation on actions to address climate change. In contrast to the two 
reported questionnaire studies however, they did not specifically focus on testing the negative 
effect of the social dilemma structure. Horton and Doron’s (2011) research explored whether 
people’s sense of fairness increased actions to address climate change. The researchers 
provided different prompts during focus groups, including information on the link between 
people’s behaviours, emissions and climate change as well as differences in people’s 
emissions related behaviour. Some participants were also provided with a social dilemma 
perspective on climate change mitigation: the emission budget was introduced as a scarce 
resource. Findings showed that the presentation of this dilemma perspective triggered strong 
notions of fairness in participants. These notions of fairness can be powerful drivers to 
change attitudes about consumptions and approval of climate change policies. For example, 
participants approved of polices as a way to prevent free riding and to achieve a fair 
distribution of the burden to mitigate. 
Capstick (2013) investigated people’s understanding of climate change as a social 
dilemma, drawing on different qualitative data sets on perceptions of climate change. He 
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analysed the occurrence of a social dilemma frame in participants’ answers and found 
evidence of numerous themes relating to the social dilemma structure of climate change 
mitigation. Among these are references to a self-interested human nature and the self-
interested nation, which fails to act for the collective good. Another common theme centres 
around the insignificance of individual actions and the necessity for others to act. Thus the 
social dilemma structure of climate change mitigation is often “associated with a sense of 
resignation, fatalism and lack of agency” (Capstick, 2013, p.3490). However, the research 
also reveals a number of cooperative considerations as a response to the social dilemma 
structure. Participants reported acting on climate change because of an obligation to do their 
bit as part of a collective response. Capstick thus reveals ways in which “both a social 
dilemma framing and an ‘anti’-dilemma counter position […] support rationales either for 
action or inaction on climate change at a personal level.” (Capstick, 2013, p.3492). Capstick 
further designed a questionnaire to quantify these two opposing responses to the social 
dilemma of climate change mitigation. On the one side 30% of respondents agreed or 
strongly agreed with the statement “The actions of a single person don’t make any difference 
in tackling climate change” and 13% agreed or strongly agreed with the statement “There is 
no point in me doing anything about climate change because no one else is”. On the other 
side 41% agreed or strongly agreed with the statement “If each of us did our bit to help, we 
could put an end to the problems of climate change”. How the agreement or disagreement 
with these statements relates to respondents’ own actions to address climate change was not 
assessed. 
Overall, research on the effect of the social dilemma structure of climate change 
mitigation on individual actions to address climate change is limited and inconclusive. The 
assumption that people are aware of the social dilemma structure of climate change 
mitigation is contradicted by qualitative research. The argument that the social dilemma 
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structure reduces actions on climate change is supported by a number of quantitative and 
qualitative studies. However, qualitative studies show evidence of a set of cooperative 
considerations in response to the social dilemma structure, such as fairness notions. They 
further suggest a potential motivating effect of these cooperative considerations. This 
suggested effect has not been formally tested.
 
2.5. Knowledge gaps 
There is a considerable amount of knowledge and research on behaviour in social 
dilemmas and how this can be applied to the social dilemma of climate change mitigation. 
Based on the literature it is clear that the predictions of Rational Choice Theory do not always 
reflect reality. A variety of person characteristics and circumstances lead to a higher level of 
cooperation. Based on this finding, approaches have been developed to further increase 
cooperation and ensure the achievement of socially optimum outcomes in social dilemmas. 
Many of the insights on approaches for increasing cooperation are from experimental or lab 
studies under controlled conditions. It is generally difficult to predict if such approaches can 
be applied to real world decision making. Further research is needed to identify which 
approaches to achieve mutual cooperation are best applicable to different real world social 
dilemmas.  
Climate change mitigation is an especially complex social dilemma. Because 
emissions are only a by-product of a multitude of behaviours relating to cooperation and non-
cooperation, it is not clear if the social dilemma structure is obvious to people. The question 
that arises is whether people perceive a conflict between personal and collective outcomes 
with regards to behaviours with emission consequences. Interdependence Theory as well as 
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the Appropriateness Framework emphasise the importance of the situational structure and 
how situations are interpreted with regards to behaviour in social dilemmas. The lack of 
knowledge about whether people are aware of the social dilemma structure of climate change 
mitigation needs addressing. 
It is also unclear whether people engage in a transformation process in the climate 
change mitigation dilemma to transform the ‘given situation’ based purely on immediate 
outcomes for themselves. Findings from qualitative research on climate change and emission 
behaviours suggest that people may not be aware of the collective cost of certain emission 
behaviours, especially in the area of travel decisions. 
The transformation process in social dilemma situations in general and especially with 
regards to the mitigation dilemma is currently not sufficiently understood. With regards to the 
climate change mitigation dilemma, some elements of the transformation process have 
received more research attention. The positive effect of pro-social orientations and a 
consideration of future consequences on personal actions to address climate change have 
been studied in more detail. Conversely, considerations and emotional responses to the social 
dilemma situation are not well understood. These considerations and emotional responses 
directly guide the transformation to an ‘effective situation’, which then determines behaviour 
in social dilemma situations. It is important to understand how these antecedents of 
cooperative and non-cooperative choices affect behaviour in the climate change mitigation 
dilemma. Two studies have been reported that directly assess the effect of considerations 
relating to the dilemma structure of climate change mitigation on actions to address climate 
change (Aitken et al., 2011, Franzen, 1995). However, these studies have limited the 
assessment to a set of negative, non-cooperative perceptions such as powerlessness and free-
riding. Both studies failed to include other, cooperative considerations relating to the 
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dilemma structure. Examples of cooperative considerations are fairness or a contribution to a 
collective effort as described by Horton and Doron (2011) and Capstick (2013). A 
comprehensive assessment of both non-cooperative and cooperative considerations in 
response to the social dilemma of climate change mitigation and their influence on personal 
actions to address climate change is missing.
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3. Research approach 
Climate change mitigation has been described as probably the greatest social dilemma 
ever faced (Milinski et al., 2006). The situational structure of such an interdependent situation 
is an important predictor of behaviour (Van Lange and Rusbult, 2012). As outlined before, 
the situational structure of a social dilemma is characterised by a socially optimum outcome 
(achievable through mutual cooperation), non-cooperation as the dominating strategy and the 
social interdependence of the situation. The aim of this thesis is to understand people’s 
considerations in response to the social dilemma structure of climate change mitigation and 
how these considerations affect people’s actions on climate change. 
Much of our knowledge on people’s behaviours in social dilemmas is based on games 
and experiments under controlled conditions. In these experiments the social dilemma 
structure of the situation is clearly outlined to participants. For example, participants in a 
common resource dilemma game are informed that all participants will lose their personal 
benefits if the common resource cannot be sustained (Dorfman et al., 2014). Awareness of 
the social dilemma structure is a given in these studies, but cannot be assumed in real life 
situations. Interdependence Theory (Kelley and Thibaut, 1978) also outlines how people may 
not be fully aware of the social dilemma structure of a situation. They may at first only 
perceive a ‘given situation’, which reflects purely immediate personal outcomes, not 
including collective costs and benefits. This may especially be the case in the complex 
climate change mitigation dilemma with characteristics such as emissions as a by-product, a 
spatial and temporal trap or environmental and social uncertainty. For example, research on 
travel behaviour suggests that people show little consideration of the climate change 
implications of different travel modes (Higham et al., 2014, Hares et al., 2010, Line et al., 
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2010). A key question is: To what extent are people aware of the conflict between personal 
and collective benefits when they encounter everyday choices with emission consequences? 
 Objective 1: To determine people’s awareness of the social dilemma structure 
of climate change mitigation. 
It has been argued that the social dilemma structure of climate change mitigation 
decreases individual actions to address climate change (Aitken et al., 2011). This is because 
the social dilemma structure may trigger considerations related to the temptation to free-ride, 
non-cooperation resulting in the highest personal payoffs and characteristics more specific to 
the climate change mitigation dilemma such as the personal insignificance of individual 
decision makers. But a social dilemma also includes characteristics that may trigger 
cooperative considerations. Considerations related to a fair distribution of actions to address 
climate change or a contribution to a successful collective response are examples (Horton and 
Doron, 2011, Capstick, 2013). This thesis aims to create a comprehensive set of 
considerations which can be triggered by the social dilemma structure of climate change 
mitigation. 
 Objective 2: To determine people’s cooperative and non-cooperative 
considerations in response to the social dilemma structure of climate change 
mitigation. 
In a subsequent step the thesis aims to establish the link between these cooperative 
and non-cooperative considerations and people’s actions to address climate change. On the 
one hand, cognitions relating to the powerlessness of the individual or the incentives for free-
riding could decrease individual actions to address climate change. As outlined in chapter 2, 
these non-cooperative considerations are frequently used as an explanation for a lack of 
actions to address climate change (e.g. Aitken et al., 2011, Staats et al., 1996). On the other 
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hand a second set of cooperative considerations relating to the social dilemma structure may 
increase cooperation. The effects of personal actions on others can lead to a moralisation of 
the situation (Dawes, 1980). Interdependence Theory (Kelley and Thibaut, 1978) describes 
how a consideration of the effects on others can transform a ‘given situation’, which is purely 
focused on immediate personal benefits, to an ‘effective situation’ which may increase 
cooperation. Similarly the Appropriateness Framework states the importance of whether or 
not people perceive a situation as a moral situation or not (March and Olsen, 2004). In 
addition to theories on behaviour in social dilemmas, theories on pro-environmental 
behaviour also stress the importance of considering others affected by personal decisions. 
The Norm Activation Model (Schwartz, 1977) and Value Belief Norm Theory (Stern et al., 
1999), both of which are frequently applied to explain pro-environmental behaviour, predict 
that moral norms are activated in individuals who are aware of a threat to others and accept a 
responsibility to prevent these negative consequences for others. In both the Norm Activation 
Model and Value Belief Norm Theory, an increased consideration of these negative effects 
on others is predicted to increase pro-environmental behaviour. The findings of a meta-
analysis on factors influencing pro-environmental behaviours confirms that “pro-
environmental behaviour is probably best viewed as a mixture of self-interest (e.g., to pursue 
a strategy that minimises one's own health risk) and of concern for other people, the next 
generation, other species, or whole eco-systems (e.g., preventing air pollution that may cause 
risks for others’ health and/or the global climate).” (Bamberg and Möser, 2007, p.15). The 
literature review and knowledge gaps show that the link between cooperative considerations 
and actions on climate change remains under researched. A combined assessment of both sets 
of considerations, cooperative and non-cooperative, and their relationship with actions on 
climate change has not been done before. The resulting knowledge gap is addressed through 
the novel empirical research set out in this thesis. 
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 Objective 3: To determine how cooperative and non-cooperative 
considerations in response to the social dilemma structure of climate change 
mitigation affect personal actions to address climate change. 
If a set of cooperative considerations is associated with an increase in personal actions 
to address climate change, this could have implications for efforts to promote mitigation on a 
personal level. These cooperative considerations could potentially be used in communication 
campaigns to increase actions to address climate change. This thesis explores the potential to 
encourage actions on climate change through messages based on cooperative considerations. 
 Objective 4: To determine whether communication based on cooperative 
considerations can increase personal actions to address climate change. 
The thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter four tests awareness of the social dilemma structure and its effect on 
behaviour through an online study. The first part of the study explores whether people are 
aware of the social dilemma structure of everyday situations and therefore addresses 
objective one of the thesis. Participants were presented with a number of different social 
dilemma situations. Participants’ consideration of characteristics that define social dilemmas 
in their decision making was assessed through two different assessment methods: open-ended 
questions and a hierarchy ranking task. This determined whether participants included 
considerations of the conflict between personal and collective benefits in their decision 
making. Answers to open-ended questions also provide an initial indication of people’s 
considerations in response to social dilemmas, and are therefore relevant to objective two of 
this thesis. 
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In the second part of the study a framing manipulation was administered to test the 
effects of a salient collective outcome on participants’ actions to address climate change. This 
framing manipulation is a first exploration of the relationship between cooperative 
considerations relating to the social dilemma structure and action on climate change, and so 
addresses objective three of this thesis. This social dilemma framing is compared to no 
information about climate change and purely factual information about climate change. 
While chapter four tests people’s awareness of social dilemmas, the use of open-
ended questions meant that only a limited set of the most salient considerations in response to 
different social dilemmas was assessed. Chapter five develops a comprehensive set of 
potential considerations to the social dilemma of climate change mitigation. This set is based 
on findings from chapter four and research literature reviewed in chapter two on social 
dilemmas in general and on the social dilemma structure of climate change mitigation 
specifically. The set includes both considerations that are expected to promote cooperation 
(cooperative considerations) and considerations that are expected to foster non-cooperation 
(non-cooperative considerations), and so addresses objective two of this thesis. As examples, 
cooperative considerations include considerations of collective outcomes and outcomes for 
others, and non-cooperative considerations include a focus on immediate personal benefits or 
the temptation to free-ride. Chapter five further reports an online questionnaire study which 
addresses objective three of this thesis. The study tests how both cooperative and non-
cooperative considerations are linked to people’s actions on climate change and approval of 
climate change policies. In addition to self-reported data from the questionnaire, the study 
further uses behavioural assessments, such as a commitment to donate a potential cash prize 
to an environmental NGO, to test this link.  
Chapter six reports the findings from a series of qualitative interviews. These 
interviews enable a more in depth understanding of people’s considerations in response to the 
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social dilemma of climate change and their relation to individual actions to address climate 
change and approval of climate change policies. This chapter therefore provides interpretive 
depth to the survey data analysed in chapter five, and so complementarily addresses 
objectives two and three of this thesis. The interviews feature general questions about climate 
change and climate change mitigation as well as specific card sorting tasks to explore the link 
between considerations and actions and approval. 
Finally, chapter seven addresses objective four of this thesis in exploring the 
following question: Can considerations linked to cooperation be used as a way to promote 
actions to address climate change? An online pilot study and a field experiment in a shopping 
mall test whether using cooperative considerations as a basis for messages in climate change 
communication could increase both people’s actions to address climate change and their 
approval of climate change policies. The studies contain three different experimental 
conditions which vary the communication message: two of the messages are based on 
cooperative considerations and one is a control message. The studies test whether these 
messages influence people’s self-reported actions on climate change as well as whether they 
donate money to a NGO working on climate change and sign a petition for stricter climate 
change policies. 
Empirical chapters four and seven are structured and written in a manuscript form 
which enables submission for publication. Empirical chapters five and six differ from the 
original mixed-method manuscript written for publication. They have been separated for this 
thesis into a chapter describing the quantitative assessment and one describing the qualitative 
assessment to enable a more detailed description of the methods and analyses involved. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the structure of this thesis in terms of knowledge gaps, objectives 
and empirical chapters: 
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Figure 3.1: Structure of knowledge gaps, objectives and empirical chapters. 
Chapter eight synthesises the findings from the empirical chapters four to seven in 
light of the overall aim of the thesis and the four objectives. It further concludes with an 
outlook about practical applications and areas for further research.
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4. Social dilemma characteristics and cooperation in the climate change 
mitigation dilemma 
4.1. Abstract 
Climate change mitigation constitutes a social dilemma, characterised by a conflict 
between personal and collective outcomes and high social interdependence. Social dilemma 
characteristics are frequently called upon to explain a lack of personal actions to address 
climate change. This explanation draws on two assumptions: 1) people consider social 
dilemma characteristics in everyday decisions with emission consequences; 2) these 
characteristics discourage personal actions to address climate change. We explored both 
assumptions in a multi-method online study. The study consisted of three parts. In part one 
we assessed through open-ended questions whether people consider the conflict between 
personal and collective outcomes in different everyday decision making situations. Results 
show that the consideration of social dilemma characteristics differs between situations and 
can be increased through making the collective more salient. The second part assessed the 
consideration of social dilemma characteristics through closed-ended questions. When social 
dilemma characteristics are made salient through closed-ended question participants are more 
likely to consider them in their decision making. It thus cannot be assumed that people 
consider social dilemma characteristics in decisions without making these characteristics 
salient to participants. The third part consisted of a framing manipulation which focused on 
social dilemma characteristics expected to promote, rather than discourage personal actions to 
address climate change. The experimental manipulation revealed that framing an everyday 
decision making situation as a conflict between personal and collective outcomes promotes 
actions on climate change.
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4.2. Introduction 
Researchers have argued that people do not act on climate change because climate 
change mitigation constitutes a social dilemma (e.g. Aitken et al., 2011). The term social 
dilemma refers to a situation in which the individual outcome is in conflict with the collective 
outcome (Dawes, 1980, Kollock, 1998). In a social dilemma individuals can select a non-
cooperative or a cooperative choice (Osbaldiston and Sheldon, 2002). Cooperative choices 
promote collective benefits at the expense of personal benefits, while non-cooperative 
choices increase personal benefits, but result in collective costs (Dawes, 1980, Kollock, 
1998). The key to prevent high collective costs in a social dilemma is to increase cooperation 
(Lozano, 2007, Raihani and Aitken, 2011). 
The following three characteristics are central to a social dilemma1 : 
1. The socially optimum outcome is achieved through mutual cooperation. In a 
social dilemma, non-cooperation results in a socially suboptimal outcome (and 
mutual non-cooperation in a high collective cost). The socially optimum 
outcome (which leaves everyone better off) can only be achieved through 
mutual cooperation. 
2. Non-cooperation is the dominating strategy. Non-cooperation results in the 
highest personal benefits, regardless of other people’s choices.  
3. Social dilemmas are situations of social interdependence. 
a. In a social dilemma personal choices change not only personal 
outcomes, but alter the collective outcome and imply consequences for 
others. 
                                                 
1 Note that these characteristics are applicable only to social dilemmas which possess a dominating 
strategy (as outlined in chapter 2), KOLLOCK, P. 1998. Social dilemmas: The anatomy of cooperation. Annual 
Review of Sociology, 24, 183-214. 
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b. At the same time personal outcomes are not only contingent on 
personal choices, but on the choices of all others involved in the social 
dilemma. 
The mitigation of climate change is referred to as “a social dilemma on an 
unprecedented scale” (Hasson et al., 2010, p.331) and has recently received considerable 
attention amongst social dilemma researchers. As outlined in chapter two, decision makers in 
the mitigation dilemma can either be conceptualised as countries (e.g. Hasson et al., 2010), 
companies or individuals (e.g. Raihani and Aitken, 2011). This paper will focus on 
individuals as decision makers. In the mitigation dilemma a non-cooperative choice takes the 
form of high emission behaviours (not taking actions to address climate change), whereas the 
cooperative option means engaging in low emission behaviours (actions to address climate 
change) (Horton and Doron, 2011, Raihani and Aitken, 2011). High emission behaviours 
represent the dominating strategy: the individual is better off choosing non-cooperation, 
regardless of the choices of others involved. If everyone else chooses non-cooperation, a 
single decision maker’s mitigation efforts will not successfully address climate change. So he 
loses the immediate personal benefits without preventing the collective cost. On the other 
hand if everyone else does take actions on climate change, a single decision maker’s non-
cooperative behaviour will not trigger severe global warming and he can enjoy the benefits of 
a non-cooperative choice without the consequences of this severe collective cost. 
This also illustrates social interdependence. An individual decision maker cannot 
avoid the collective outcome of a warming planet themselves, but is dependent on others’ 
actions to address climate change. At the same time decision makers engaging in non-
cooperative behaviours create negative outcomes for a majority of people on earth. 
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The social dilemma characteristics of climate change mitigation have served as one 
explanation for the failure to achieve cooperation in the form of personal actions to address 
climate change (e.g. Raihani and Aitken, 2011). Aitken, Chapman and McClure (2011) asked 
participants to indicate the importance of different factors for their decision to engage in 
actions to address climate change. As outlined in chapter two, findings show that awareness 
of the social dilemma characteristics of mitigation predicts a lack of personal actions (Aitken 
et al., 2011). Staats, Wit and Midden (1996) explained the failure of a climate change 
information campaign to significantly change people’s behaviour from a social dilemma 
perspective. They argue that people are aware of the social interdependence of climate 
change mitigation. As the campaign did not attempt to increase trust in others’ cooperative 
efforts, this awareness discourages behaviour change. Social dilemma characteristics have 
further been cited as an explanation for the gap between pro-environmental attitudes and 
green consumerism (Gupta and Ogden, 2009). Two assumptions underlie these explanations: 
1) People in social dilemma situations consider social dilemma characteristics in their 
decision making; 2) A social dilemma situation elicits considerations associated with 
decreased cooperation. The validity of these assumptions remains understudied to date and is 
addressed by this paper. The paper is structured as follows: We first explore how and why 
people may not consider social dilemma characteristics in their decision making. We then 
outline how the consideration of certain social dilemma characteristics may increase 
cooperation. This is followed by an empirical study designed to investigate two main 
questions related to objectives one and four outline in chapter three: 1) Are people’s decisions 
in social dilemma situations informed by social dilemma characteristics? 2) What are the 
effects of considering social dilemma characteristics on cooperation in a social dilemma 
related to climate change mitigation? Finally we discuss the results and implications of this 
study.
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4.3. Consideration of social dilemma characteristics 
To date, it is still unclear to what extent people consider the three central social 
dilemma characteristics (the socially optimum outcome achieved through mutual cooperation, 
non-cooperation as the dominating strategy, and social interdependence) when making 
decisions in real world social dilemmas. In most economic laboratory experiments these 
social dilemma characteristics are made explicit, but this may not be the case for real world 
situations (Gifford, 2008, Ostrom, 1998, Tenbrunsel and Northcraft, 2010). Individuals may 
for example not perceive the social interdependence of a situation (Dawes, 1980, Fennell, 
2004, Kelley and Thibaut, 1978, Tenbrunsel and Northcraft, 2010), preventing the rise of a 
conflict between personal and collective outcomes (Burke, 2001). Thus the following 
question arises: Do social dilemma characteristics inform decisions in social dilemma 
situations, including decisions related to climate change mitigation? 
In questionnaire studies, using closed-ended questions, participants report that social 
dilemma characteristics inform decisions about mitigation behaviours (Aitken et al., 2011, 
Franzen, 1995). For example, the agreement with statements describing the dependence of 
personal outcomes on others’ choices (as a result of social interdependence) is associated 
with a stated lack of personal actions to address climate change (Aitken et al., 2011). But the 
use of closed-ended questions may make social dilemma characteristics salient, which might 
not actually inform people’s choices in real life.  
In contrast, open-ended questions are less likely to make social dilemma 
characteristics salient. When social dilemma characteristics are not made salient, participants 
are less likely to report social dilemma characteristics amongst the aspects that inform 
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decisions about actions on climate change and behaviours with emission consequences 
(Hares et al., 2010, Horton and Doron, 2011, Line et al., 2010, Platt and Retallack, 2009). For 
example, focus group research exploring the factors people consider in decisions about 
overseas holidays found frequent accounts of personal benefits (e.g. weather, costs or travel 
time), but not of social dilemma characteristics of climate change mitigation, such as the 
socially optimum outcome or social interdependence (Hares et al., 2010). This indicates that 
participants viewed these holiday decisions as decision problems (as outlined in chapter two) 
rather than social dilemmas. Burke (2001) expresses his doubt about the assumption that 
social dilemma characteristics are considered in decisions about high or low emission 
behaviour: “most end-product users are too poorly informed about [climate change 
mitigation] for [social dilemma theory] to be fully applicable” (Burke, 2001). 
Qualitative research suggests that the introduction of climate change as a collective 
cost leads participants to raise and discuss social dilemma characteristics (Horton and Doron, 
2011). For example, in the study exploring factors considered in overseas holidays, 
participants referred to social interdependence only when confronted with the contribution of 
air travel to climate change (Hares et al., 2010). In-depth explorations of barriers to personal 
mitigation efforts also led to frequent reports of social interdependence. These include how 
the fact that successful mitigation requires cooperation from others demotivates personal 
actions on climate change (Hares et al., 2010, Line et al., 2010, Lorenzoni et al., 2007). 
To summarise, the literature suggests that individuals are unlikely to consider social 
dilemma characteristics in decisions about mitigation behaviour when characteristics are not 
made salient, but can be led to do so when salience is increased. Salience can be increased 
through additional contextual information that frames mitigation as a social dilemma (Hares 
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et al., 2010, Horton and Doron, 2011) or through closed-ended statements (Aitken et al., 
2011). 
The psychological literature offers four potential reasons why participants report 
social dilemma characteristics as important for decisions in closed-ended assessment 
approaches (where dilemma characteristics are salient), but fail to do so in open-ended 
assessment approaches (where dilemma characteristics are not salient): 
 Anti-introspection bias (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977) 
o People’s decisions are informed by social dilemma characteristics, but they 
fail to report so in open-ended questions due to a limited capacity for 
introspection. When social dilemma characteristics are presented, their 
accessibility increases (Chong and Druckman, 2007), and people realise and 
report their relevance for decisions. This anti-introspection bias is stronger in 
habitual decisions with little deliberative cognitive involvement. 
 Social desirability bias (Crowne and Marlowe, 1960) 
o People’s decisions are not informed by social dilemma characteristics. When 
social dilemma characteristics are presented people realise that considering 
social interdependence and the socially optimum outcome is a more socially 
desirable way of making decisions. To be perceived in a better light by others 
(including the researchers) they report that their decisions were informed by 
these characteristics. 
 Egocentric bias 
o People may excuse inaction on the basis of social dilemma characteristics, 
when they perceive actions on climate change to be costly (Aitken, 2009, Kerr 
and Kaufman-Gilliland, 1997, Lorenzoni et al., 2007). Making social dilemma 
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characteristics salient might increase such an egocentric bias by making self-
serving excuses available. 
 Demand bias (Orne, 1969) 
From closed-ended questions participants may infer that they are expected to 
acknowledge or report social dilemma characteristics as informing 
considerations. Participants may reason, if these characteristics had no 
relevance for the decision they would not have been included in the closed-
ended questions. 
This discrepancy between assessment approaches that do and don’t increase the 
salience of social dilemma characteristics has not been studied using the same sample and 
decision making situations. We address this gap using open-ended questions that do not make 
dilemma characteristics salient, a situation with explicit social interdependence and 
assessment through closed-ended questions that increase the salience of social dilemma 
characteristics.  
Based on the stated literature the following hypotheses can be derived: 
 H1: Without making them salient, individuals seldom consider social dilemma 
characteristics when making choices in social dilemma situations. 
 H2: When making them salient, individuals show greater consideration of social 
dilemma characteristics when making choices in social dilemma situations. 
 
In the next section we outline literature relevant to the argument that the consideration 
of certain social dilemma characteristics may promote, instead of discourage, cooperation.
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4.4. Consideration of social dilemma characteristics and cooperation 
Awareness of the social dilemma characteristics of a situation elicits a variety of 
individual considerations. Some of these considerations are frequently offered to explain the 
difficulty in promoting cooperation in social dilemmas: 
• Immediate self-interest: Choices in social dilemmas are influenced by the 
motive to maximise immediate personal benefits, which results in non-cooperative choices 
(Dawes, 1980, Hardin, 1968).  
• Temptation to free-ride: Free-riding is the exploitation of others’ cooperation 
by personally choosing the non-cooperative option (e.g. Horton and Doron, 2011, Kollock, 
1998). 
• Fear of being a sucker: Individuals in a social dilemma may fear that others 
free-ride on their cooperative choices and exploit their efforts (e.g. Aitken, 2009, Lorenzoni 
et al., 2007). 
• Personal insignificance and hopelessness: Many social dilemmas are 
characterised by a large number of individuals involved, which leads to the relative 
insignificance of individual choices (Aitken et al., 2011). If others’ cooperation cannot be 
expected, the situation may seem hopeless (e.g. Lorenzoni et al., 2007). 
Nevertheless, social dilemma situations may equally elicit considerations that promote 
cooperation but have received less attention in the social dilemma literature. 
Consideration of the socially optimum outcome may motivate cooperation (Batson, 
1994, Hine and Gifford, 1997), as the individual realises that everyone (including 
themselves) will be better off under the condition of mutual cooperation. These notions of 
enlightened self-interest and collective interest may in turn motivate the individual to 
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cooperate (Burke, 2001, Hine and Gifford, 1997, Horton and Doron, 2011, Lozano, 2007, 
Tenbrunsel and Northcraft, 2010).  
Evidence from the laboratory supports this claim: educating participants about the 
potential to achieve a socially optimum outcome increased levels of cooperation in a variety 
of computer-simulated or hypothetical social dilemma situations (Dhont et al., 2012, Isaac, 
1985, Pruyn and Riezebos, 2001, Stern, 1976, Van Vugt et al., 1996). Similarly, Kelly and 
Grzelak (1972) found that co-operators show a higher ability to identify the choice strategy 
that results in the socially optimum outcome. Hine and Gifford (1997) asked their participants 
to vocalise goals and strategies they applied in a simulated social dilemma. Participants 
frequently referred to notions of enlightened self-interest and cooperation in order to be 
‘better off’ in the end. 
Considering that personal non-cooperative choices in a social dilemma result in 
negative consequences for others (externalities) can further elicit moral considerations which 
can increase cooperation (Dawes, 1980, Dhont et al., 2012, Fennell, 2004, Horton and Doron, 
2011, Tenbrunsel and Northcraft, 2010). In Hine and Gifford’s study (1997) one subject 
directly stated the link between social interdependence, moral considerations and a 
“cooperative way of maximizing what everybody gets” (Hine and Gifford, 1997, p.185). 
Horton and Doron (2011) explored the mitigation dilemma in focus groups and concluded: 
“Evidence suggests that making people aware of the collective context of their behaviour can 
trigger a deeply held set of fairness instincts in relation to co-operation and free-riding […]” 
(Horton and Doron, 2011, p.67). The direct effects of these “fairness instincts” on actual 
mitigation efforts were not investigated. 
On the basis of the cited literature the following hypothesis, related to objective four 
of this thesis, can be formulated: 
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 H3: Consideration of the socially optimum outcome, achieved through mutual 
cooperation, and consequences created for others are associated with increased 
cooperation in a social dilemma related to climate change. 
To test the three outlined hypotheses, an empirical study was conducted. We explored 
the consideration of social dilemma characteristics in a variety of social dilemmas, related 
and unrelated to climate change mitigation. The design and results of this study are described 
in the following sections.
 
4.5. Methodology 
4.5.1 Participants 
An online study was conducted in February 2012 amongst students at the University 
of East Anglia. Students were recruited through posters, flyers and via emails sent out 
through the internal email system of a number of schools. The total sample consisted of 187 
students, of which 147 completed the questionnaire. Of these 147 students 56 were 
undergraduate and 91 postgraduate students. The gender ratio was 59% females to 41% males 
and the mean age was 24.59 (SD= 5.37). Different sample sizes were used to analyse the data 
of unrelated parts of the questionnaire. 
4.5.2. Materials and procedure 
The online study consisted of three parts. The full questionnaire can be found in Table 
4.1 in Appendix A. 
Part one was designed to investigate whether people consider social dilemma 
characteristics in their decision making, when these characteristics are not made salient (H1). 
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Participants were presented with five decision making situations (Table 4.2) and asked to list 
things they weigh up when making a decision in the respective situation. Each situation 
presents a conflict between personal and collective outcomes, as confirmed by the respective 
research literature (see references in Table 4.1) and expert assessment. The situations 
included both, social dilemmas that were linked to environmental issues and those that had no 
connection to environmental issues. This way we were able to explore whether there are any 
patterns that emerge solely in dilemma situations linked to environmental issues. The order in 
which situations were presented was randomised. Open-ended questions were used, which 
avoid making social dilemma characteristics salient, contrary to closed-ended question 
formats.  
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Situation 
 
Description 
 
Literature 
Related to 
climate 
change 
Deliberative 
decision 
making 
Social 
interdependence 
salient 
Restaurant dilemma 
 
Imagine you are at a restaurant with the 
people from one of your courses. You 
have agreed that after dinner you will 
split the bill equally between you. You 
need to decide what food and drink to 
have from the menu. 
Dawes & 
Messick 
(2000) 
 
          X                             
Campaign dilemma Imagine you are trying to decide 
whether or not to participate in a 
climate change campaign by handing 
out leaflets. 
Leighley 
(1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
Strike dilemma 
 
Imagine you are trying to decide 
whether or not to actively support 
public sector strikes by joining a 
demonstration. 
Klandermans 
(2004) 
X  
 
 
X 
Movie dilemma Imagine you are trying to decide 
whether or not to watch a movie 
streamed online for free. 
Phau, Teah & 
Lwin, (2013) 
X 
 
X X 
Transport dilemma Imagine you need to travel to 
Aberdeen, Scotland (about 500 miles 
from Norwich) for a couple of days. 
You need to decide how to get there. 
Line, 
Chatterjee & 
Lyons (2010) 
 X X 
Table 4.2: Social dilemma situations presented in the open-ended questions. 
 
The restaurant dilemma is unique in making the collective (the people from one of 
your courses) explicit. Making social interdependence salient should increase the 
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consideration of social dilemma characteristics (H2). The restaurant dilemma acts as a 
baseline against which dilemmas without an explicit collective can be compared.  
Part two of the study, a hierarchy task, was designed to further investigate whether 
people consider social dilemma characteristics in their decision making when these 
characteristics are made salient (H2). The movie, campaign and strike dilemmas were 
presented again alongside different statements of things that people may or may not weigh up 
when making a decision (Table 4.3). Participants were asked to create a hierarchy that 
indicates the importance of each of the presented statements for their decision making in the 
respective situations. Two of these statements referred to social dilemma characteristics and 
thus increase the salience of social dilemma characteristics. Two statements referred to 
immediate personal outcomes, thus the ‘given situation’ in Interdependence Theory (see 
chapter two). To reduce demand bias and explore the relevance of social dilemma 
characteristics in the context of other relevant considerations we included statements 
referring to other factors derived from prominent behaviour theories (Ajzen, 1991, Schwartz, 
1977, Stern et al., 1999). Stern’s Value-Belief-Norm Theory, for example, is one of the most 
prominent theories to explain pro-environmental behaviour. Participants were also given the 
option to exclude from this hierarchy ranking those statements which were not relevant for 
their decision. 
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Statements Description Example 
Referring to personal 
outcomes 
Time/ effort 
 
Convenience 
 
“Whether or not it is time 
consuming” 
“Whether or not it is 
convenient” 
Referring to social dilemma 
characteristics 
Costs for others 
 
 
Social interdependence 
“Whether or not other people 
will suffer under climate 
change” 
“Whether or not we can make a 
difference if enough people 
participate” 
Referring to other factors  Attitude towards the activity 
 
Threat 
 
Personal responsibility 
  
Value 
“Whether or not supporting 
strikes is worthwhile” 
“Whether or not I believe 
climate change is a threat” 
“Whether or not I am 
responsible for climate change” 
“Whether or not a healthy 
public sector is important to 
me.” 
Table 4.3: Statements presented alongside the social dilemma situations in the hierarchy task. 
 
Part three of the study was designed to assess the effect of considering the socially 
optimum outcome achieved through mutual cooperation and the consequences created for 
others on cooperation (H3). The study targets a cooperative behaviour in the context of 
climate change mitigation: reduction in meat consumption (Stehfest et al., 2009).  
Consideration of these specific social dilemma characteristics was increased through a 
framing manipulation in the form of a short informative text. Participants were randomly 
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assigned to one of four experimental groups (Table 4.4). The respective texts are included in 
Table 4.5 in Appendix A. 
 
Experimental Group Framing manipulation 
Control Group No information text 
Facts Group Factual information about the greenhouse gas emissions resulting 
from meat production 
SD Group Social dilemma framing: information about the conflict between 
personal and collective outcomes, the socially optimum outcome 
and the consequences for ‘everyone’ resulting from the decision 
to consume meat 
Facts and SD Group Factual information and social dilemma framing 
Table 4.4: Framing manipulations of the four experimental groups. 
 
This framing manipulation was followed by the assessment of variables associated 
with cooperation: 1) attitude towards meat consumption, using a Semantic Differential Scale 
(Cronbach’s Alpha = .887, example item: “Eating meat is unpleasant – pleasant); 2) intention 
to reduce meat consumption, assessed through two items (Cronbach’s Alpha = .527, example 
item: “How willing are you to cut down the amount of meat you eat?”); and 3) seeking 
information on reducing meat consumption through a behavioural measure: At the end of the 
questionnaire participants could decide whether they would like to be redirected to a website 
with tips on how to eat less meat. A choice to be directed to this website was interpreted as 
information seeking behaviour.  
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4.6. Results 
4.6.1. Consideration of social dilemma characteristics without increased salience 
Participants’ three responses to the open-ended questions were coded with regards to 
whether or not they contain considerations of social dilemma characteristics. Weighing up 
solely personal costs and benefits without acknowledging social interdependence and the 
collective nature of the situation is interpreted as a lack of consideration of social dilemma 
characteristics. The literature on movie streaming for example lists a number of costs and 
benefits for the individual consumer of the movie, such as financial aspects (streaming 
movies for free), convenience or the low quality of streamed movies (Phau et al., 2013). In 
contrast, references to the socially optimum outcome, non-cooperation as the dominating 
strategy, or social interdependence, are interpreted as considerations of social dilemma 
characteristics. In the movie dilemma the lost revenue and the resulting decrease in movie 
productions is an example of a collective cost and thus a consideration of social dilemma 
characteristics (Phau et al., 2013). Responses have been coded as personal outcomes, 
considerations where a social dilemma interpretation is possible, and social dilemma 
characteristics. Other considerations and ambiguous responses form the last code. Coding 
examples from the restaurant dilemma provide an illustration of the different codes. “What I 
feel like eating” is an example of an answer coded as personal outcomes as it focuses purely 
on personal preferences. Answers that include a very clear deliberation about the collective 
costs and social interdependence are coded as social dilemma characteristics. The following 
is an example from this code in the restaurant dilemma: “I tend to avoid the most expensive 
dish as I believe it would burden others with higher costs; or maybe encourage others to 
spend more increasing the costs for everyone”. In cases where participants refer to others, a 
potential collective cost or benefit and social interdependence, it is likely that they refer to 
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social dilemma characteristics. Where it is likely, but not entirely clear, that a person referred 
to these as social dilemma characteristics the answer is coded as social dilemma 
interpretation possible. An example of this category in the restaurant dilemma is referring to 
the possibility to share a dish. A frequent example of the last category, an ambiguous 
response, in the restaurant dilemma is “price”. Here it is unclear, whether people refer to the 
price in relation to the collective cost or simply their personal finances. Figure 4.1 shows a 
categorisation of considerations cited in response to open-ended questions. The percentage 
values refer to the proportion of responses which can be allocated to the respective 
categories. 
 
Figure 4.1: Categorisation of responses to open-ended questions. 
Results show that personal outcomes represent the most frequently cited 
considerations. Especially in the movie dilemma, answers focused primarily on personal 
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costs and benefits concerned with how enjoyable the experience of watching the movie 
would be (e.g. quality of the streaming, type of movie).  
Social dilemma characteristics were considered to a much lesser extent in the answers 
across dilemmas. Nevertheless notable differences between situations emerged: 
The movie dilemma lacked considerations of social dilemma characteristics almost 
completely. In contrast, in both the campaign and strike dilemma a theme of concerns about 
the effectiveness of the activity emerged from the answers. This theme can be interpreted 
from a social dilemma perspective. In social dilemmas a large enough number of co-operators 
is needed to achieve the socially optimum outcome. This might be reflected in considerations 
like “How many other people are demonstrating.” Similarly the theme ‘belief in cause’ that 
emerged in both dilemmas, can be interpreted from a social dilemma perspective. Participants 
seemed to question, whether the underlying cause is one of getting closer to a desirable 
socially optimum outcome. If, for example, people do not perceive a healthy public sector as 
a desirable outcome with positive implications for everyone, then preserving it will not be 
perceived as the socially optimum outcome. Several participants raised this consideration in 
the strike dilemma by questioning whether the strike mattered for them personally, for their 
future or their family. The presence of this theme emphasises Burke’s argument, that we 
cannot assume people’s awareness of the collective cost in a social dilemma (Burke, 2001). 
One potential explanation for the lack of considerations of social dilemma 
characteristics in the movie dilemma might be the amount of deliberation involved in the 
decision making process. Streaming a movie online can be considered as a common 
behaviour. Compared to a decision about campaigning or supporting a strike it requires little 
deliberation from the decision maker. 
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Similarly, in a climate change related situation which requires less deliberation, the 
transport dilemma, participants almost uniformly emphasised personal costs and benefits as 
considerations that informed the choice of travel mode (financial costs, time considerations 
and convenience or comfort). Statements referring to the environmental impact of different 
transport modes can be interpreted from a social dilemma perspective, as they refer to the 
long term socially optimum outcome of preserving the environment. The low number of 
statements referring to the environment is especially noticeable as a high percentage of the 
student sample consisted of environmental science students (28%). Although the environment 
was considered most often by environmental science students, only 32% of these students 
reported environmental consequences as important for their transport mode decision. The low 
consideration of social dilemma characteristics in the transport dilemma is in line with 
qualitative research reported in chapter two. A number of studies have found that awareness 
of the climate implications of individual decisions is low particularly in the travel domain 
(Higham et al., 2014, Hares et al., 2010, Line et al., 2010). This finding can be interpreted in 
two ways: 1) less deliberative decision making situations are less likely to involve 
considerations of social dilemma characteristics; 2) less deliberative decision making 
situations are more prone to the anti-introspection bias. 
An inferential Chi-square test of independence confirmed a significant association 
between the type of dilemma and the categories of coded responses, χ2 (12, N = 1077) = 
791.849, p < .001. Table 4.6 in Appendix A shows the standardised residuals for each cell. 
The largest standardised residuals are for the 'social dilemma interpretation possible' category 
in both the strike and campaigns dilemma, and for the 'social dilemma characteristics' 
category in the restaurant dilemma. These make the greatest contribution to the significant 
chi-square test. The residuals show that the number of answers falling into these categories 
were greater than expected. 
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Overall, personal considerations account for the majority of answers and are 
especially prominent in less deliberative decision making. This is broadly consistent with H1. 
 
4.6.2. Consideration of social dilemma characteristics when salience is increased 
The restaurant dilemma makes explicit social interdependence (others sharing the bill) 
and thus makes social dilemma characteristics salient. Responses to the restaurant dilemma 
were consistent with H2: when social dilemma characteristics are made salient, participants 
frequently took others’ choices, thus social interdependence, into consideration. 
This was expressed either through a concern about other people’s outcomes (“I would 
tend to avoid the most expensive dish as I believe it would burden others with higher costs 
[…]”), or a concern about the effect of others’ choices on personal outcomes (“What the 
other person will have as the overall cost will increase”). Several participants tried to balance 
burdening others and ‘being the sucker’ (“Because it’s split equally I’ll decide to not order 
something really cheap or really expensive”). We also found expressions of a temptation to 
free-ride (“expensive Steak [sic.] I would not have bought alone”). 
Standardised residuals reported in Table 4.6 in Appendix A further confirm the strong 
relationship between presenting the restaurant dilemma (where the collective is made salient) 
and open-ended answers in the coding category ‘social dilemma characteristics’. 
To further explore the role of salient social dilemma characteristics we compared 
answers to open-ended questions with answers to closed-ended questions for the campaign, 
strike and movie dilemma. We investigated the importance participants ascribed to the 
different statements presented alongside the social situations in the hierarchy task (see Table 
4.3). The importance was analysed by how frequently each statement was rated amongst the 
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top three considerations (most important considerations for their decision). Figure 4.2 shows 
the frequency of top three ratings for each statement relative to the total amount of top three 
rankings (separately for each dilemma). 
 
Figure 4.2: Proportion of statements amongst the top three rankings in the hierarchy task. 
 
Inferential chi-square tests on whether a consideration was ranked or not ranked 
amongst the top three considerations confirm the relationship between different 
considerations and dilemmas displayed in Figure 4.2. The test found no difference between 
the three dilemmas with regards to ranking the attitude towards the activity amongst the top 
three considerations, χ2 (2, N= 448) = .614, p = .736. For all other considerations, significant 
differences were found: time/ effort: χ2 (2, N= 448) = .19.394, p < .001; convenience: χ2 (2, 
N= 447) = 51.207, p < .001; social interdependence: χ2 (2, N= 448) = 45.233, p < .001; cost 
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for others: χ2 (2, N= 448) = 43.723, p < .001; personal responsibility: χ2 (2, N= 448) = 6.78, p 
< .05, value: Χ2 (2, N= 448) = 6.161, p < .05; threat: χ2 (2, N= 448) = 29.884, p < .001. 
The results in Figure 4.2 show that the hierarchy ranking reflects the answers to open-
ended questions displayed in Figure 4.1. In answers to the open-ended questions the movie 
dilemma received a high number of considerations of personal outcomes, while references to 
social dilemma characteristics were negligible. A similar pattern can be found in the results 
of the hierarchy task for the movie dilemma. Equally, in the campaign dilemma, time was 
both a frequently named consideration in the open-ended answers and frequently ranked in 
the top three of the hierarchy task. Furthermore, the importance ascribed to the social 
dilemma characteristic ‘social interdependence’ (e.g. “Whether or not we can make a 
difference if enough people participate”) may reflect the ‘effectiveness’ theme that emerged 
from the open-ended questions. 
In spite of these similarities, crucial differences can also be found between the results 
of the two assessment approaches: open-ended questions where social dilemma 
characteristics are not made salient and closed-ended questions where salience is increased. 
One such difference can be observed in the movie dilemma: while personal outcomes were 
still the aspects most frequently ranked as important in the hierarchy task, they were not as 
predominant as in the open-ended questions. Considerations of other factors such as threat, 
value, personal responsibility, social interdependence and the cost for others were not 
mentioned in the open-ended answers as a reaction to the movie dilemma, but are found in 
the top three hierarchy ranking. Further, the social dilemma characteristic ‘cost for others’ 
was not explicitly mentioned in the open-ended answers to the campaign or strike dilemma. 
On the contrary, in the hierarchy task they appear in the top three hierarchies for both these 
dilemma situations. 
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Thus results are partially consistent with H2, as a discrepancy was found between the 
two modes of assessment: participants showed a higher consideration of social dilemma 
characteristics in the hierarchy task where they were made salient. Nevertheless, this 
discrepancy is small and generally the results from the hierarchy task turned out to be a fairly 
close reflection of the open-ended answers. 
 
4.6.3. The effect of a social dilemma framing 
Part three of the study introduced a framing manipulation in the form of short, 
informative texts on the greenhouse gas emissions associated with meat consumption. 
Differences in variables associated with a reduction in meat consumption were assessed 
between the four experimental groups. The subsample of vegetarian participants (n=19) was 
excluded from this analysis. 
A sumscore of all items assessing the attitude towards meat was created (M = 44.27, 
SD = 7.40, maximum possible range 13 - 65). Higher attitude scores represent a more 
positive attitude towards meat consumption. Attitudes towards meat consumption differed 
significantly between experimental groups (one-way between subjects ANOVA, F (3, 95) = 
3.70, p = .014, η2 = .105). Post hoc comparisons (Tukey HSD test) revealed a significant 
difference between attitude scores of the ‘control group’ (M = 48.11, SD = 6.81) and both the 
‘SD group’ (M = 42.85, SD = 7.15) and the ‘facts and SD group’ (M = 42.20, SD = 7.74). 
There was no significant difference between the ‘control group’ and the ‘facts group’ (M = 
43.32, SD = 6.87). Thus the presence of the social dilemma framing in the text led to 
significantly less positive attitudes towards meat consumption, compared to the ‘control 
group’. 
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When investigating the second variable, stated intentions to reduce meat consumption, 
we calculated a sumscore by adding up the two measurement items (M = 6.30, SD = 1.60, 
maximum possible range 2-10). For this second variable, an ANOVA showed no significant 
differences between groups (one-way between subjects ANOVA, F (3,105) = 1.45, p = .232, 
η2 = .040). The finding that the framing manipulation affected attitudes towards eating meat, 
but not self-reported intentions to reduce meat consumption was unexpected. One explanation 
is a general high reluctance of the UK population to change their diet for environmental 
reasons (DEFRA, 2008). 
Of the 108 non-vegetarian participants who completed the questionnaire up to this 
final stage, 58 opted to exit to a website with tips on how to eat less meat. A logistic 
regression was performed to assess the effect of the manipulation on this third variable, 
information seeking behaviour (Table 4.7). Participants in the ‘SD group’ were found to be 
significantly more likely to seek further information on reducing meat consumption than 
participants in the other three groups. The finding that only the ‘SD group’, but not the ‘facts 
and SD group’ was affected by the manipulation could be due to the order in which 
information was presented. In the ‘facts and SD group’ factual information was presented 
first, followed by the social dilemma framing. This may decrease the effectiveness of the 
social dilemma framing due to a drop in participants’ level of concentration and a lower focus 
on the social dilemma framing. 
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Predictor Β SE B Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
      
Manipulation ‘control’ (n= 27)   5.08 .17  
Manipulation ‘facts’ (n= 27) .62 .56 1.20 .27 1.85 
Manipulation ‘facts and SD’ (n= 23) .64 .58 1.23 .27 1.89 
Manipulation ‘SD’ (n= 28) 1.29 .57 5.08 .02 3.64 
Constant -.38 .39 .92 .34 .69 
Note: All variables were entered simultaneously; Cox & Snell R2 = .051; χ2 (3, N = 105) = 5.353, p = .148 
Table 4.7: Logistic regression analysis on the effect of the framing manipulation on 
information seeking behaviour. 
In summary, the social dilemma framing led to less positive attitudes towards meat 
consumption and influenced information seeking behaviour, but did not affect self-reported 
intentions.
 
4.7. Discussion 
This study explored whether people are aware of the social dilemma structure of a 
situation and therefore addresses objective one of this thesis (To determine people’s 
awareness of the social dilemma structure of climate change mitigation). Results show that a 
person’s subjective interpretation of a situation can differ from the objective characteristics of 
the situation (e.g. Ostrom, 1998, Tenbrunsel and Northcraft, 2010). Based on our findings 
across a range of environmental and social decision situations, it is not justified to assume 
that without increasing their salience, people’s decisions are informed by social dilemma 
characteristics when confronted with a social dilemma situation. People may still consider 
social dilemma characteristics when they are not made salient, due to prior knowledge and 
exposure. Participants’ answers to open-ended questions show a number of considerations in 
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response to the social dilemma situations (see objective two of this thesis: To determine 
people’s cooperative and non-cooperative considerations in response to the social dilemma 
structure of climate change mitigation.). A person working on sustainability is likely to see 
the collective cost of climate change in the transport dilemma, even if it is not made salient. 
Findings show that students from the School of Environmental Sciences, where climate 
change is a frequently taught and discussed topic, were more likely to consider the 
environment in the transport dilemma. Based on our findings we argue that the consideration 
of social dilemma characteristics cannot be assumed and is more likely when these are made 
salient. Increasing their salience can be achieved by including explicit wording or adding 
contextual information. The restaurant dilemma gives an example: it explicitly mentions the 
affected collective. In the mitigation dilemma the relevance for the collective can be 
emphasised by stating the benefits of mitigation for everybody, our children or future 
generations. This introduces the collective as a frame of reference and may thus increase 
social dilemma considerations. The framing manipulation indicates the positive effects of 
focusing on the collective outcome and consequences for others. Such a framing effect should 
be most effective if it takes place at the time of decision making. In the transport dilemma, 
for example, an indication of the collective costs and benefits of different transport options 
could be included as additional information when people compare prices on the internet or at 
travel agencies.  
The findings further indicate that social dilemma characteristics are less likely to be 
considered in situations that require less deliberative decision making such as the transport 
and movie dilemma. Another explanation for lower considerations of social dilemma 
characteristics in these two situations could be that they are less likely to be perceived as pro-
social. The restaurant, campaign and strike dilemma might, due to their more obvious pro-
social aspects, be more likely to lead to considerations of others and the collective. This 
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interpretation is supported by Whitmarsh (2009) who found that reasons people express for 
their choice of travel behaviour are predominantly associated with convenience, while 
reasons for taking part in a climate change campaign reflect issues of morality. 
In addition the movie dilemma has one characteristic which distinguishes it from the 
other situations. Streaming a movie online often results in an infringement of copyright and 
therefore in an unlawful act (fact-uk.org, 2012). The fact that an unlawful behaviour has been 
socially normalised may decrease the consideration of social dilemma characteristics in the 
situation. 
The study was not explicitly designed to disentangle these proposed explanations, but 
was a first exploratory attempt to assess people’s consideration of social dilemma 
characteristics. Further research is needed to investigate the importance of deliberation in the 
decision making process and the perceived pro-social nature of a behaviour for the 
consideration of social dilemma characteristics.  
Answers to the open-ended questions were compared with the results from the 
hierarchy task which made social dilemma characteristics salient. Creating salience in such a 
way, inherent in the task’s nature, is found in most questionnaire based research. We were 
interested as to whether this methodological artefact would lead to a higher consideration of 
social dilemma characteristics and therefore explain the cited differences in findings from 
questionnaire studies and focus groups. Results showed that the outlined differences between 
open- and closed-ended questions were there, but not as pronounced as expected. 
There are four possible explanations for a rise in considering social dilemma 
characteristics in the hierarchy task compared to the open-ended questions: an anti-
introspection bias, a social desirability bias, an egocentric bias and a demand bias. 
Characteristics of the research design might have reduced the scope for three of these biases. 
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This might explain the small nature of the discrepancy between the open-ended questions and 
the hierarchy task: 
Social desirability bias might have been reduced through the anonymity of the online 
study and further assurance of confidentiality and anonymity of the collected data. Egocentric 
bias may have been reduced as participants were neither asked about past behaviour nor to 
state an actual decision. The social dilemma characteristics presented in the hierarchy task 
were not suitable for justifying inaction, as they were associated with increased action (e.g. 
“whether or not other people will suffer under climate change”). Demand bias may have been 
reduced by the option to exclude statements from the hierarchy ranking and the inclusion of 
statements referring to a variety of other factors that can be considered in the decisions. The 
small discrepancy between the two assessment approaches may further be due to participants’ 
aiming for consistency in their answers. Participants might have completed the hierarchy task 
with their prior answers to open-ended questions in mind. 
Anti-introspection bias may on the other hand have contributed to the observed, small 
discrepancy in considerations of social dilemma characteristics. Participants may have failed 
to access considerations that actually inform decisions in the respective situations without 
increased salience. The anti-introspection bias is expected to be stronger in more common 
decision making. As these decisions require less deliberation, people may be less consciously 
aware of the things that inform their decisions. The discrepancy between assessments that do 
and don’t increase the salience of social dilemma characteristics is most pronounced in the 
movie dilemma, the most common decision making situation.  
In conclusion the discrepancy between assessment approaches that differ in the 
salience of social dilemma characteristics may contribute to explain findings in the literature. 
Salience effects can lead participants to report social dilemma characteristics as decisive 
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factors that are considered to a slightly lesser extent when not made salient. This conclusion 
has proven to be specifically relevant for the social dilemma characteristic concerned with the 
consequences for others involved in the dilemma situation. 
The study further included a first exploration of the effect of cooperative 
considerations on mitigation actions, therefore addressing objective three of this thesis (To 
determine how cooperative and non-cooperative considerations in response to the social 
dilemma structure of climate change mitigation affect personal actions to address climate 
change). Findings suggest that a manipulation focusing on the conflict between personal and 
collective outcomes, the socially optimum outcome and the consequences for others can 
positively influence variables associated with increased cooperation in a social dilemma 
related to climate change. The opportunity to instrumentalise certain characteristics of the 
dilemma situation in order to increase cooperation could be a promising approach for the 
framing of campaigns that aim for attitude and behaviour change (see chapter seven). These 
findings are in line with moralization, a motivational approach to increase cooperation in 
social dilemmas (see chapter two). 
A social dilemma framing of climate change mitigation could result in higher 
cooperation. As Horton & Doron (2011) noted, many governmental intervention programmes 
shy away from explicitly acknowledging the fact that actions to address climate change often 
conflict with personal interests. Rather, they try to increase the attractiveness of mitigation 
efforts through appealing to financial gains or growth possibilities and therefore through 
focusing on possible personal benefits (see structural approaches in chapter two). But this 
study suggests that openly acknowledging the personal costs of mitigation may not decrease 
efforts if it is illustrated that those personal sacrifices go hand in hand with positive effects 
for the collective and others. The results are especially encouraging as the framing 
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manipulation focused on an aspect of life that is especially resistant to behaviour change - 
meat consumption (DEFRA, 2008). A similar conclusion can be drawn from the salience of 
social interdependence in the restaurant dilemma. In this situation, where the collective was 
explicitly mentioned, considerations concerned with reducing the collective cost were much 
more prominent compared to other decision making situations. Nevertheless, further research 
is needed to establish whether a social dilemma framing, as administered in this study, would 
also affect other behaviours related to climate change mitigation and exert an influence on 
real life actions on climate change (see chapter seven). 
This study constitutes a first exploration of the consideration of social dilemma 
characteristics and its effects especially with regard to the climate change mitigation 
dilemma. As such it has a number of limitations. Social dilemmas occur in the form of many, 
very different decision making situations in the real world. We were only able to include a 
very small number of different situations in our study and thus could only touch on 
differences between those situations that may affect the consideration of social dilemma 
characteristics. Further, the decision making situations were hypothetical. Although 
participants will likely have experienced similar decision making situations, they read them 
on a computer screen. This compromises the external validity of the findings for real world-
decision making. The framing manipulation in part three was administered at the end of the 
study. By that point participants will have already been exposed to social dilemma 
characteristics, which may influence the effects of the experimental manipulation. A further 
limitation is that the qualitative data from open-ended questions was coded only by the 
author, no independent analysis by a second researcher took place. Involving a team of 
researchers could increase the confidence in the coding process and make findings more 
robust and less susceptible to a subjective bias. Finally, the use of a student sample limits the 
generalizability of the research findings.
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5. Effects of cooperative and non-cooperative considerations - a quantitative 
assessment 
5.1. Abstract 
Social dilemma characteristics of climate change mitigation are used to explain the 
lack of widespread individual action on climate change. This chapter examines people’s 
considerations in response to the mitigation dilemma. We first provide a comprehensive set 
of possible considerations in response to the social dilemma structure of climate change 
mitigation. Using a quantitative questionnaire study, we then test the significance of 
considerations linked to both inaction and action. We confirm previous findings that the 
mitigation dilemma discourages action by eliciting considerations such as personal 
insignificance or fear of being a sucker. However, we also find robust evidence for a set of 
considerations linked positively to action on climate change, including fairness and collective 
interest. The quantitative questionnaire further explores how different considerations are 
linked to people’s approval of climate change policies. Findings show that cooperative 
considerations, which are linked to increased actions, are also linked to higher approval of 
climate change policies. The hypothesis that a number of considerations which are linked to 
inaction (e.g. personal insignificance) could lead to a higher approval of climate change 
policies in order to address these cognitions, was not confirmed. Results further show that the 
collective interest consideration is the best predictor for both, actions to address climate 
change and approval of climate change policies.
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5.2. Considerations in response to the social dilemma of climate change mitigation and 
their relation to actions on climate change 
Individual behaviour changes and personal mitigation efforts form one component of 
decreasing world-wide greenhouse gas emissions and therefore mitigating climate change 
(IPCC, 2014b). The social dilemma characteristics of climate change mitigation are quoted as 
one potential explanation for a lack of personal actions to address climate change (e.g. Aitken 
et al., 2011). From an individual perspective, efforts to mitigate climate change are 
characterised by a conflict between personal and collective outcomes (Raihani and Aitken, 
2011). Individuals can choose to engage in actions to address climate change, the cooperative 
choice, or to refrain from personal actions to address climate change, the non-cooperative 
choice (Dawes, 1980, Raihani and Aitken, 2011, Van Lange et al., 2013). Actions to address 
climate change can be time-consuming, expensive or inconvenient. Thus a non-cooperative 
choice increases personal benefits, but results in collective costs: a contribution to climate 
change. The socially optimum outcome, addressing climate change, can be achieved through 
mutual cooperation, if all or a majority of individuals engage in actions to address climate 
change (Horton and Doron, 2011, Raihani and Aitken, 2011). 
According to Interdependence Theory, this social dilemma structure of climate change 
mitigation leads to specific considerations (Rusbult and Van Lange, 2003). We use the term 
consideration here to refer to the cognitions that an individual associates with a specific 
situation, in our case the climate change mitigation dilemma, which in turn influence the 
person’s behaviour in this situation. In a socially interdependent situation like climate change 
mitigation (an individual’s outcome does not only dependent on their own actions, but on the 
actions of everyone involved) these considerations are influenced by the structure of the 
situation, interpersonal dispositions, relationship specific motives and social norms (see 
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chapter two) (Rusbult and Van Lange, 2003). Based on answers to the open-ended questions 
reported in chapter four, literature on social dilemmas in general and especially the literature 
reported in section 2.4.2 on the social dilemma of climate change mitigation several non-
cooperative considerations to the climate change mitigation dilemma have been identified: 
 Immediate self-interest. The climate change mitigation dilemma constitutes a conflict 
between short-term personal benefits and long-term collective benefits (Van Lange et 
al., 2013). People may respond to this situation by focusing on the short-term personal 
benefits, resulting in cognitions of immediate self-interest. Qualitative research finds 
these frequently expressed in references to convenience, forgoings, financial costs or 
time required for actions to address climate change (Becken, 2007, Capstick, 2013, 
Horton and Doron, 2011, Kasemir et al., 2000, Lorenzoni et al., 2007, Semenza et al., 
2008, Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). Based on chapter two, this may occur because 
people perceive the social dilemma as a pure decision problem, being only aware of 
the ‘given situation’, the immediate costs and benefits. Alternatively, as predicted by 
Rational Choice Theory, people may be aware of the collective outcomes, but focus 
on the maximazation of immediate personal benefits. 
 Temptation to free-ride. In a social dilemma the highest benefits for an individual 
result if everyone else behaves cooperatively, while the individual opts for the non-
cooperative choice (Dawes, 1980). If everyone else chose to act to address climate 
change, the inaction of one individual would not harm the climate. This individual 
would receive all the immediate benefits from inaction, while climate change would 
still be addressed. In this scenario the individual would free-ride on the cooperative 
behaviour of everyone else. Cognitions around the temptation to free-ride thus mean 
that the individual is consciously aware of the collective outcome and chooses to 
exploit the socially interdependent situation. A high temptation to free-ride in social 
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dilemma situations is predicted by Rational Choice Theory and has been emphasised 
by scholars (Albanese and Fleet, 1985, Dawes, 1980, Hughes et al., 2005). References 
to this consideration can also be found in relation to climate change mitigation 
(Capstick, 2013, e.g. Horton and Doron, 2011). 
 Fear of being a sucker. The high temptation to free-ride equally entails the potential 
to be exploited if one choses to cooperate. Thus a possible response to a social 
dilemma situation is the fear of being a sucker, a fear that others will free-ride on 
one’s cooperative behaviour (Aitken, 2009). Fear of being a sucker has been reported 
as a theme in connection with people’s lack of actions to address climate change 
(Aitken, 2009, Capstick, 2013, Horton and Doron, 2011, Lorenzoni et al., 2007). The 
consideration fear of being a sucker is closely related to one of the characteristcs of 
the mitigation dilemma (see chapter two): social uncertainty (the uncertainty of 
whether others involved are going to cooperate). 
 Personal insignificance. Social dilemmas are characterised by high social 
interdependence. Personal outcomes are dependent on the choices of everyone 
(Kollock, 1998). Any individual alone will not be able to mitigate climate change 
(Aitken et al., 2011). Personal insignificance is an important characteristic of the 
mitigation dilemma (see chapter two) and is reported as a frequent theme associated 
with perceptions of climate change mitigation (Aitken, 2009, Capstick, 2013, 
Lorenzoni et al., 2007, O'Neill and Nicholson-Cole, 2009, Semenza et al., 2008, Stoll-
Kleemann et al., 2001). 
 Hopelessness. If, in addition to the realisation of personal insignificance, an 
individual further expects the others involved in the social dilemma to opt for non-
cooperation, the situation appears hopeless. If one person alone cannot mitigate 
climate change and the others cannot be expected to take actions on climate change, 
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cognitions around hopelessness are a likely response (Capstick, 2013, Lewinsohn-
Zamir, 1998, Lorenzoni et al., 2007, Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). 
As evident from the definitions, these non-cooperative considerations are closely 
related. They have been used to explain the observed lack of personal actions to address 
climate change (Aitken et al., 2011, Lorenzoni et al., 2007). But the social dilemma structure 
of climate change mitigation may also result in a number of closely related cooperative 
considerations that may promote personal mitigation efforts. The following set of such 
cooperative considerations is derived from answers to the open-ended questions reported in 
chapter four and the literature review on social dilemmas, especially literature specific to the 
social dilemma of climate change mitigation reported in chapter two: 
 Enlightened self-interest. One characteristic of climate change mitigation is its 
temporal dimension (see chapter two). Individuals may focus on avoiding personal 
costs or respectively achieving personal benefits in the future (Batson, 1994, Hine and 
Gifford, 1997, Milinski et al., 2008). Individuals realise that it would be better for 
them personally to avoid the future negative consequences of climate change. 
Enlightened self-interest thus represents a transformation of the ‘given situation’ 
involving temporal considerations (see chapter two) (Van Lange et al., 2013). 
 Collective interest. Cognitions around collective interest focus on the better outcome 
for everyone, for the collective as a whole (Batson, 1994). With regard to the climate 
change mitigation dilemma, the collective can be as big as the entire human race. A 
smaller collective, for example the country or the family, may also lie behind 
cognitions around collective interest. In focus groups conducted by Horton and Doron 
(2011) participants repeatedly referred to ‘a greater good’ achieved through 
mitigation. 
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 Externalities. Cognitions around externalities are purely focused around the 
consequences for others, they do not include the self (contrary to collective interest). 
In social dilemmas personal decisions do result in consequences for others (e.g. 
Kollock, 1998). An individual’s decision not to act to address climate change means 
further negative impacts on the climate and therefore negative consequences for 
others as well. The temporal and spatial dimensions of the climate change mitigation 
dilemma (see chapter two) mean that these negative consequences are expected to be 
more severe in the future and in subtropical developing countries (IPCC, 2014a). Such 
externalities created for future generations or people in developing countries arise as 
concerns in many discussions around climate change mitigation (Horton and Doron, 
2011, Lowe et al., 2006). 
 Fairness. Cognitions around fairness are concerned with a fair distribution of the 
burden or cost of cooperation (actions to address climate change) (e.g. Wilke, 1991). 
They are thus closely related to differences in emission rates (see chapter two, 
heterogeneity of ‘harvest rates’) and perceived differences in responsibilities to act on 
climate change. The topic of climate change mitigation frequently sparks discussions 
around fairness and a fair distribution of the burden to take actions (e.g. Capstick, 
2013, Horton and Doron, 2011). Collective interest, externalities and fairness 
considerations represent a pro-social transformation of the ‘given situation’ as 
described in Social Interdependence Theory (see chapter two) (Rusbult and Van 
Lange, 2003). 
As Capstick (2013) points out, these cooperative considerations are, to date, 
understudied. Where climate change mitigation is studied as a social dilemma, the focus is on 
barriers to personal actions. The promotion of mitigation efforts also tends to be studied 
“within an individualised and self-interest frame” (Capstick, 2013, p.3496). This chapter 
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addresses this research gap by studying both non-cooperative and cooperative considerations 
to the climate change mitigation dilemma and their relevance for personal actions to address 
climate change. A better understanding of this relevance can then be used to improve efforts 
to promote personal actions on climate change (see chapter seven). The association between 
considerations and personal actions to address climate change can be formulated as follows: 
 H1: Enlightened self-interest, collective interest, externalities and fairness 
considerations are associated with an increase in cooperation (taking action to 
address climate change). 
 H2: Fear of being a sucker, personal insignificance, hopelessness, temptation to 
free-ride and immediate self-interest are associated with a decrease in cooperation 
(not taking action to address climate change). 
 
5.3. Considerations in response to the social dilemma of climate change mitigation and 
their relation to approval of climate change policies 
One potential way to increase cooperation in the social dilemma of climate change 
mitigation is through climate change policies, thus structural approaches to address the social 
dilemma. Chapter two introduced a range of structural approaches aimed at increasing 
cooperation in social dilemma situations. Many of these structural approaches, including 
incentives or disincentives and regulations, are imposed by governments in the form of 
policies (Dawes, 1980, Hardin, 1968, Ostrom et al., 1999). ‘Pull’ measures are implemented 
to increase the attractiveness of cooperation, for example through financial subsidies. ‘Push’ 
measures aim to decrease the attractiveness of non-cooperation. Prominent examples are 
taxes or prohibition of a certain behaviour (De Groot and Schuitema, 2012). 
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Climate change policies are present in both forms, ‘push’ and ‘pull’ measures. Taxes 
introduced to reduce energy use by increasing the price for energy are classic ‘push’ 
measures. Policies like the Green Deal (DECC, 2010), which support investments in home 
energy efficiency measures, can be categorised as ‘pull’ measures. The difficulty with these 
two approaches lies in the high costs required to implement and maintain ‘pull’ measures as 
well as the public objection to ‘push’ measures (Cherry et al., 2012, Dawes, 1980, Van Vugt, 
1998). Governments, the institutions authorised to implement such structural approaches, are 
reluctant to do so because of their low political feasibility (e.g. Gärling and Schuitema, 2007). 
Both authors of the classic works on social dilemmas, Dawes (1980) and Hardin 
(1968), consider coercion as a ‘push’ measure (De Groot and Schuitema, 2012) to resolve 
social dilemmas. However while Dawes disregards coercive ‘push’ measures as being too 
costly, Hardin advocates “mutual coercion mutually agreed on” (Hardin, 1968, p. 1247) as 
the only means to avoid “universal ruin” (Hardin, 1968, p. 1248). He specifically advises for 
laws and taxation to decrease the attractiveness of the non-cooperative choice. He further 
emphasises the value of coercive measures which are “mutually agreed upon by the majority 
of the people affected” (Hardin, 1968, p. 1247), thus would advocate for governmental 
policies which hold strong public support. This does not mean that people must like these 
policies. They are accepted to “escape the horror of the commons” (Hardin, 1968, p. 1247). 
This acceptance occurs when people involved in a social dilemma recognise the necessity for 
these policies in order to achieve mutual cooperation and thus avoid collective costs. 
A number of scholars agree with the assumption that people involved in a social 
dilemma are willing to give up part of their personal decision-making freedom or invest 
personal resources in order to achieve the socially optimum outcome (Ostrom, 1998, 
Yamagishi, 1992). A broad area of research on real world social dilemmas shows that 
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communities find ways to manage common resources through self-imposed regulations 
(Ostrom et al., 1999, Ostrom, 2000, Singh, 1994). Prominent examples of such solutions are 
fishing quotas to avoid overfishing, or regulated harvesting to limit deforestation (Ostrom, 
2000, Singh, 1994). This area of research shows that structural approaches can be a self-
chosen strategy for communities to resolve a social dilemma. Nevertheless structural 
approaches are not always successful in their attempt to create mutual cooperation and stories 
of failure are just as present in the real world as are stories of success (Ostrom et al., 1999).  
The success of any form of structural approach depends on its acceptance amongst the 
affected individuals (Harrington et al., 2001, Hsu et al., 2008, Kallbekken and Sælen, 2011, 
Schade and Schlag, 2003). Structural approaches are more likely to be effective if they are 
self-chosen or based on wide public approval (Schade and Schlag, 2003). This also applies to 
climate change policies (Cherry et al., 2012, De Groot and Schuitema, 2012).  
Increasing the approval of climate change policies is therefore an important strategy to 
resolve the mitigation dilemma. According to Hardin this can be achieved if people learn 
about the socially optimum outcome achievable through mutual cooperation (Hardin, 1968). 
In a study on adolescents’ perception of travelling modes, Line and colleagues (2010) guided 
their young participants to a better understanding of the social dilemma characteristics of 
travel choices. As a result, several focus group participants emphasised enforced travel 
behaviour change as a way to achieve mutual cooperation. Horton and Doron (2011) also 
found their participants recognising the necessity of coercive ‘push’ measures to ensure 
mutual cooperation. Even participants that preferred voluntary behaviour change as a first 
approach wanted this attempt to be backed up by coercion if necessary. Structural approaches 
are perceived as a viable way to achieve the socially optimum outcome through mutual 
cooperation in the climate change mitigation dilemma (Horton and Doron, 2011, Line et al., 
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2010). Cooperative considerations (enlightened self-interest, collective interest, externalities 
and fairness) represent a focus on this socially optimum outcome and the necessity for mutual 
cooperation. Thus climate change policies are expected to be more acceptable for people with 
cooperative considerations as a response to the mitigation dilemma (Horton and Doron, 2011, 
Line et al., 2010, Markowitz and Shariff, 2012, Schroeder et al., 2003): 
 H3: Enlightened self-interest, collective interest, externalities and fairness 
considerations are considerations associated with an increase in the approval of 
climate change policies. 
Non-cooperative considerations are expected to be associated with decreased personal 
actions to address climate change. The non-cooperative considerations temptation to free-ride 
and immediate self-interest are similarly expected to decrease the approval of climate change 
policies. An individual responding to the social dilemma situation with a temptation to free-
ride (who is aware of the collective outcome but choses to exploit the interdependent 
situation) is expected to object to governmental regulations which are designed to prevent 
free-riding and ensure mutual cooperation. Similarly a consideration of immediate self-
interest may hinder the acceptance of coercive measures, which limit the opportunity for 
short term personal benefits. 
 H4: Temptation to free-ride and immediate self-interest are considerations associated 
with a decrease in the approval of climate change policies. 
 The non-cooperative considerations fear of being a sucker, personal insignificance 
and hopelessness may on the contrary increase the approval of climate change policies. 
Personal insignificance and hopelessness include a realisation that others’ cooperation is 
required for a significant mitigation attempt. The expectation that others won’t cooperate and 
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the socially optimum outcome cannot be achieved, underlies both the fear of being a sucker 
and hopelessness. According to Hardin, this should increase the demand for coercive 
measures (Hardin, 1968). As policy approaches are designed to ensure that everyone 
contributes to addressing climate change these approaches directly address the fear of being a 
sucker, hopelessness and personal insignificance. Therefore these considerations should 
strengthen the approval of climate change policies. Empirical findings on climate change 
related topics confirm this view (Horton and Doron, 2011, Line et al., 2010, Staats et al., 
1996). When focus groups were introduced to the limited emission budget, most participants 
justified their preference for structural approaches by their desire to inhibit free-riding by 
others (Horton and Doron, 2011). 
 H5: Fear of being a sucker, personal insignificance and hopelessness are 
considerations associated with an increase in the approval of climate change policies.
 
5.4. Methodology 
5.4.1. Participants 
We conducted a quantitative online questionnaire to test the proposed associations 
between cooperative and non-cooperative considerations and the outcome variables, actions 
to address climate change and approval of climate change policies. Participants were 
recruited from a variety of internet forums, social media (Facebook, Twitter) and email lists 
in the UK. This sampling method was chosen to attract participants from a wide range of 
different age groups and interests. Targeting different internet forums with a variety of 
different contents ensured that the sample does not consist predominantly of individuals with 
a prior specific interest in the issue of climate change mitigation. As an incentive participants 
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could choose to be entered into a prize draw for four cash prizes (1x £200, 3x £50) on 
completion of the online questionnaire. 
Two hundred and seventy six participants completed the online questionnaire, 86% of 
the people who started it (126 men, 148 women, 2 missing, mean age = 34.87 years (SD = 
13.44)). Of the 276 participants 3.6% reported a doctoral degree as the highest level of 
education, 20.7% a master’s degree, 40.2% a bachelor’s degree, 25.4% A-Levels or a college 
equivalent, 9.4% Secondary School, GCSE or O-Levels and no participant reported less than 
Secondary School as the highest level of education. Thus the sample shows a larger 
proportion of highly educated individuals than the UK population (Office for National 
Statistics, 2013). Answers regarding how people learnt about the study confirmed that 
participants were recruited from a variety of different online sources (e.g. 34.4% of 
participants were recruited through ‘gumtree’, 19.9% through friends or facebook friends and 
3.6% through a wedding forum). 15.9% reported to be a member of a group, institution or 
political party that works (amongst other things or solely) on climate change. This is slightly 
higher than the UK average, where just under 10% of the population are members of an 
environmental group (Cracknell et al., 2013). The two most frequently named groups were 
the Green Party and Greenpeace (Green Party members were explicitly targeted as one source 
of participants).  
5.4.2. Materials and procedure 
The online questionnaire first asked participants’ consent. Half of the participants then 
continued to a set of questions assessing people’s personal actions to address climate change 
and the relevance of different considerations for their personal actions. Respondents were 
asked  
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1) Personal actions on climate change (“In your life, do you take any actions to address 
climate change” based on Aitken et al. (2011)). This item could be answered with yes or no. 
In the case of a positive answer to this question participants were asked 
1.1) more detailed information about these actions, for example the amount of financial 
resources, time, effort and inconvenience involved in these actions (four items, Cronbach’s 
Alpha = .819, example item: “How much time is required for these actions?”, answered on a 
four item Likert scale ranging from “None” to “A lot”). For the full list of items see Table 5.1 
in Appendix B. 
2) The importance of 23 statements for whether or not they take actions to address climate 
change (five point Likert scale ranging from “Unimportant” to “Important”). The 23 
statements represent the nine non-cooperative and cooperative considerations (see Table 5.2 
in Appendix B). For example, the consideration fear of being a sucker was represented by the 
following three statements: 1) Even if I take actions to address climate change, others will 
start emitting more. 2) Why should I do my bit, if my next door neighbour doesn’t? 3) It is 
unfair that I should bear the burden of taking actions whilst others do not. 
3) Future actions on climate change: willingness, preparedness and intention to change action 
due to considerations of climate change (six items, Cronbach’s Alpha = .768, example item: 
“I intend to take actions to address climate change.” ), (DEFRA, 2007, partly based on 
Lorenzoni et al., 2007). For the full list of items see Table 5.1 in Appendix B. 
The other half of participants, after giving their consent, continued to a set of 
questions assessing people’s approval of climate change policies and the relevance of 
different considerations for their approval of climate change policies. Respondents were 
asked 
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1) Self-reported current approval of climate change policies (four items, Cronbach’s Alpha 
= .946, example item: “I approve of policies which ensure that everyone takes action to 
address climate change.”, answered on a five point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly 
disagree” to “Strongly agree” ). For the full list of items see Table 5.1 in Appendix B. 
2) The importance of 23 statements for whether or not they approve of climate change polices 
(five point Likert scale ranging from “Unimportant” to “Important”). The 23 statements 
represent the nine non-cooperative and cooperative considerations. The presented statements 
can be found in Table 5.2 in Appendix B.  
3) Self-reported future approval of climate change policies (four items, Cronbach’s Alpha 
= .916, example item: “I will approve of policies which ensure that everyone takes action to 
address climate change.”, answered on a five point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly 
disagree” to “Strongly agree”). For the full list of items see Table 5.1 in Appendix B. 
All participants ended the online questionnaire with the following assessments 
4) Demographics, including a question on participants’ membership in a group working 
(solely or amongst other things) on climate change (see Table 5.1 in Appendix B). Such 
membership can further be interpreted as a measure of personal actions to address climate 
change. 
5) A binding choice to donate half of the potential cash prize to an NGO working on climate 
change. Opting for the donation was interpreted as a form of action to address climate 
change.  
6) Exit the online questionnaire to one of four web pages including webpages with an 
environmental theme (a petition to support policies to address climate change and an 
environmental blog). A decision to exit to an environmental webpage (the petition or the 
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blog) was interpreted as another behavioural measure for actions to address climate change. 
A decision to exit to the petition was interpreted as a behavioural measure for the approval of 
climate change policies.
 
5.5. Results 
5.5.1. Considerations and their association with actions to address climate change 
In this section we analyse the data from those 50% of participants who received 
questions about their personal actions to address climate change. This section therefore 
addresses the association between considerations and their association with actions to address 
climate change and tests hypotheses H1 and H2. Data from the 50% of participants who 
received questions about their approval of climate change policies is analysed in the 
following section. 
82.4% of this subsample reported to take actions to address climate change. A 
sumscore of more detailed characteristics of these actions (cost, time effort and 
inconvenience involved) was calculated as a measure of difficulty (M = 9.42, SD = 2.41, 
maximum possible range 4-16). Further 15.5% of the sample reported to be a member of a 
group, institution or political party which works on climate change. 33.1% committed to 
donating a potential cash prize to an NGO working on climate change and 45.3% exited the 
survey to an environmental homepage. Participants on average expressed strong intentions to 
take actions to address climate change (M = 22.31, SD = 4.67, maximum possible range 6-
30). 
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Table 5.3 in Appendix B shows the mean importance ratings for the 23 statements 
which represent the nine cooperative and non-cooperative considerations. We conducted a 
factor analysis of these 23 importance ratings to explore whether the proposed considerations 
indeed group into the two expected factors - cooperative and non-cooperative considerations. 
Due to the highly interrelated nature of the considerations we did not expect each 
consideration to form a separate factor. 
The eigenvalues of an explorative factor analysis were compared with the eigenvalues 
derived from a Monte Carlo parallel analysis. Based on this comparison a two factor solution 
could be established and the retrieved two factors were subjected to a Promax rotation (based 
on the expectations that these two factors were negatively correlated). The emerging factors 
are represented in Table 5.4. The pattern matrix is reported and small coefficients (.30 and 
below) are suppressed. 
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Consideration item Factor loading 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 
Temptation to free-ride1 .352  
Temptation to free-ride2 .541  
Personal insignificance1 .645   
Personal insignificance2 .746   
Personal insignificance3 .664  
Hopelessness1 .614 .357 
Hopelessness2 .795  
Fear of being a sucker1 .619  
Fear of being a sucker2 .651  
Fear of being a sucker3 .733  
Immediate self-interest1  .531  
Immediate self-interest2 .550  
Collective interest1  -.383  
Collective interest2  .636 
Collective interest3   .830 
Enlightened self-interest1   .675 
Enlightened self-interest2   .657 
Externalities1  .761 
Externalities2   .675 
Fairness1   .646 
Fairness2 
Fairness3 
 .759 
.457 
Table 5.4: Factor loadings for items exploring the importance of different considerations for 
actions to address climate change. 
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All items reflecting non-cooperative considerations loaded positively on the first 
factor, almost all items reflecting the cooperative considerations loaded positively on the 
second factor. The first factor is therefore labelled “non-cooperation factor” and the second 
factor “cooperation factor”. The sizes of the factor loadings also support this two factor 
interpretation. 
The only item that slightly diverts from this structure is collective interest1 (“Even 
though it's not in my narrow self-interest, I think about what is best for the greater good, for 
the human race as a whole”). It does show a high negative loading on the “non-cooperation 
factor” and a lower positive loading on the “cooperation factor”. This diversion from the 
otherwise clear-cut factor structure may be explained by the complexity of the specific item 
or the salience of self-interest in the wording of the item. 
Next we explored the associations between the two factors and personal actions to 
address climate change. Factor scores were calculated by summing up the item scores of all 
items that could be attributed to the respective factor (simple sum, not weighted by item 
loadings on the respective factor (DiStefano et al., 2009)). We used regression analysis 
(linear and logistic regression) to determine which factors predict an increase or a decrease in 
personal actions (Table 5.5, full regression tables, Tables 5.6 – 5.11, can be found in 
Appendix B): 
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 Outcome variables – assessments of actions to address climate change 
 Current actions Future actions 
 
 In your life do 
you take any 
actions to address 
climate change?” 
(n=133) 
Membership 
in group 
working on 
climate change 
(n= 133) 
Donating 
half of the 
potential 
cash prize 
(n=129) 
Exiting to 
environment
al homepage 
(n=123) 
More detailed 
characteristics 
of reported 
actions 
(n=104) 
Willingness 
and intention 
to act on 
climate change 
in the future 
(n=132) 
Logistic regressions 
Non-cooperation 
factor 
-.078** -.031 -.047* -.053**   
Cooperation factor  .099** -.003   .054*  .077**   
Linear regressions 
Non-cooperation 
factor 
    -.024 -.220*** 
Cooperation factor      .005  .470*** 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Table 5.5: Predicting current and future actions to address climate change on the basis of the 
non-cooperation and cooperation factors (numbers represent non-standardised regression 
coefficients). 
The regression results are in line with prior expectations (H1 and H2). Non-
cooperative considerations are associated with not taking action to address climate change, 
whereas cooperative considerations are associated with actions on climate change. The 
underlying structure of the considerations (two factor solution) contributes to predict self-
reported current and future actions to address climate change. The two factor solution 
significantly predicts whether or not people take any actions to address climate change in 
their life (χ2 (2, N = 133) = 22.004, p < .001, see Table 5.6 in Appendix B). It further explains 
a significant amount of variance in participant’s self-reported willingness and intention to act 
on climate change in the future (F (2, 130) = 75.695, p < .001, see Table 5.11 in Appendix 
B). The two factor solution also significantly predicts two behavioural measures for future 
actions to address climate change: exiting to an environmental homepage (χ2 (2, N = 123) = 
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19.060, p < .001, see Table 5.9 in Appendix B) and donating half of a potential cash price (χ2 
(2, N = 129) = 12.312, p =.002, see Table 5.8 in Appendix B). Nevertheless the factors fail to 
explain a significant amount of variance in more detailed characteristics of current actions to 
address climate change (F (2, 102) = .334, p = .717, see Table 5.10 in Appendix B). One 
potential explanation for this finding lies in the subjective interpretation of the items 
assessing these characteristics. Participants were, for example, asked how much time they 
invest into actions to address climate change. It is possible that a person high in cooperative 
considerations perceives an action like taking the bus, as less time consuming than a person 
with high non-cooperative considerations. The factors did not significantly predict the strong 
commitment of group membership (χ2 (2, N = 133) = 1.693, p = .429, see Table 5.7 in 
Appendix B). The pattern that associations between the factors and outcome variables are 
strongest for self-reported data, lower for behavioural outcome measures and lowest for 
lifestyle commitments (group membership) is to be expected. 
The above analysis established the importance of the two factors for actions to address 
climate change. We also explored the influence of each consideration individually. We 
calculated a composite score for each of the nine considerations by summing up the item 
scores of their respective measurement items. For example, the composite score for the 
consideration fear of being a sucker is calculated by summing up the scores of the items: 1) 
Even if I take actions to address climate change, others will start emitting more. 2) Why 
should I do my bit, if my next door neighbour doesn’t? 3) It is unfair that I should bear the 
burden of taking actions whilst others do not. We then conducted a further set of regression 
analyses with the same outcome variables as above, but the composite scores of each 
consideration as independent variables. The results are shown in Table 5.12 (full regression 
tables, Tables 5.13 – 5.18, can be found in Appendix B): 
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 Outcome variables – assessments of actions to address climate change 
 Current actions Future actions 
 
 In your life do 
you take any 
actions to address 
climate change?” 
(n=133) 
Membership 
in group 
working on 
climate change 
(n= 133) 
Donating 
half of the 
potential 
cash prize 
(n=129) 
Exiting to 
environment
al homepage 
(n=123) 
More detailed 
characteristics 
of reported 
actions 
(n=104) 
Willingness 
and intention 
to act on 
climate change 
in the future 
(n=132) 
Logistic regressions 
Externalities .114 .080** .113* .232   
Collective interest .243 .305** .289* .093   
Enlightened self-
interest 
-.080 -.198** -.226* -.144   
Fairness -.005 -.103** .048* .087   
Immediate self-
interest 
-.205 -.274** -.049* -.063   
Fear of being a 
sucker 
-.012 .120** -.300* -.124   
Personal 
insignificance 
-.215 .388** -.049* -.172   
Hopelessness .146 -.444** .119* .107   
Temptation to free-
ride 
 
-.007 -.105** .393* .156   
Linear regressions 
Externalities     .335* .228*** 
Collective interest     -.094* .447*** 
Enlightened self-
interest 
    .031* .299*** 
Fairness     -.113* .117*** 
Immediate self-
interest 
    .052* -.717*** 
Fear of being a 
sucker 
    .057* .081*** 
Personal 
insignificance 
    -.020* -.271*** 
Hopelessness     -.334* -.068*** 
Temptation to free-
ride 
    .096* .296*** 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Table 5.12: Predicting current and future actions to address climate change on the basis of 
the nine cooperative and non-cooperative considerations (numbers represent non-standardised 
regression coefficients). 
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Overall, the regression model including each of the nine considerations significantly 
explains whether or not participants take any actions to address climate change (χ2 (9, N = 
133) = 25.887, p =.002, see Table 5.13 in Appendix B), membership in a group working on 
climate change (χ2 (9, N = 133) = 31.991, p < .001, see Table 5.14 in Appendix B), donations 
of half of a potential cash prize (χ2 (9, N = 129) = 19.946, p = .018, see Table 5.15 in 
Appendix B), participants exiting to an environmental homepage (χ2 (9, N = 123) = 26.150, p 
= .002, see Table 5.16 in Appendix B) and participants’ willingness and intention to address 
climate change in the future (F (9, 123) = 18.902, p < .001, see Table 5.18 in Appendix B). 
Results show that only one of the cooperative considerations significantly predicts 
actions to address climate change once the other considerations are controlled for: collective 
interest is a significant positive predictor of people’s reported willingness and intention to act 
on climate change in the future. This finding is in line with H1. However, contrary to 
expectations, the remaining cooperative considerations did not predict actions on climate 
change. With regards to the non-cooperative considerations, immediate self-interest and 
hopelessness are strong predictors of people’s lack of action to address climate change. While 
this finding is in line with H2, the remaining non-cooperative considerations did not 
negatively predict actions on climate change. Two further results are noteworthy. Firstly, 
contrary to expectations, personal insignificance positively predicts people’s membership in 
a group working on climate change. This suggests that people who do feel their own actions 
will not make a meaningful difference look to become part of a collective, a group that works 
on climate change. Therefore membership of a group maybe a way to overcome personal 
insignificance. Secondly, the temptation to free-ride positively predicts the donation of half 
of the potential cash prize to an environmental NGO. The two items assessing the temptation 
to free-ride are “Others could take actions and address climate change without my help” and 
“I would rather have others take care of climate change so I don’t have to take actions”. 
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People may through donating a potential cash prize ‘pay’ others to take actions. Thus the 
items might have been interpreted by a number of people as others are more capable or better 
placed to take actions, rather than in the sense of free-riding in a social dilemma. 
 
5.5.2. Considerations and their association with approval of climate change 
policies 
In this section we analyse the data of the 50% of participants who received questions 
about their approval of climate change policies. We thus assess the association between 
considerations and people’s approval of climate change policies. 
50.7% of this subsample exited to a petition for stricter climate change policies. 
Participants on average expressed high current approval of climate change policies (M = 
15.39, SD = 4.02, maximum possible range 4-20) and future approval of climate change 
policies (M = 15.27, SD = 4.13, maximum possible range 4-20). 
Table 5.3 in Appendix B shows the mean importance ratings for the 23 statements 
which represent the nine cooperative and non-cooperative considerations. We performed a 
factor analysis on the 23 importance ratings to explore whether the expected structure of the 
considerations is reflected in the findings. We expected one factor to contain cooperative 
considerations expected to be associated with an increase in the approval of climate change 
policies as well as an increase in actions to address climate change: enlightened self-interest, 
collective interest, externalities, and fairness. We expected the second factor to contain non-
cooperative considerations that are expected to be associated with an increase in policy 
approval but a decrease in actions to address climate change: fear of being a sucker, 
hopelessness and personal insignificance. Finally a third factor we expected to contain the 
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non-cooperative considerations expected to be associated with a decrease in policy approval 
and a decrease in actions to address climate change: temptation to free-ride and immediate 
self-interest. Again, due to the highly interrelated nature of the considerations we did not 
expect each consideration to form a separate factor. 
A Monte Carlo parallel analysis indicated a three factor solution. The detected factor 
structure, based on an explorative factor analysis within Promax rotation, is shown in Table 
5.19. The pattern matrix is reported and small coefficients (.30 and below) are suppressed. 
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Item (cooperative 
considerations) 
Factor loadings Item (non-cooperative 
considerations) 
Factor loadings 
Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 
 
Collective interest1 .495     Hopelessness1 
 
.432    
Collective interest2 .833     Hopelessness2  .709  
 
Collective interest3 
 
.884   Fear of being a sucker1 
 
  .722   
Fairness1 
 
.546 .303   Fear of being a sucker2 
 
  .695  
Fairness2 
 
.856   Fear of being a sucker3 
 
  .644  
Fairness3 
 
.647    Personal insignificance1 
 
  .649  
Externalities1 
 
.748     Personal insignificance2 
  
  .300 .387 
Externalities2 
 
.725  .324 Personal insignificance3 
 
   .362 .436 
Enlightened self-interest1 
 
.796   Temptation to freeride1 
 
 .336  .636 
Enlightened self-interest2 
 
.621   .324 Temptation to free-ride2 
 
   .557 
 
 
   Immediate self-interest1 
 
   .604 
    Immediate self-interest2 
 
-.334  .462 
 
    Immediate self-interest3   .617 
 
Table 5.19: Factor loadings for items exploring the importance of different considerations for 
participants’ approval of climate change policies. 
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Factor1 shows high positive loadings for all cooperative considerations (collective 
interest, fairness, enlightened self-interest and externalities). As expected, this factor includes 
all cooperative considerations which are expected to be associated with both an increase in 
policy approval and an increase in actions to address climate change. Additionally 
hopelessness1 has its highest positive loading on this factor. This is not surprising though, as 
the item content is highly suggestive of a policy approach (“Voluntarily most people won't 
take actions and we won't be able to tackle climate change”). Due to its content the first 
factor is called “policy cooperation factor”. Factor2 shows high loadings for the fear of being 
a sucker items, hopelessness2 and personal insignificance1. Most of these items focus on the 
theme that others won’t act and therefore personal actions are unjustified. We call this factor 
“why me”. This factor reflects well the expected second factor, containing considerations 
expected to be associated with an increase in policy approval, but a decrease in actions to 
address climate change. The third factor shows high positive loadings on the temptation to 
free-ride items, the immediate self-interest items and personal insignificance2 and 3. These 
items share a high focus on self-evaluation and centre on the themes of personal costs and 
personal insignificance. We call this factor “personal costs/ insignificance factor”. We did not 
expect this third factor to contain items relating to personal insignificance. Thus the detected 
factor structure is largely in line with our expectations but does not reflect the expected factor 
structure fully. Next we tested the associations of the detected factors with policy approval. 
We expected the “policy cooperation factor” as well as the “why me factor” to be associated 
with an increase in policy approval and the “personal costs/ insignificance factor” with a 
decrease in policy approval. 
We calculated factor scores by summing up item scores of those items that load 
highly on a factor. We then used regression analysis (linear and logistic regression) to 
determine which factors predict an increase or a decrease in the approval of climate change 
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policies. Table 5.20 shows a summary of the results of these regression analyses (full 
regression tables can be found in Appendix B, Tables 5.21 – 5.23): 
 
  Outcome variables – assessments of approval of 
climate change policies 
 Exiting to petition for 
stricter climate 
change policies 
(n=127) 
Current 
approval of 
climate change 
policies 
(n=137) 
Future approval of 
climate change 
policies (n=133) 
Logistic regression     
Policy cooperation factor .107**    
Why me factor -.039**    
Personal costs/ 
insignificance factor 
-.123**    
Linear regressions     
Policy cooperation factor  .325*** .345*** 
Why me factor   -.002*** .025*** 
Personal costs/ 
insignificance factor 
  -.105*** -.099*** 
 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Table 5.20: Predicting current and future approval of climate change policies on the basis of 
the factors ‘policy cooperation factor’, ‘why me factor’ and ‘personal costs/ insignificance 
factor’ (numbers represent non-standardised regression coefficients). 
Overall, the regression model including the three factor solution significantly explains 
participants exiting to a petition for stricter climate change policies (χ2 (3, N = 127) = 38.900, 
p < .001, see Table 5.21 in Appendix B), current approval of climate change policies (F (3, 
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134) = 85.869, p <.001, see Table 5.22 in Appendix B), and future approval of climate 
change policies (F (3, 130) = 95.342, p < .001, see Table 5.23 in Appendix B). 
The link between considerations and the approval of climate change policies can be 
summarised as follows: The “policy cooperation factor” as well as the “personal costs/ 
insignificance factor” are associated with participants’ approval of climate change policies 
across a variety of measures. On the contrary, the “why me factor” does not significantly 
contribute to the approval of climate change policies. The results are in line with H1: the 
“policy cooperation factor” is associated with an increased policy approval. H2 also finds 
support in the results: the third factor “personal costs/ insignificance factor”, which contains 
the items representing temptation to free-ride and immediate self-interest is negatively linked 
to policy approval. H3 is not supported by the results: The “why me factor”, comprising 
items referring to the fear of being a sucker, hopelessness and personal insignificance, did 
not significantly predict levels of policy approval. Additionally, items relating to personal 
insignificance, contrary to the hypothesised direction are linked to a decrease in policy 
approval. The results are summarised in Figure 5.1: 
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Policy Cooperation Factor 1 
Considerations: 
 Externalities 
 Collective interest 
 Enlightened self-interest  
 Fairness 
 Hopelessness 
  
 
 
 
   
Why Me Factor 2 
Considerations: 
 Fear of being a sucker 
 Personal insignificance 
 Hopelessness 
 Approval of climate change policies 
 Exiting to petition for stricter 
climate change policies 
 Current approval of climate 
change policies (self-report) 
 Future approval of climate 
change policies (self-report 
 
 
Personal Costs/ Insignificance   
Factor 3 
Considerations: 
 Temptation to free-ride 
 Immediate self-interest 
 Personal insignificance 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Associations between factors and approval of climate change policies. 
Overall the results were partially in line with expectations. 
In addition to the association between the outlined factors and approval of climate 
change policies we were further interested in the influence of each consideration individually. 
We created a composite score for each of the nine considerations by summing up the item 
scores of their respective measurement items. We then conducted a series of regressions, with 
the different measures for policy approval as outcome variables and the sumscores for the 
- 
+ 
+ 
_ 
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nine considerations as independent variables. Results of these regressions can be found in 
Table 5.24 (full regression tables, Tables 5.25 – 5.27, can be found in Appendix B): 
  Outcome variables – assessments of approval of climate 
change policies 
 Exiting to petition for 
stricter climate change 
policies (n=127) 
Current 
approval of 
climate change 
policies (n=137) 
Future approval of 
climate change 
policies (n=133) 
Logistic regression     
Externalities -.361*    
Collective interest .375*    
Enlightened self-interest .139*    
Fairness .267*    
Immediate self-interest -.144*    
Fear of being a sucker .003*    
Personal insignificance .019*    
Hopelessness -.161*    
Temptation to free-ride -.292*    
Linear regressions     
Externalities  .255** .073*** 
Collective interest   .401** .636*** 
Enlightened self-interest   .192** .219*** 
Fairness   .376** .351*** 
Immediate self-interest   -.149** -.071*** 
Fear of being a sucker   .089** .048*** 
Personal insignificance   -.244** -.227*** 
Hopelessness   .006** .212*** 
Temptation to free-ride   .229** .122*** 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Table 5.24: Predicting current and future approval of climate change policies on the basis of 
the nine cooperative and non-cooperative considerations (numbers represent non-standardised 
regression coefficients).
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Overall the regression model including each of the nine considerations significantly 
explains participants exiting to a petition for stricter climate change policies (χ2 (9, N = 127) 
= 47.436, p < .001, see Table 5.25 in Appendix B), current approval of climate change 
policies (F (9, 128) = 28.617, p < .001, see Table 5.26 in Appendix B) and future approval of 
climate change policies (F (9, 124) = 31.689, p < .001, see Table 5.27 in Appendix B). 
Results show that the two cooperative considerations collective interest and fairness 
consistently predict people’s approval of climate change policies across the three different 
measures. This result is in line with H3. However, contrary to expectations, the remaining 
cooperative considerations do not predict policy approval. With regards to the non-
cooperative considerations, personal insignificance is the only consistent negative predictor 
of policy approval. Thus, while people may see membership in a group that works on climate 
change as a way to address a feeling of personal insignificance, climate change policies do 
not seem to be supported as a way to address personal insignificance. These findings, do not 
support hypotheses H4 and H5, as personal insignificance is the only negative predictor of 
policy approval, whereas this consideration was expected to increase approval.
 
5.6. Discussion 
This chapter developed a comprehensive set of considerations in response to the 
social dilemma structure of climate change mitigation and therefore addresses objective two 
of this thesis (To determine people’s cooperative and non-cooperative considerations in 
response to the social dilemma structure of climate change mitigation). We further explored 
the role of cooperative and non-cooperative in people’s actions on climate change, addressing 
objective three of this thesis (To determine how cooperative and non-cooperative 
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considerations in response to the social dilemma structure of climate change mitigation affect 
personal actions to address climate change). We were interested in how they may facilitate or 
hinder personal actions to address climate change and the approval of climate change 
policies. 
Non-cooperative considerations, as outlined in the literature (e.g. Aitken, 2009, 
Aitken et al., 2011, Capstick, 2013, Horton and Doron, 2011, Lorenzoni et al., 2007), are 
indeed present in people’s thinking about climate change mitigation. Their discouraging 
effect can be seen in the findings from this quantitative assessments. But results also show 
that cooperative considerations play an important role in people’s reasoning and are linked to 
increases in personal actions to address climate change. It is an important finding that the 
social dilemma structure of climate change mitigation can both, discourage and encourage 
actions to address climate change, through eliciting different considerations. This is the first 
study that assesses the importance of both cooperative and non-cooperative considerations 
simultaneously. Similarly, we could show that cooperative considerations are not only 
associated with an increase in actions to address climate change, but also with an increase in 
the approval of climate change policies. Thus strengthening these cooperative considerations 
could have a beneficial effect not only on personal actions to address climate change, but also 
help to increase public approval of climate change policies. In both cases, collective interest 
is the consideration most strongly associated with increases in action and approval. Further, 
fairness is a significant positive predictor of people’s approval of climate change policies. We 
were specifically interested to see whether people show higher approval of climate change 
policies in association with three of the non-cooperative considerations: fear of being a 
sucker, personal insignificance and hopelessness. We hypothesised that these three 
considerations are linked to an increase in policy approval. Findings from the quantitative 
data did not support this hypothesis. The two factors containing items representing the 
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relevant non-cooperative considerations did not show a positive association with the approval 
of climate change policies. Further, regression analyses using composite scores for every 
considerations as independent variables show that hopelessness and fear of being a sucker do 
not significantly predict policy approval, while personal insignificance is a negative 
predictor. Thus our data does not support the strategy to use personal insignificance as a way 
to achieve public approval of or demand for policies. This strategy can be found applied in 
campaigns seeking public pressure on politicians (Kang, 2014). Personal insignificance is, 
however, a positive predictor for membership in a group working on climate change. Thus, 
people may use the collective power of a group to overcome their feelings of personal 
insignificance. This study has a number of limitations. The self-reported nature of the data 
may give rise to a social desirability or self-serving bias. Nevertheless we took several steps 
to reduce these biases and thus increase our confidence in the presented findings and 
interpretations. The online study was anonymous and it is likely that most participants 
completed it in the absence of others. Further we included several behavioural measures in 
addition to self-reported measures. It is unlikely that participants chose to donate half of a big 
potential cash prize on the basis of social desirability. However, with regards to the 
behavioural measure of policy approval, exiting the site to a petition asking for stricter 
climate change policies, we have no means of knowing whether participants signed the 
petition or not. We only know that they chose to be directed to the petition site.
Despite these steps taken, participants’ answers reflect their personal interpretations. 
As the study design is not experimental, these interpretations may represent participants’ post 
hoc rationalisations and may differ from people’s reasons and motivations underlying actions 
to address climate change. Further experimental research is needed to establish a definite 
causal relation between the two sets of considerations and personal actions on climate change
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6. Effects of cooperative and non-cooperative considerations – a qualitative 
assessment 
6.1. Abstract 
This chapter uses semi-structured interviews to explore in depth people’s cooperative 
and non-cooperative considerations and how these relate to action on climate change and 
approval of climate change policies. Twenty interview participants were asked general 
questions about climate change, people’s actions to address climate change and policy 
approval. They were then given a specific sorting task to explore which considerations have a 
discouraging effect and which have an encouraging effect. The qualitative data enabled us to 
explore subthemes and reasonings behind considerations. The interview data supports and 
extends the findings of the quantitative study in chapter five. Divergences from the findings 
of the quantitative data are also highlighted and discussed. These areas of divergence include 
the effect of considerations of others and immediate self-interest. A crucial finding of this 
qualitative study is that people apply a number of reasoning strategies to overcome 
considerations linked to inaction.
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6.2. Introduction 
The previous chapter reported quantitative empirical research exploring the link 
between cooperative and non-cooperative considerations and people’s actions to address 
climate change and approval of climate change policies. It showed how both sets of 
considerations are linked to personal actions to address climate change and policy approval. 
This chapter investigates these links using qualitative data gathered through semi-structured 
interviews. Such qualitative data gives the opportunity to explore in more depth the link 
between considerations and the two outcome variables, people’s reasoning behind and 
explanation for these associations as well as a more in depth exploration of divergences found 
between hypotheses and findings from the quantitative data. The more in depth data provides, 
for example, the chance to explore potential explanations for the finding of a non-significant 
association between the “why me factor” and policy approval. 
 
6.3. Methodology 
6.3.1. Participants 
Participants were recruited through flyers and posters, displayed at different cafes and 
public places around Norwich. People interested in participating in the interview study were 
asked to fill out a short online questionnaire to assess their demographics as well as their 
actions to address climate change and their levels of policy approval. Forty five people 
expressed an interest of which twenty participants were selected to represent a variety of age 
groups, educational and socio economic statuses as well as levels of personal actions on 
climate change and policy approval. Selected participants were invited to take part in an 
interview that lasted approximately 45 minutes and receive a reimbursement of £20. Of these 
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twenty participants, ten were male and ten were female. Two participants reported to be 
members of an organisation that works on climate change. The twenty participants were aged 
between 20 and 78, with a mean age of 38.75 (SD= 14.87). The sample shows a larger 
proportion of highly educated individuals than the UK population (Office for National 
Statistics, 2013): of the twenty interview participants one person reported their highest level 
of education as less than secondary school, two people reported Secondary School, GCSE or 
O-Levels as their highest level of education, three people A-levels or college equivalent, 
eight people a Bachelor’s Degree, five people a Master’s Degree and one person a Doctoral 
Degree.
6.3.2. Materials and procedure 
Interviews took place either in people’s homes or in a public place. An interview 
guide outlining the structure of the interviews can be found in Table 6.1 in Appendix C. 
However the nature of semi-structured interviews means that there is some variability 
between interviews to ensure a natural conversational flow to the questions and answers 
which also explored areas of interest more deeply. 
The interviews started with open questions asking participants’ opinion on the issue of 
climate change and why they think some people do and some don’t act on climate change. 
The interviewer noted any reasons participants offered for action or inaction on paper cards. 
The second part of the interview was a sorting task. The interviewer presented a 
number of paper cards with short statements on them. Nine of these cards contained 
statements representing the nine cooperative and non-cooperative considerations. The nine 
statements can be found in Table 6.2 in Appendix C. The rest of the cards contained summary 
statements of the reasons participants named for people’s actions and inactions to address 
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climate change during the first part of the interview. Participants were asked to sort the cards 
into three different categories: those representing considerations that encourage them to act 
on climate change; those representing considerations that discourage them to act on climate 
change; and those that represent considerations not relevant to acting on climate change. 
Participants were asked to elaborate their thoughts and give examples throughout this sorting 
task and explore hierarchies and communalities amongst encouraging and discouraging 
considerations. 
In the third part of the interview participants were asked to discuss reasons why 
people do or don’t approve of climate change policies. 
In the final part of the interview participants were again presented with three paper 
cards containing statements representing the three non-cooperative considerations fear of 
being a sucker, personal insignificance and hopelessness. They were asked to elaborate 
whether these considerations encourage or discourage them to approve of climate change 
policies and what effect they believe these considerations have on other people. 
The interview data was transcribed and analysed for themes relating to the nine 
cooperative and non-cooperative considerations. The analyses focused on a deeper 
understanding of the nine considerations, including their importance for people’s actions to 
address climate change and approval of climate change policies. Additionally subthemes of 
the nine considerations were explored as well as themes relating to approaches to reduce 
discouraging considerations. A priori themes based on expected considerations were 
supplemented by emergent themes of participants’ reactions to the presentation of the nine 
statements representing considerations.
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6.4. Results 
The following sections explore the nine considerations and their importance for 
people’s actions to address climate change and approval of climate change policy in greater 
depth and detail through the analysis of the qualitative interview data. They further outline 
where the interview data confirmed the role of considerations established in the quantitative 
assessment in chapter five and explore divergences between the two data sets. Table 6.3 gives 
examples of interview statements related to the different considerations and provides a 
summary of relevant subthemes identified in the following sections. 
 
Consideration Subthemes Example 
Collective interest  Well, I’ve been thinking about the [climate 
change]. […] The feeling I had… I’ve had 
really strong feelings in recent years. 
Because I felt, that… there is a better way 
to life, really. Which would be better for 
everybody.  participant 5, male 78 
Enlightened self-
interest 
 […] The average office worker isn’t going 
to appreciate being sat at seventy degrees 
in an office. And so by doing something 
about the climate, you’ll actually help out 
in the long run, with that. You won’t be sat 
in an office at seventy degrees, it’ll be 
forty degrees and you might not be melting 
all over the place, or something like that. 
 participant 3, male, 24 
Externalities Future generations 
abstract 
[…] We’re ok, although already the 
weather is starting to go downhill. And 
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that seems to be, because of climate 
change. But I am worried about the future 
generations.  participant 7, female, 27 
 
 Offspring Well, I’ve got grandchildren. So, you can’t 
sort of really help but sort of to project 
forward a bit, can you. Just to imagine 
what it would be like for them. […]  
participant 6, female, 65 
 
 Vulnerable current 
others (less prominent 
theme) 
Interviewer: So, one is ‘Climate change is 
a serious threat.’ Yeah? 
Yes, if not to me individually than to the 
world at large, or to certain vulnerable 
populations.  participant 9, male, 50s 
Fairness Everybody has to do 
his/ her bit 
[…] You know, maybe I don’t do enough 
but at least I do something. You know, like 
compared to other people who are 
completely oblivious you know, at least I 
can say: well, I’m doing something.  
participant 2, female, 35 
 
 We are fortunate/ less 
vulnerable, thus we can 
and should take action 
[…P]articularly in the developing world, 
they have less choices and ability to 
influence their local environments or life. 
That does upset me and I think to a certain 
extent it does encourage my actions, even 
though I am sceptical about climate 
change, cause I believe in social justice. 
 participant 13, male, 39 
 
 We (humans or the 
West) are responsible 
I guess anyone who believes that it’s a 
consequence of our activities, 
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for the problem and 
thus should address it 
philosophically you therefore should 
change your activity … to try and alleviate 
your impact.  participant 9, male, 50s 
Temptation to free-
ride 
Government or 
businesses should take 
action 
Interviewer: So, you said, some people 
might think somebody else has to take care 
of it, who do you think, or what they think 
of? 
Politicians, governments. Leave it to 
somebody else, they make the policies, 
they should be the ones that deal with it, 
perhaps. That’s perhaps how they think. 
participant 15, female, 40 
Personal 
insignificance 
I cannot do anything 
about the situation 
[…] What, if. Everything you feel is as 
though you do is a drop in the ocean. You 
feel as though whatever you do won’t have 
any effect.  participant 17, female, 46 
 
 Businesses hold the 
power to change 
Yeah, I think it’s like we are completely 
draining the world’s resources massively. 
Unfortunately it’s the big corporations 
who control the world, who have all the 
power, they are so governed by immediate 
profits so don’t really care about future 
generations. They just wanna make money 
for themselves.  participant 16, male, 35 
 
 Difficulty to achieve 
collective action 
I can’t see how everybody … I don’t 
believe everybody would be agreeable to 
sort of altering their way of life, if it was 
necessary. That’s all.  participant 6, 
female, 65 
Hopelessness  Well, it’s just life really and I just think 
like, you can’t really change it, because 
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there are so many people that, you know 
that do all this stuff in the world and it’s 
gonna get worse and worse and worse. 
[…]  participant 19, female, 20s 
Fear of being a 
sucker 
Not right if others 
don’t act 
Interviewer: And does that discourage you 
personally as well, or …? Do you think 
that? 
Well, it does a bit. Yeah, it does a bit. 
Because you can feel yourself, if you are 
not careful, you are doing a whole lot of 
stuff and other people aren’t? And other 
people are resisting, what you are 
suggesting.  participant 6, female, 65 
 
 Others cancel out one’s 
effect 
I think it taps back to… You know if you 
think about making, yielding a patch of 
land. If you do the weeding, get rid of the 
weed so that the plants can grow up and 
then someone comes along and just walks 
all over it, compresses the soil, then your 
work’s been ruined. In a way it feels a 
little bit like that. […] You know if 
somebody is driving round in an electric 
car and somebody else like me is pumping 
out fumes with my car then you know, I’m 
the bad guy, so… participant 8, female, 
44 
Immediate self-
interest 
 Ok, my gut feeling, the most common one 
is … ease of life, availability of, 
availability of savings. I don’t even know 
if that makes sense. How easy is that to do 
something compared to having to do 
something. For example, how easy would 
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it be to use public transport every day for 
your 25 year career? That’s gonna be a 
lot of, you know, saving compared to using 
the car every day over your 25 year 
career. But, but how easy is that? 
participant 1, male, 36 
 
Table 6.3: Examples of interview quotes referring to the nine cooperative and non-
cooperative considerations and important subthemes. 
The interview data confirm the expected predominately encouraging effect of 
collective interest and externalities (consequences for others) on personal actions to address 
climate change. When we probed further to understand why collective interest is a 
consideration related to people’s increased actions two main reasonings emerged: 1) We can 
only approach the problem successfully as a collective. 2) Other people and the consequences 
it will have on them. This indicates that collective interest and externalities are strongly 
related. In connection to the cooperative consideration externalities, participants mentioned 
several groups of others: 1) future generations in general, 2) offspring, more specifically and 
3) less frequently, vulnerable current others. Answers reflected both the spatial and temporal 
dimensions of the climate change mitigation dilemma. Overall, others were frequently 
referred to as the most encouraging reason to take actions to address climate change, and 
future generations were especially important. Here the interview data diverges from the 
quantitative data reported in chapter five. While considerations around externalities were 
reported as strongly encouraging actions on climate change by interview participants, the 
consideration did not emerge as a significant predictor for any of the measures assessing 
actions on climate change in the quantitative assessment. However, the quantitative data 
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shows a positive trend towards externalities encouraging actions on climate change and the 
items assessing the consideration externalities do not specifically mention future generations. 
Interview participants who did not feel encouraged to take actions due to 
consequences for others, reported that they 1) were not sure about those consequences, 2) did 
not feel responsible for those consequences or 3) focused on the minor consequences that 
they expected for people in the UK. The uncertainty of consequences for humans reflects one 
of the distinct characteristics of the climate change mitigation dilemma (see chapter two): 
environmental uncertainty. 
Participant 8 (female, age 44): It [the externalities prompt] doesn’t make me feel like: 
alright I really need to do something about this. […] I think the main thing that I’m 
thinking when we are talking is: I really don’t know what impact it will have for 
humans. So… 
With regards to the cooperative consideration fairness three important subthemes 
emerged: 1) everybody has to do his or her bit, 2) we are fortunate or less vulnerable, thus we 
can and should take action 3) we (humans or the West) are responsible for the problem and 
thus should address it. Fairness was mostly categorised as a relevant consideration that 
encourages personal actions to address climate change. Different reasoning for this 
encouraging effect of fairness considerations can be detected: 1) collective action will be 
more effective, 2) leading by example or as a role model, displaying the fair behaviour and 
thus encouraging others, 3) others would have to compensate for personal inaction. 
But some participants voiced objection to the notion of fairness. One basis of 
objection was that people should do something because they want to and not out of an 
obligation based on fairness: 
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Participant 6 (female, age 65): […] I don’t think you can insist that people do certain 
things. I mean it’s more a matter of persuasion. But, I would sort of regard it as looking 
at my contribution. You see. As part of the fairness. Yeah. But, you know, I don’t think 
you can really nag other people. You can educate them. I don’t think you can nag. 
Another objection was based on a differentiation between fairness as equality and 
fairness as differentiated responsibilities: 
Participant 12 (female, age 24): ‘Fairness’ I put under ‘less likely’ [to encourage 
actions]. Because I do think that some, for example, governments have more 
responsibility than kind of the entire population. Because it’s their responsibility to 
actually promote the reasons and to put the... You need somebody to actually implement 
the policies or the … encourage people to change. Yeah. So yeah, they have a greater 
burden to a certain extent. 
These objections to considerations around fairness could explain the fact that fairness 
did not emerge as a significant predictor of actions to address climate change in the 
quantitative assessment. 
In line with the quantitative data reported in chapter five, enlightened self-interest did 
not emerge as a dominant consideration. This is due to the belief that the current generation 
will not be confronted with severe negative consequences of climate change. Participants 
predicted that it would increase as a motivation when the effects of climate change worsen 
and become geographically closer and more personal. 
To summarise, the interview supported the positive link between the cooperative 
considerations collective interest and externalities and personal mitigation efforts. It further 
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offered insight into why the other two cooperative cognitions fairness and enlightened self-
interest were not found to encourage personal actions to address climate change. 
While the quantitative data indicates a negative link between non-cooperative 
considerations on a factor level and personal mitigation efforts, the qualitative data suggests 
more complex links. In many cases interview participants did report discouraging effects of 
non-cooperative considerations. Nevertheless, participants also revealed different strategies to 
protect themselves from these discouraging effects. In some cases participants even report a 
defiant reaction which results in an encouraging effect. These counter reasonings could not be 
detected on the basis of the questionnaire data due to the fixed, pre-formulated items. Table 
6.4 identifies the key counter reasonings, that emerged from the interviews and gives 
illustrative examples. 
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Counter reasoning  Example (interview quotes) 
Desire to be one of the ‘good 
ones’, who is not discouraged, but 
takes actions on climate change. 
 Participant 17 (female, age 46): ‘Temptation to free ride’ 
[...] that would encourage me to act. Because knowing that 
other people. I wouldn’t want to be one of the people that 
benefited from somebody else’s actions. I would want to 
be one of the ones that contribute to benefit from those 
actions. So that would make me want to do it, rather than 
somebody to turn around and say ‘Well actually, we did 
everything and you just benefited. 
 
Acting as a role model, 
encouraging larger changes and 
inspiring more people. 
 Participant 14 (male, age 30): Even if the efforts that I 
make, make next to no difference, they are at least making 
a small difference and hopefully by other people seeing 
that I’m doing it, they might go: well he is doing it maybe 
I do it as well. 
 
If everyone adopted these non-
cooperative considerations, 
nothing would ever get done 
 Participant 16 (male, age 35): I know a lot of people would 
say this thing, well I’m just one person, how much change 
can I make, but it’s if everyone thinks like that, no one 
makes a change. 
 
Being part of the collective action  Participant 19 (female, age 20): ‘Personal insignificance. 
I’m just one in billions, my actions will not make a 
difference.’ … yeah, I do think that in some ways, but then 
I think obviously every little does really help […]. So, no 
I think that people do make a difference, even if it’s just a 
little thing. I guess it’s one less little bit that’s going into 
the ozone I guess.  
 
Table 6.4: Key counter reasonings to overcome the discouraging effect of non-cooperative 
considerations. 
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The qualitative data also revealed other notable divergences from the findings of the 
quantitative data. 
Immediate self-interest was acknowledged as an important discouraging consideration 
for participants’ own as well other people’s actions on climate change. But participants also 
reported that immediate self-interest can encourage actions to address climate change, if these 
actions serve immediate personal, for example economic, benefits. Strategic approaches (see 
chapter two), such as incentives build on this encouraging effect based on self-interest. 
Participant 13 (male, age 39): My quality of life is improved, in terms of, my time isn’t 
wasted on commuting. I am able to enjoy all the city centre, you know, on my doorstep. 
Less of my income is wasted on financing a car. I’m healthier because of walking and 
cycling. So all the positive reasons for a low carbon life style I’m now enjoying and 
experiencing and valuing. But the only reason I did it was for economic.  
Actions to address climate change were also seen as an investment in the future, 
which would eventually pay off. This is an indication of enlightened self-interest. 
Participant 5 (male, age 78): ‘Immediate self-interest. Addressing climate change is 
expensive and inconvenient right now’. Well … I would ... Yeah. … I think, it would 
be more expensive not do anything right now. Actually. I think, it’ll become more 
expensive, if we don’t do anything. So, I would be encouraged to take action, to … 
counter this sort of thing. 
With regards to the discouraging effect of personal insignificance, participants voiced 
three different (but potentially related) subthemes: 1) The individual is not capable of doing 
anything about the situation. 2) Businesses hold the power to change. 3) Achieving collective 
action is difficult. Some participants very strongly disagreed with the notion of personal 
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insignificance. Either they felt that their efforts do matter and that even small changes make a 
difference, or they would not let it count as an easy way to opt out of responsibility. 
The data also revealed two different sources for the non-cooperative consideration 
fear of being a sucker: Participants voiced this feeling either because 1) It is not right that 
others don’t act (closer to fairness considerations) or because 2) Others would cancel out the 
effect an individual can have (closer to personal insignificance). 
Further the qualitative data indicate that hopelessness was very much overlapping 
with a feeling of personal insignificance, a finding that is in line with the closely related 
definition of the two concepts. When probed with personal insignificance some participants 
literally referred to hope or hopelessness. 
Participants did mention temptation to free-ride, but no one stressed that people 
actually aimed to profit from other people’s cooperative behaviour. Participants 
acknowledged an attitude of ‘let someone else do it’. In the majority of cases this attitude was 
observed in other people, but not as an important consideration for participants’ own actions 
to address climate change. In fact reactions to prompts showed that cognitions around the 
temptation to free-ride were alien to a number of participants. Participants saw the temptation 
to free-ride mainly as a profit- driven motive for businesses. Thus the interview data shows 
that participants assign less importance to the temptation to free-ride, compared to its role in 
social dilemma research and literature. 
Especially when they talked about other people’s inactions, participants saw personal 
insignificance, hopelessness and the fear of being a sucker as an excuse people made, when 
their real motivation not to act was laziness, convenience or selfishness. 
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Interviewer: So, if you think about those people ‘Who aren’t good’ in your terms. 
[…]Why do you think they are not doing their bit? 
Participant 7 (male, age 27): Sheer laziness, I think. Part of it is…. They… The excuses 
they make are, that it’s ‘their little thing isn’t going to make any difference’. 
In conclusion, the qualitative data largely confirmed the negative link between non-
cooperative considerations and personal actions to address climate change. But it also 
revealed different strategies that people use to minimise or avoid such a discouraging effect 
of non-cooperative considerations. 
With regards to the approval of climate change policies, the qualitative interviews 
showed that participants did offer policies as a possible approach to achieve mutual 
cooperation and frequently acknowledged it as a way to ensure that everyone participates in 
actions to address climate change. 
Participant 7 (female, age 27): I am aware that we cause it [climate change] quite a lot as, 
as human beings. I, I would like to, I would like there to be some kind of policy where 
everyone has to make difference with it. In, even in small ways. Cause, I know people 
that are lazy. And they pollute, and they… and I know all of that contributes. 
This is in line with previous research that showed how people perceive policies as a 
strategy to resolve the climate change mitigation dilemma (Horton and Doron, 2011, Line et 
al., 2010). 
Further the qualitative data, in line with the quantitative data, suggests that climate 
change policies may be rather regarded in the light of collective interest and fairness than in 
the light of fear of being a sucker, personal insignificance and hopelessness: 
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Interviewer: [...] What is their reasoning for… supporting policies? 
Participant 9 (male, age 50s): They would have to feel that it was the best thing for their 
society in general. 
Thus both the quantitative and qualitative assessments suggest that approval of 
climate change policies is better supported through cooperative considerations, with regards 
to structural approaches directed at all citizens. Equally both data sets highlight the 
cooperative considerations collective interest and fairness as considerations that particularly 
encourage policy approval. 
Some participants perceive policies as an approach to enforce change on companies 
and businesses rather than fellow citizens. Fear of being a sucker, personal insignificance 
and hopelessness are more frequently mentioned in reference to businesses that would be 
forced to act through policies: 
Interviewer: [...] Why do you think some people [...] would ask for policies to approach 
climate change or to address climate change? 
Participant 16 (male, age 35): […T]o me people causing the most damage to climate 
change is down to the big corporations that have all the power in the world […]. 
Individuals can make all the change they want, but big corporations who are mining the 
world of its oil, cutting down the trees doing these unethical things and whatever they are 
the ones with rules to be in place, maybe laws to restrain them in sort of to make a 
sacrifice. 
Because of the unclear role hopelessness, personal insignificance and fear of being a 
sucker play from a theoretical perspective in relation to the approval of climate change 
policies, we asked some participants directly how they perceive the relationship between 
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these three considerations and approval of climate change policies. Answers were very 
mixed. Consistent with H5 (outlined in chapter five), some participants thought these 
considerations make it more likely that people approve of policies, because policies will 
ensure that others act. 
Interviewer: And why do you think some people would strongly approve of policies? 
Participant 7 (female, age 27): […] And maybe they would feel a bit less … annoyed, 
when other people don’t do their bit and they do. As well.  
Interviewer: […W]ould a feeling of hopelessness make you more or less likely to say we 
need a policy? 
Participant 8 (female, age 44): I think policy could give you hope. Because someone is 
showing, somebody, that there is a general believe that things can be different, I think 
that’s what a policy shows sometimes. 
 Others thought fear of being a sucker, personal insignificance and hopelessness are 
related to decreased approval of climate change policies, because these considerations reflect 
a general negative outlook. 
Participant 11 (male, age 30): I think if you have that [hopelessness], then like I say, you 
not gonna think that legislation will make a difference. […W]hat would happen is that 
people who have that negative outlook, their general view will be: this won’t make a 
difference, so why would I vote for it, this won’t make a difference, so should I go along 
with it, why should I deal with it? 
Thus the qualitative data suggest a possible explanation for the quantitative result that 
the “why me factor” does not show any significant link to the approval of climate change 
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policies: interview participants did report opposing associations between the considerations 
hopelessness, personal insignificance and fear of being a sucker and policy approval. 
 
6.5. Discussion 
The interview data enabled us to explore the considerations and their association with 
personal actions to address climate change and approval of climate change policies in more 
detail. The interview study therefore addresses objective two of this thesis (To determine 
people’s cooperative and non-cooperative considerations in response to the social dilemma 
structure of climate change mitigation) and objective three (To determine how cooperative 
and non-cooperative considerations in response to the social dilemma structure of climate 
change mitigation affect personal actions to address climate change). In line with the 
quantitative data, the qualitative data confirmed considerations around collective interest as a 
key consideration that encourages both, actions to address climate change and the approval of 
climate change policies. Key reasonings for this encouraging effect were that collective 
action is more effective (the awareness of a socially optimum outcome) and potential 
consequences for others (externalities). These themes may be important gateways to 
strengthening cooperative considerations and their encouraging effect. Further research is 
needed to investigate if and how these cooperative considerations can be strengthened and 
used to promote personal actions to address climate change (see chapter seven). Further 
confirming findings from the quantitative assessment, fairness considerations are reported as 
important encouragement for the approval of climate change policies. This suggests that 
policies are likely to be perceived as a way to achieve a fair distribution of the burden to 
mitigate. Further research is required to investigate whether eliciting especially fairness and 
collective interest considerations can be a gateway to introduce climate change policies in a 
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way that reduces public objection (see chapter seven). Temptation to free-ride, a non-
cooperative consideration that receives considerable attention in the social dilemma literature 
(e.g. Albanese and Fleet, 1985, Axelrod, 1984, Hughes et al., 2005), was not perceived as a 
key barrier to personal actions to address climate change in interviews. The finding that 
temptation to free-ride is more likely to be attributed to businesses may reflect research 
findings about distrust in businesses with regards to climate change mitigation (Horton and 
Doron, 2011, Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 2006, Lorenzoni et al., 2007). Further, immediate self-
interest can increase personal actions to address climate change, if these actions produce 
immediate personal benefits. This aspect of immediate self-interest is frequently used in 
social marketing approaches to climate change mitigation (e.g. Lucas et al., 2008), although 
appealing to self-interest can undermine intrinsic motivation to change (Corner and Randall, 
2011, Evans et al., 2013). 
Participants frequently reported that certain non-cooperative considerations may 
‘cross their minds’, or are familiar from other people’s reasoning, but do not decrease 
personal actions. Participants voiced different strategies they apply to reduce the discouraging 
effect of non-cooperative considerations. Some participants even reported to turn the non-
cooperative considerations into an encouraging force, by wanting to counter them. This 
finding is in line with and extends research that reports people’s ability to find resolutions for 
the social dilemma of climate change mitigation (Capstick, 2013). Amongst the identified 
strategies, two are especially noteworthy: The role-model reasoning (acting as a role model, 
encouraging larger changes and inspiring more people) and ‘what would happen if no one 
acted’ have not been identified as strategies to deal with the mitigation dilemma in previous 
research. The findings indicate strategies to counter potentially discouraging non-cooperative 
considerations (Lorenzoni et al., 2007). 
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Participants frequently suggested that the other non-cooperative considerations are 
voiced as excuses when immediate self-interest is the real underlying motivation for inaction. 
This causal pathway was most frequently discussed in the context of other people’s 
behaviour. This is consistent with an egocentric bias or social desirability bias (see chapter 
four). To protect their own self-esteem or to appear in a better light in the eyes of others 
(including the researchers) participants may not have voiced immediate self-interest as their 
own motive for inaction (Crowne and Marlowe, 1960). 
When we asked participants to elaborate on the link between the non-cooperative 
considerations fear of being a sucker, hopelessness and personal insignificance and policy 
approval, the answers fell in two groups. One group confirmed the positive connection stated 
in the literature. They believed that people who do respond with fear of being a sucker, 
personal insignificance or hopelessness would perceive policies as a way to achieve mutual 
cooperation and therefore approve of them. This explanation would create a positive link 
between the three non-cooperative considerations and policy approval. The other group 
argued that people who respond with these non-cooperative considerations have a general 
negative outlook and thus would not see climate change policies as a potential solution. On 
the contrary, their negative outlook would generalise to climate change policies. This is the 
reason why they would disapprove of these policies, creating a negative link between the 
non-cooperative considerations and policy approval. Further research is needed to determine 
whether the public is indeed split into these two different tendencies and what determines 
which category one falls in. 
Attention has to be drawn to a number of important limitations of this qualitative 
assessment. Firstly, the qualitative interview data exploring the role of considerations to the 
climate change mitigation dilemma for the approval of climate change policies was collected 
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in the second part of the interview. The first interview part explored the link between 
considerations and people’s actions on climate change. Thus interviewees had already been 
exposed to the different considerations and related them to personal actions. This prior 
exposure may have influenced results from the second part of the interview. Secondly, the 
interview data was only analysed by the author and no independent data analysis by a second 
researcher was conducted. Analysis through a second, independent researcher would be able 
to address potential selective perceptions and subjective bias. Thirdly, the sample is likely to 
have a self-selection bias. Although a number of measures were taken to ensure the 
recruitment of a sample varying in a number of demographic variables, it is likely that people 
who expressed interest in the study did so for one of two reasons, their personal interest in the 
issue of climate change or to receive the financial incentive of £20. 
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7. The effect of collective interest and fairness messages on actions on climate 
change 
7.1. Abstract 
From an individual’s perspective climate change mitigation is a social dilemma, a 
conflict between personal benefits and collective benefits. Social dilemmas elicit non-
cooperative considerations including free-riding, but also cooperative considerations 
including fairness and an interest for the collective. In this study we use an online pilot study 
and a field experiment to address the following question: Can framing messages around 
collective interest and fairness promote actions to address climate change and approval of 
climate change policies? In a pilot study we found that students who were exposed to a 
collective interest message (Act on climate change for the good of everybody) or a fairness 
message (Act on climate change – everybody has to do their bit) showed a tendency to 
express higher willingness and intention to act on climate change. In the real world setting of 
a shopping mall, we found contradicting results. People exposed to the control message (Act 
on climate change) on posters and questionnaires expressed higher willingness and intention 
to act on climate change, higher approval of climate change policies and were more likely to 
donate to a charity working on climate change, compared to people exposed to a collective 
interest or fairness message. We discuss potential reasons for these unexpected findings, 
including an adverse effect of moralising messages and the importance of the message 
context. We further found that values and identities related to a focus on collective outcomes 
may moderate the effect of different framing messages.
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7.2. Introduction 
Climate change mitigation is a pressing issue that requires action on multiple levels, 
including personal actions to address climate change (IPCC, 2014b). However, from an 
individual’s point of view climate change mitigation is a social dilemma (Raihani and Aitken, 
2011). A social dilemma constitutes a conflict between immediate personal benefits and 
longer term collective benefits (Dawes, 1980, Kollock, 1998). 
 Previous research suggests that this social dilemma structure elicits non-cooperative 
considerations that explain an observed failure to act to address climate change (Aitken et al., 
2011). For example, people may think it is unfair if they make the effort to act on climate 
change when others don’t, as everyone will benefit from successful climate change 
mitigation. Recent research as well as chapters four, five and six of this thesis have further 
considered the possibility of a second set of cooperative considerations elicited by social 
dilemma structures (Batson, 1994, Capstick, 2013, Horton and Doron, 2011). These 
cooperative considerations could potentially increase, not decrease personal actions to 
address climate change, and offer potential ways to promote climate change mitigation and 
the approval of climate change policies.  
In an online study and field experiment we tested whether message frames based on 
cooperative considerations related to the climate change mitigation dilemma have a positive 
effect on action and policy approval as outcome variables. This study therefore addresses 
objective four. We also tested personality characteristics as moderators on this effect. The 
tested personality characteristics relate to a person’s focus on the collective benefit in a social 
dilemma rather than on personal benefits.
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7.3. Promoting mitigation through cooperative considerations 
The social dilemma structure of climate change mitigation can elicit different 
cooperative and non-cooperative considerations. As outlined in chapter five, considerations 
describe the cognitions a person associates with a specific situation, here with the climate 
change mitigation dilemma. According to Interdependence Theory these considerations form 
one important determinant of a person’s subsequent actions in a social dilemma (Rusbult and 
Van Lange, 2003). As outlined in chapter five, four cooperative considerations can be 
identified: 
 Enlightened self-interest. Individuals may focus on these long term benefits for 
themselves, realizing that it is better for them to avoid the negative consequences of 
climate change in the future (Batson, 1994, Hine and Gifford, 1997, Milinski et al., 
2008). 
 Collective interest. Individuals may focus on the positive results of mitigating climate 
change for everyone and thus on ‘a greater good’ (Batson, 1994, Horton and Doron, 
2011). In the case of climate change mitigation the collective can be perceived on 
different scales: it may be as large as the entire human race or a nation, or it may only 
comprise a community. 
 Externalities. Individuals may solely focus on the consequences for others, not 
including the self (Horton and Doron, 2011, Lowe et al., 2006). 
 Fairness. Mitigating climate change results in immediate personal costs, thus in a 
burden for those who act. Individuals may be concerned with the fair distribution of 
this burden (Capstick, 2013, Horton and Doron, 2011, e.g. Wilke, 1991). 
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Chapters five and six show that these four cooperative considerations form a 
consistent underlying factor linked to both action on climate change and the approval of 
climate change policies. Cooperative considerations are based on the desire to achieve the 
collective benefit, the best outcome for the individual in the long run, the collective and 
others. In a social dilemma this collective benefit can only be achieved if a large enough 
number of people cooperate. Climate change policies are designed to achieve this mutual 
cooperation. People responding with cooperative considerations are thus also more likely to 
approve of climate change policies (Horton and Doron, 2011, Line et al., 2010, Markowitz 
and Shariff, 2012, Schroeder et al., 2003). 
These prior findings suggest that eliciting cooperative considerations can achieve two 
important aims: increasing personal actions to address climate change and increasing the 
approval of climate change policies. 
This study tests whether communication messages framed around cooperative 
considerations can increase cooperation in the climate change mitigation dilemma. Framing is 
“to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman, 1993). In order 
for a framing effect to occur, the desired interpretation of the issue must be accessible and 
salient. Models of communication stress different components of communication including 
the sender (who is a message from?), the channel (how is it communicated?), the message 
(what is communicated?) and the receiver (who is the communication directed to?) (Berlo, 
1960). Based on the definition of framing, the message is the obvious target of any framing 
exercise in order to achieve the desired interpretation of an issue. But the sender and the 
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channel can be further components that may help making certain aspects of a message more 
salient. 
Framing messages in different ways is a widely used technique to elicit desired 
emotions or considerations, including in the area of environmental behaviour. A number of 
studies show that using different frames to communicate information about environmental 
behaviour can increase pro-environmental attitudes and promote pro-environmental 
behaviour (Bain et al., 2012, Moser, 2010, Nisbet, 2009, Pelletier and Sharp, 2008, Spence et 
al., 2010). Chapter two further alludes to experiments in social dilemma research, where 
framing the situation differently (for example as an non-economic compared to an economic 
context, or as a moral situation) was shown to increase cooperation (Dawes et al., 1976, 
Pillutla and Chen, 1999). 
In this study we test framing effects related to climate change mitigation by exposing 
participants to interpretations of climate change mitigation based on two cooperative 
considerations, fairness and collective interest. In our experiments, we manipulate one 
component of the communication, the message, to study the effect of different framings. 
Specifically, we test the following: 
 H1: Exposure to messages based on cooperative considerations to the climate change 
mitigation dilemma leads to an increase in actions to address climate change and the 
approval of climate change policies. 
To identify those cooperative considerations with the strongest association with 
actions to address climate change and approval of climate change policies we used the results 
from the quantitative and qualitative assessment reported in chapters five and six. The results 
from the quantitative assessment in chapter five show that collective interest is the only 
significant positive predictor of actions to address climate change, across a variety of 
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measures. Both fairness and collective interest are significant predictors of approval of 
climate change policies. We selected these two cooperative considerations, collective interest 
and fairness, as the basis for our framing manipulation in this study. 
In addition to these findings from the quantitative data, the interview data in chapter 
six also highlights the pronounced importance of collective interest for people’s actions on 
climate change and collective interest and fairness for people’s approval of climate change 
policies. 
Our hypotheses, based on the literature review and previous research, predict a 
positive relationship between cooperative considerations and both outcome variables. The 
only predicted positive relationship we could not confirm in chapters five and six is the 
positive link between fairness and people’s actions to address climate change. However, a 
variety of research from different fields further supports the hypotheses that both these 
frames, fairness and collective interest, may exercise a positive effect on people’s 
cooperation in social dilemmas and so increase pro-environmental behaviour. In the case of 
collective interest frames, experimental research on social dilemmas indicates that knowledge 
about the social optimum and consequences of personal actions for the collective can increase 
cooperation (Dhont et al., 2012, Kelley and Grzelak, 1972, Schroeder et al., 1983). Further, 
increasing the weight assigned to the collective outcome underlies the motivational 
approaches to increase cooperation in social dilemmas (see chapter two). Lozano (2007) 
argues that creating “a new breed of humans, Homo Socio-collaboratibus” (p.371), who has 
collective interest at heart, would ensure sustainable development and overcome the current 
environmental crisis. A study of young people’s travel behaviour showed that when 
participants were made aware of the collective context of travel choices, policies were 
suggested as a way to achieve mutual cooperation (Line et al., 2010). Fairness, justice and 
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collective action frames have also been used by the environmental movement as a tool to 
mobilise participation (Taylor, 2000). A fair distribution of the economic burden to address 
environmental issues is also a prominent discourse in political debate, especially in relation to 
international climate change negotiations (Johansson-Stenman and Konow, 2009, Oberthür, 
2006, Ringius et al., 2002) . Horton and Doron (2011) published a report based on a series of 
focus groups which explored whether the public perceives climate change from a fairness 
perspective and how far this fairness frame can motivate actions on climate change. The 
authors conclude “Fairness and citizenship can drive support for sustainable consumption 
[…] if people understand the social context of behaviour” (Horton and Doron, 2011). Support 
for climate change policies to ensure mutual cooperation and avoid free-riding was frequently 
justified as a means of ensuring a fair distribution of the mitigation burden.
 
7.4. Personality characteristics  
The effect of different messages will also depend on the receiver, the characteristics of 
the person receiving the message. Psychological predispositions, such as values, worldviews 
and experiences, will influence how a person engages with issues like climate change 
mitigation (Newell et al., 2014). Previous research on framing has shown that certain frames 
are only effective if they are in line with people’s pre-existing interpretations (Nisbet, 2009, 
Smeesters et al., 2003). Are frames relating to collective interest and fairness effective only 
in people with predispositions consistent with collective outcomes? Three personality 
characteristics pre-dispose people towards collective outcomes (in contrast to personal 
outcomes): self-transcendence values, collective identity and communitarianism. 
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 Self-transcendence values include a consideration of other people and interpersonal 
relations and are important predictors of how people act in a social dilemma (Van 
Vugt et al., 1995). Several studies show the importance of self-transcendence values 
for cooperation, either using Schwartz’s value scale (Karp, 1996) or by assessing 
social value orientations (Balliet et al., 2009). A self-transcendent person focuses 
outside their own interest. 
 Identification with the collective influences behaviour in social dilemmas (De Cremer 
and Van Vugt, 1998, De Cremer and Van Vugt, 1999). In-group identity is positively 
related to cooperation in social dilemmas, including those related to environmental 
issues (Gupta and Ogden, 2009). Who the collective is, and how much a person 
identifies with the collective, is especially important in the climate change mitigation 
dilemma. People may view their community as the collective, their country or 
everyone (the entire human race). Recent research on place attachment, for example, 
showed that stronger global attachment, in contrast to national attachment, is related 
to a number of beliefs around climate change, including opposition to myths that 
legitimise inaction (Devine-Wright et al., 2015).  
 Communitarianism is a worldview based on a conceptualization of cultural theory 
(Thompson et al., 1990). Cultural theory formulates a typology of cultural biases 
(based on social or cultural framing of a topic) that shape an individual’s perception 
and attitude. Cultural cognition is one conceptualization of cultural theory that 
measures cultural worldviews using attitudinal scales including the individualism – 
communitarianism scale. This scale assesses individuals’ tendencies towards a more 
competitive way of life or a way of life based more on solidarity (Kahan et al., 2012).  
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We expected that people with stronger predispositions towards collective outcomes 
will be more affected by messages based on cooperative considerations to the climate change 
mitigation dilemma (moderator effect). We also expect a direct relationship between 
predisposing personality characteristics and both cooperative considerations, actions to 
address climate change and the approval of climate change policies (main effect). A 
predisposition towards collective outcomes underlies a number of the motivational 
approaches to increase cooperation in a social dilemma (see chapter two). Our study therefore 
tested the following: 
 H2 (Main effects): Predispositions towards collective outcomes are associated with an 
increase in actions to address climate change and approval of climate change policies. 
 H3 (Moderator effects): Predispositions towards collective outcomes reinforce the 
effect of collective interest and fairness framing on actions to address climate change 
and approval of climate change policies. 
Predispositions towards collective outcomes are measured by self-transcendence 
values, collective identity, and communitarianism.
 
7.5. Pilot Study 
We piloted the effect of the different messages on both outcome variables (actions to 
address climate change and approval of policies) on a student sample. 
The pilot study was designed to test H1 in a controlled environment in which 
participants read the framing messages and answer questions. 
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7.5.1. Methodology 
7.5.1.1. Participants 
Students from a course on quantitative research methods in development studies were 
asked to fill out an online questionnaire and pass the link on to friends and family. Thirty four 
people filled out the questionnaire (22 women). Their age ranged from 18 to 58, with a mean 
age of 24.61 (SD = 11.67). This low mean age was to be expected, as the questionnaire was 
filled out by students and their families.  
7.5.1.2. Materials and procedure 
The online questionnaire consisted of the following assessments of personal actions to 
address climate change and the approval of climate change policies (item wording can be 
found in Table 7.1 in Appendix D): 
 Actions to address climate change (three items assessing current intention and 
willingness to take actions to address climate change, Cronbach’s Alpha = .906, 
example item: “I am prepared to take actions on climate change in the future.”, 
answered on a five point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly 
agree”) 
 Approval of climate change policies (two items, Cronbach’s Alpha = .909, example 
item: “I will approve of policies which ensure that everyone takes actions to address 
climate change.”, answered on a five point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly 
disagree” to “Strongly agree”) 
An experimental manipulation was introduced both as a heading and in the specific 
wording of questions. Based on the results of the quantitative and qualitative assessments 
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reported in chapter five and six we designed a different message for each of three conditions: 
a control condition where none of the cooperative considerations are elicited through framing 
and two conditions which elicit the cooperative considerations, fairness and collective 
interest. The messages had to be similar in format and short enough to be able to use them as 
framing manipulations in later field experiments. 
 [Control condition]: Act on climate change 
 [Collective interest condition]: Act on climate change for the good of 
everybody 
 [Fairness condition]: Act on climate change – everybody has to do their bit 
7.5.2. Results and discussion 
To assess the influence of the three different framing messages we calculated 
sumscores for actions to address climate change (M = 11.47, SD = 2.35, maximum possible 
range 3-15) and approval of climate change policies (M = 7.83, SD = 1.42, maximum 
possible range 2-10). We then conducted ANOVAs, with the different messages as 
independent variables and the sumscores for actions on climate change and policy approval 
as dependent variables. 
ANOVA results revealed that there is no significant difference between the three 
different framing messages with regards to actions to address climate change (one-way 
between subjects ANOVA, F (2, 31) = 2.02, p = .150, η2 = .115). However the results show a 
tendency in the expected direction. As illustrated in Figure 7.1, participants who read the 
collective interest or fairness message displayed higher reported willingness and intention to 
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address climate change. The insignificant ANOVA result is likely to be due to the small 
sample size.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Average willingness and intention to take actions to address climate change in 
the three experimental conditions. 
 
With regards to approval of climate change policies, the ANOVA showed no 
significant difference between the three experimental groups (one-way between subjects 
ANOVA, F (2, 32) = .149, p = .862, η2 = .009). Descriptive statistics further reveal, that 
people in the collective interest condition reported higher average levels of policy approval 
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(M = 8.00, SD = 1.34) compared to the control (M = 7.83, SD = 1.40) and fairness condition 
(M = 7.67, SD = 1.61), but the difference was very small. 
The pilot study showed a tendency in line with H1: a framing message based on 
collective interest and fairness leads to higher actions on climate change. This finding 
increased our confidence in the framing manipulation and confirmed the manipulation for use 
in a field setting. With regards to the approval of climate change policies the pilot study did 
not produce a significant effect or clear tendency. The small sample size means that this study 
is limited in power. The student sample further limits its generalisability. Therefore the 
results may not be robust and may not apply to populations across a wider range of ages, 
educational backgrounds or cultures. 
 
7.6. Field Study 
After piloting the framing manipulation on a student sample, we tested its effects in a 
field study. For the field study we collaborated with a Cambridge based NGO working on 
climate change mitigation, called Cambridge Carbon Footprint. This NGO was specifically 
selected because their work solely concentrates on climate change mitigation and because 
their relatively new and unknown status reduced the risk of participants having strong 
preconceptions towards this NGO. The messenger is an important factor in any climate 
change communication (Berlo, 1960, Moser, 2010). We wanted to test real world climate 
change communication, therefore it was important to select a messenger that was not a 
university researcher, would be likely to communicate on climate change and is consistent 
with the message given (Moser and Dilling, 2011). Cambridge Carbon Footprint is a 
community based charity, working with volunteers and trying to assist individual change 
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within the local community. This charity is highly suitable as a messenger for both messages 
around fairness and collective interest. 
The field study took place at the Grafton shopping mall in Cambridge on several 
Sunday afternoons throughout the winter and spring of 2014. 
The purpose of this field study was to test the outlined hypotheses in a study that 
offers a high degree of external validity, uses actual behavioural measures and a larger 
sample size as well as a diverse sample from the general public. 
7.6.1. Methodology 
7.6.1.1. Participants 
One hundred and twenty nine people took part in this field study. Each participant 
received a small financial incentive of £2 to take part. All participants were passers-by at the 
Grafton shopping mall in Cambridge. Their ages ranged from 11 to 74 with a mean age of 
31.43 (SD = 14.95). Several participants came in groups of two or more to fill out the 
questionnaire, thus there are several participants who are connected to each other for example 
through friendships or family relationships. Of the participants 60.6% were female and 39.4% 
were male. 
7.6.1.2. Materials and procedure 
In this field study we administered a questionnaire and additionally set up a 
behavioural measure that assessed people’s actions to address climate change and approval of 
climate change policies in a real world setting. 
The questionnaire consisted of the following assessments (a full list of items used in 
the questionnaire can found in Table 7.1 in Appendix C): 
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 Communitarianism (four items based on Kahan and colleagues (2012), Cronbach’s 
Alpha = .501, example item: “Government should put limits on the choices 
individuals can make so they don’t get in the way of what’s good for society.”, 
answered on a five point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly 
agree”) 
 Schwartz transcendence values (three items based on Schwartz and colleagues (2001), 
Cronbach’s Alpha = .754, example item: “It is important that every person in the 
world should be treated equally and have equal opportunity in life.”, answered on a 
five point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”) 
 Collective identity (three items - community, Britain, humans in general (McFarland 
et al., 2012), example item: “I identify with (feel a part of, feel love toward, have 
concern for) people in my community.”, answered on a five point Likert scale ranging 
from “Not at all” to “Very much”). These items were not combined to a scale, but 
used separately. 
 Actions to address climate change (three items assessing intention and willingness to 
take actions to address climate change, Cronbach’s Alpha = .854), example item: “I 
am prepared to take actions on climate change in the future.”, answered on a five 
point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”) 
 Approval of climate change policies (two items, Cronbach’s Alpha = .827, example 
item: “I will approve of policies which ensure that everyone takes actions to address 
climate change.”, answered on a five point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly 
disagree” to “Strongly agree”) 
 Two items assessing gender and age of participants. 
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We booked a table reserved for charities on three Sundays to collect data at the 
Grafton shopping mall. Above this table a poster advertised that people could earn £2 for 
completing a short questionnaire. We also asked people walking by if they were willing to 
complete the questionnaire. Once participants filled out the questionnaire, they were asked to 
return to the table to collect the £2 reward and provide a signature to confirm that they 
received the money. After receiving the money in the form of four 50p coins, participants 
were asked to fold their completed questionnaire and drop it in a box on the other end of the 
table. Next to this box a donation tin was placed with the respective experimental message on 
the donation tin. In front of the tin another poster displayed the experimental message and a 
request to donate generously. A petition was displayed on the table asking people to sign to 
support stricter climate change policies. Again in front of the petition a poster with the 
experimental message and a request to sign the petition was displayed. 
Thus the experimental manipulation was achieved through presenting the respective 
message for each condition five times: 1) as a heading for questionnaire items relating to 
climate change, 2) in the wording of one of the questions asking about people’s actions to 
address climate change, 3) on the donation tin, 4) on a poster in front of the donation tin, 5) 
on a poster in front of the petition. 
Each experimental message (control, fairness, collective interest) was presented for 
the time span of an hour. After an hour the questionnaire and the messages on the tin and 
posters were changed to a different message. Throughout the three different days of data 
collection each of the messages were further presented at similar times of the day. We were 
thus able to assess the effect of the experimental message on participants’ self-reported 
intention and willingness to act to address climate change, their self-reported approval of 
climate change policies, their donation behaviour (which serves as a behavioural measure for 
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actions to address climate change) and the signing of the petition (which serves as a 
behavioural measure for the approval of climate change policies). 
7.6.2. Results 
We ran a series of stepwise multiple regressions to determine the role of the different 
personality characteristics predisposing a focus on collective outcomes as well as the effect of 
the framing manipulation. 
Descriptive statistics for the different personality characteristics were as follows: 
collective identity community (M = 3.32, SD = .96, maximum possible range 1-5), collective 
identity Britain (M = 3.17, SD = 1.07, maximum possible range 1-5), collective identity all 
humans (M = 3.27, SD = 1.19, maximum possible range 1-5), communitarianism (M = 11.66, 
SD = 2.91, maximum possible range 4-20), and self-transcendence values (M = 13.25, SD = 
1.97, maximum possible range 3-15). 
On average participants reported a high willingness and intention to act on climate 
change (M = 11.55, SD = 2.04, maximum possible range 3-15). We started by assessing the 
unique contribution of the personality characteristics to explaining people’s self-reported 
willingness and intention to act on climate change. We included the personality 
characteristics as predictors in a linear regression model with self-reported willingness and 
intention to act on climate change as the dependent variable (the full regression table can be 
found in Table 7.2 in Appendix D). Self-transcendence values (t = 2.254, p = 0.26) and a 
collective identity with all humans (t = 2.909, p = .004) were significant positive predictors of 
participants’ reported intention and willingness to act on climate change. This is consistent 
with H2. 
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We then added the experimental framing conditions into the model. We added two 
dummy variables, representing the contrast between the control condition and the respective 
experimental condition (collective interest and fairness). R2 change for this model was .020 
(F change = 1.533, p = .220). The full regression table can be found in Table 7.3 in Appendix 
D. 
After establishing a marginally significant negative effect of the collective interest 
manipulation (t = -1.743, p = .084) we also tested interaction terms between the contrast 
variable for the collective interest manipulation and the personality characteristics. The 
interaction between the collective interest manipulation and a collective identity with one’s 
community was a predictor for people’s self-reported willingness and intention to address 
climate change. Further the interaction term between the collective interest manipulation and 
self-transcendence values reached marginal significance and was kept in the model. R2 
change for this model was .070 (F change = 5.887, p = .004). The final model, including 
these interaction terms, explains a significant amount of variance in people’s willingness to 
take actions. The model is presented in Table 7.4: 
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Predictors B SE B β t Sig. 
Constant 8.374 1.579  5.304 .000 
Self-transcendence values .096 .101 .091 .944 .347 
Collective identity community -.296 .245 -.137 -1.205 .231 
Collective identity Britain .156 .248 .081 .628 .531 
Collective identity humans .568 .202 .325 2.811 .006 
Communitarianism .089 .059 .125 1.522 .131 
Collective interest 
manipulation 
-8.390 2.528 -1.907 -3.319 .001 
Fairness manipulation -.493 .406 -.115 -1.214 .227 
Collective interest 
manipulation x self-
transcendence values 
.346 .186 1.024 1.862 .065 
Collective interest 
manipulation x collective 
identity community 
.939 .386 .720 2.431 .017 
Note: All variables were entered simultaneously; n = 120; R2 = .340; F (9, 111) = 6.36, p < 
.001 
 
Table 7.4: Linear regression analysis predicting participants’ self-reported willingness and 
intention to take actions to address climate change (personality characteristics, manipulation 
and interaction terms as predictors). 
Results from the multiple regressions show that the collective interest manipulation 
exerts a negative effect on people’s reported intention and willingness to act on climate 
change, compared to the control message. People who received the message relating to 
collective interest (Act on climate change for the good of everybody) reported a lower 
willingness or intention to address climate change compared to those who received the 
control message (Act on climate change). 
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This finding that the control message led to a higher willingness and intention to act 
on climate change was contrary to expectations (H1). One explanation could be that the more 
neutral control message allows a wider interpretation and thus gives people the chance to read 
their personal motivations into the message. The control message may not antagonise people 
who do not agree with the interpretations offered in the other two experimental messages. 
Another potential explanation is an adverse reaction to the collective interest message. The 
message could have consciously or subconsciously been perceived as morally laden and too 
prescriptive or moralizing, which in turn might evoke an adverse reaction. 
This negative effect of the collective interest manipulation is reduced for people with 
high self-transcendence values and for people that strongly identify with their community. 
These findings are illustrated in Figures 7.2 and 7.3, presenting simple slopes (based on 
uncentred data): 
 
Figure 7.2: Simple slopes for the pattern of interaction between the collective interest 
manipulation and self-transcendence values. 
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Figure 7.3: Simple slopes for the pattern of interaction between the collective interest 
manipulation and collective identity community. 
The fact that the negative effect of the collective interest message is less for people 
high in self-transcendence values supports the interpretation of an adverse reaction to the 
message in the rest of the sample. People high in self-transcendence values are less likely to 
experience this adverse reaction, as a collective interest message is more in line with their 
stronger focus on others. Further we can observe that self-transcendence values are no longer 
a significant predictor of the willingness and intention to act on climate change when we 
include the interaction term ‘collective interest manipulation x self-transcendence’. This 
result is expected as self-transcendence values were entered a second time as part of the 
interaction term. 
Next we analysed the behavioural variable assessing actions to address climate 
change: people’s donations to Cambridge Carbon Footprint. Of the 129 participants 18 
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donated all or part of their participation money to Cambridge Carbon Footprint. We 
performed a logistic regression to assess the effect of the different messages on whether 
participants donated any of the money they received for the experiment or not. The outcome 
variable here is a binary variable which assessed whether people donated or not. Results are 
similar to the ones reported below when a continuous variable of the amount donated is used.  
Again, in a first step we assessed the importance of the personality characteristics for 
whether or not participants donated to Cambridge Carbon Footprint. A logistic regression 
revealed that identifying with humans in general (Wald = 3.827, p = .050) as well as 
communitarianism (Wald = 4.942, p = .026) were both positive predictors of whether or not 
people donated to Cambridge Carbon Footprint (the full regression can be found in Table 7.5 
in Appendix D). The Chi-square for this block of variables is χ2 (5, N = 122) = 11.301, p 
= .046. 
A second step added the framing manipulation as a predictor in the regression model. 
The results are displayed in Table 7.6. The Chi-square for this second block of variables is χ2 
(2, N = 122) = 3.395, p = .183, which illustrates that this did not improve the model beyond 
the predictor variables from the first step. Overall this final model significantly explains 
participants donating money to Cambridge Carbon Footprint. 
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Predictors B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Self-transcendence values  .111 .178 .390 .532 1.118 
Collective identity community .265 .382 .482 .487 1.304 
Collective identity Britain -.647 .478 1.833 .176 .524 
Collective identity humans .843 .420 4.019 .045 2.323 
Communitarianism .226 .106 4.527 .033 1.253 
Control manipulation   3.323 .190  
Collective manipulation -1.228 .764 2.584 .108 .293 
Fairness manipulation -.947 .697 1.845 .174 .388 
Constant -7.257 3.034 5.721 .017 .001 
Note: All variables are entered simultaneously; Cox & Snell R2 = .113; χ2 (7, N = 122) = 14.696, p = 
.040 
 
Table 7.6: Logistic regression analysis predicting whether or not participants donate to 
Cambridge Carbon Footprint (personality characteristics and manipulation as predictors). 
Similar to the self-reported actions to address climate change, the data on actual 
donations shows the control message to be the most successful message. This trend did not 
reach significance but indicates that the control message may be more successful in 
promoting actual donation behaviour. Again, potential explanations for this finding are the 
higher openness to interpretation of the control message or adverse reactions to the other 
framing messages. In addition Table 7.6 also shows identifying with humans in general and 
communitarianism as significant positive predictors of donations. 
Further analyses including interaction terms between the manipulation and personality 
traits did not reveal any significant interaction effects. 
After looking at the effect of the manipulation and the role of personality 
characteristics with regards to actions to address climate change, we repeated the linear 
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regression analyses for the approval of climate change policies. On average people reported 
high approval of climate change policies (M = 7.50, SD = 1.65, maximum possible range 2-
10). Again in a first linear regression model we included the personality characteristics as 
predictors and people’s self-reported approval of climate change policies as dependent 
variable (the full regression table can be found in Table 7.7 in Appendix D). The regression 
analysis revealed self-transcendence values as a significant positive predictor for the approval 
of climate change policies (t = 2.860, p = .005). Further identifying with humans in general 
was found to be a marginally significant positive predictor for self-reported approval (t = 
1.847, p = .067). 
Next we included the manipulation in the form of a dummy contrast variable in the 
linear regression model. R2 change for this model was .037 (F change = 2.957, p = .056). 
After establishing a significant negative effect of both the collective interest (t = -2.213, p 
= .029) and fairness manipulation (t = -2.031, p = .045) (see Table 7.8 in Appendix D) we 
further explored potential interaction effects between the personality characteristics and the 
two experimental manipulations. We found only one significant interaction effect, and thus 
included the respective interaction term ‘fairness framing manipulation x communitarianism’ 
in the final model, which is displayed in Table 7.9. R2 change for this model was .025 (F 
change = 4.022, p = .047). Overall this final model explains a significant amount of variance 
in participants’ self-reported approval of climate change policies. 
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Predictors B SE B β t Sig. 
Constant 2.609 1.287  2.027 .045 
Self-transcendence values .208 .071 .245 2.927 .004 
Collective identity 
community 
-.067 .181 -.038 -.371 .711 
Collective identity Britain .295 .204 .188 1.445 .151 
Collective identity humans .289 .167 .204 1.735 .085 
Communitarianism .088 .057 .152 1.538 .127 
Collective interest 
manipulation 
-.788 .339 -.221 -2.322 .022 
Fairness manipulation 1.586 1.180 .455 1.344 .182 
Fairness manipulation x 
communitarianism 
-.201 .100 -.665 -2.006 .047 
Note: All variables were entered simultaneously; n = 121; R2 = .303; F (8, 121) = 6.130, p 
< .001 
 
Table 7.9: Linear regression analysis predicting participants’ self-reported approval of 
climate change policies (personality characteristics, manipulation and interaction terms as 
predictors). 
Results show that people reading the control message were significantly more likely 
to approve of climate change policies compared to people who read the collective interest 
message. As was the case for actions to address climate change, the effectiveness of the 
control message was surprising. Similarly the two explanations for these results are an 
adverse reaction to the framing manipulation texts and the higher openness for interpretation 
of the control message. 
Results show a significant interaction term (fairness manipulation x 
communitarianism). Including this interaction term results in the fairness manipulation no 
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longer exerting a significant main effect on approval of policies. The negative effect of the 
fairness message is larger for people who are high in communitarianism. This finding is 
illustrated in Figure 7.4 through simple slopes (based on uncentred data). 
 
Figure 7.4: Simple slopes for the pattern of interaction between the fairness manipulation 
and communitarianism. 
People high in communitarianism already advocate solidarity and policy solutions. 
These people might be negatively affected by a message that ‘preaches’ something they 
already do. But this finding and explanation contradicts the remaining interaction findings, 
where people with personality characteristics in line with the message framing did not 
experience the adverse effect of the collective interest and framing message. 
Unfortunately we were not able to assess if a similar manipulation effect could be 
detected for the behavioural measure of signing a petition which asks for stricter climate 
change policies. Only three participants signed the petition, a sample size too small to draw 
any conclusions. 
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To summarise, with regards to the manipulation effects, the field study suggests the 
control message is more effective than the collective interest and fairness message for 
promoting actions to address climate change and approval of climate change policies. 
Interaction effects reveal that the reduced effectiveness or negative effect of the collective 
interest message on actions to address climate change is less pronounced in people with high 
self-transcendence values and those who strongly identify with their community. These 
findings are in line with findings from a social dilemma study reported in chapter two. 
Researchers found that moralization in a social dilemma backfired when participants showed 
a high pro-self orientation. Primes that induced morality reduced cooperation amongst these 
participants (Smeesters et al., 2003). The reduced effectiveness or negative effect of the 
fairness message on the approval of climate change policies is reinforced by 
communitarianism. 
With regards to the direct effects of personality characteristics, results show that 
strongly identifying with all humans everywhere is a consistent predictor for actions to 
address climate change, not only self-reported actions, but also the behavioural measure 
(donating to Cambridge Carbon Footprint). Findings further show that this collective identity 
with all humans was also marginally predictive of approval of climate change policies. Thus 
a collective identity that is as widely placed as humans everywhere, in contrast to identifying 
with people in the own country or people in the community, shows a consistent positive 
effect in our field study. 
Further the field study replicated results from the pilot study in terms of the positive 
effect of self-transcendence values on people’s self-reported actions to address climate 
change and approval of climate change policies. But while self-transcendence values did 
predict self-reported measures, they were not a positive predictor for the stronger behavioural 
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measure, donating to Cambridge Carbon Footprint. However, communitarianism, the 
measure of a more solidary way of life, was a positive predictor only for this behavioural 
measure.
 
7.7. Discussion 
The pilot and field study aimed to test the effects of a message based on cooperative 
considerations and therefore address objective four of this thesis (To determine whether 
communication based on cooperative considerations can increase personal actions to address 
climate change). Results were not in line with the expected positive effect of such messaging 
on actions to address climate change and approval of climate change policies. Only the pilot 
study showed trends in the expected direction: they suggest a positive effect of messages 
based on the two cooperative considerations collective interest and fairness on people’s 
actions to address climate change. In contrast, results from the field study indicate that the 
control message was most effective in increasing action and approval. This discrepancy 
between findings from the two studies has various possible explanations.  
First, the pilot study was a computer based questionnaire, while participants in the 
field study filled in their questionnaire while shopping in a busy environment. It is possible 
that if people have time and concentrate on the messages, which is more likely the case in a 
computer based assessment, the collective interest and fairness framing may indeed elicit 
cooperative considerations and lead to an increase in action. In a busy and distracting 
environment, like a shopping centre, people may be less concentrated and thus simpler 
messages, not eluding to concepts like fairness, may be more effective. 
175 
7. The effect of collective interest and fairness messages 
Second, in the field study the experimental messages were repeated several times, 
including on colour posters which also displayed the logo of Cambridge Carbon Footprint. 
The more frequent repetitions of the messages in the field study and the link to a charity 
working on climate change mitigation may in combination with the collective interest and 
fairness message have led to participants feeling guilty or lectured. This in turn might have 
created an adverse reaction to these framing messages. Contrarily, in the pilot study the 
message was only displayed twice and without any connection to a charitable organisation. 
The reported interaction effects can be interpreted to support this explanation. The negative 
effect of the collective interest message, compared to the control message is reduced for 
people high in self-transcendence values and those that highly identify with their community. 
Due to their belief and values these people may not experience the adverse effect of being 
lectured by a repeated collective interest message. 
 Third, the pilot study was conducted on a sample of students, whereas the field study 
sample consisted of a sample of passers-by in a Cambridge shopping mall. The same 
messages may exhibit different effects dependent on the audience. Students in development 
studies have been exposed to a variety of topics relating to fairness and the collective interest 
as part of their course. They may thus be more receptive to these messages and perceive them 
as less moralising, compared to the sample from the field study. 
Further research is needed to determine the conditions under which messages based 
on cooperative considerations can be successful in promoting actions to address climate 
change and the approval of climate change policies. 
Values and identities strongly related to collective outcomes, especially if the 
collective is seen as broad as the entire human race, are related to people’s actions and 
approval of climate change policies. Especially if we take together the two most consistent 
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predictors, self-transcendence values and an identification with all humans everywhere, we 
can find support for the claim that we need to foster global citizenship to successfully 
mitigate climate change (Dower and Williams, 2002, Schattle, 2008, Szerszynski and 
Toogood, 2000). Further research is needed to identify ways to increase this broad collective 
identity. 
The results from the pilot and field study and especially the detected interaction 
effects further suggest that there is no one-size-fits-all solution for messaging in campaigns. 
The results clearly show that personality influences how people respond to messages. Careful 
pre-testing of campaigning communication in the environment they are intended to be used in 
and on the audience they are exposed to is strongly recommended. 
Several shortcomings of these studies should be recognised. As stated above, the pilot 
study functioned as a first test of our hypotheses and therefore was subject to a small and 
biased sample. This was not the case in the field study, for which we had a larger, diverse 
sample. The problems arising here were of different nature: as noted, several participants 
came in groups, as families or friends, to take part in the study. Participants were then asked 
to answer the questionnaires independently and it was ensured, where possible, that the 
participants received their reward separately and dropped their own questionnaire in the box 
separately. Additionally some of the participants were very young (the youngest was eleven). 
This happened especially if parents assured that their children were able to grasp the subject 
and wanted to complete the questionnaire as well. To ensure that these young participants did 
not skew results, we reran the analyses excluding participants below the age of 16. This 
change in the sample did not change the reported findings. A further complication might have 
been, that some participants already had earmarked the £2 for something else before they 
went through the process of filling in the questionnaire and being exposed to the experimental 
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manipulation message. We issued the £2 in four pieces of 50p, so participants did not have to 
make an all-or-nothing decision with regards to their donation.
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8. Discussion 
This thesis aims to understand people’s considerations in response to the social 
dilemma structure of climate change mitigation and how these considerations affect people’s 
actions on climate change. Findings show that the social dilemma structure can have both, an 
encouraging and a discouraging effect. The effect depends on which characteristics of the 
dilemma are focused on and whether cooperative or non-cooperative considerations are 
elicited. Although the literature documents the negative effects in some detail, the potential 
for positive effects promoting cooperation has been inadequately addressed. This thesis helps 
to fill this knowledge gap. In this concluding chapter I will discuss key findings in more 
detail, draw out strategies to increase cooperation in the climate change mitigation dilemma, 
and identify areas for further research. 
 
8.1. Awareness of social dilemma characteristics 
The first objective of this thesis is to determine to what extent people are aware of the 
social dilemma characteristics of a situation. As outlined in chapters three and four, 
Interdependence Theory, the Appropriateness Framework and researchers in the field of 
social dilemmas suggest that people may not be aware of the collective outcome, outcomes 
for others and long-term consequences in social dilemma situations. When making a decision 
the individual’s focus may remain on short-term consequences for themselves (Rusbult and 
Van Lange, 2003). This does not necessarily mean that decision makers are purely driven by 
the motive to maximise personal benefits, as suggested by Rational Choice Theory. They 
may simply not be aware of consequences beyond these short term benefits. This 
unawareness in turn prevents the rise of a conflict between personal and collective outcomes, 
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a defining characteristic of social dilemmas (Burke, 2001). Findings from the empirical study 
reported in chapter four show that the awareness of a conflict between personal and collective 
outcomes varies between different specific decision making situations. Certain situational 
characteristics were linked to an increased consideration of collective outcomes. A more 
salient pro-social nature of the situation is one of these characteristics. This finding is in line 
with the Appropriateness Framework and Interdependence Theory, which both emphasise 
people’s understanding of the situation and thus the effect of framing situations differently. 
Additionally the more common a situation, the less likely that consequences beyond 
immediate personal benefits are considered. Results further showed that people are more 
likely to consider the conflict between personal and collective outcomes when the social 
dilemma structure is made salient. Especially when the collective is made salient, as the 
restaurant dilemma shows, considerations of the collective and others involved in the social 
dilemma are much more likely. In this case certain factors described by Interdependence 
Theory – such as relationship specific motives (“how well I know and get on with the course 
mates”), social norms (“choose food and drink that is in the total amount similar to that from 
everyone else”) and interpersonal dispositions (“not too expensive so as to burden others”) - 
were triggered, which led to a transformation of the ‘given situation’. Putting social dilemma 
situations into a social context and making the affected collective salient, can increase 
considerations of collective outcomes. However, the overall conclusion is that it cannot be 
assumed that people perceive social dilemma decision making situations as such in every day 
decision contexts. 
This conclusion also applies to decision making situations with emission 
consequences (the transport and campaign dilemma in chapter four): the collective outcome 
of decisions is not necessarily obvious to people in specific decision making situations related 
to climate change mitigation. This is reinforced by decisions related to climate change 
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mitigation being often talked about in terms of personal costs and benefits. This applies to 
public perceptions, advertising and communication to increase pro-environmental behaviour, 
which often advertises behavioural change from this personal costs and benefits perspective 
(Corner and Randall, 2011). Home heating and water usage is often seen through the lens of 
costs and bills, travel advertisements refer to price, comfort and experience, and dietary 
decisions are made based on taste, cost and personal health. 
The awareness of a conflict between personal and collective outcomes differs 
depending on whether people reason about specific decisions or more generally about actions 
to address climate change. Findings from the qualitative data reported in chapter six show 
that if people talk about climate change and climate change mitigation in general, the 
collective outcome is more likely to be considered, compared to when presented with specific 
decision making situations (chapter four). During open discussions about climate change at 
the beginning of interviews, participants demonstrated an awareness of collective outcomes 
and outcomes for others. Participants mentioned consequences for future generations and the 
danger of an uninhabitable climate. This awareness may be linked to the amount of 
information and education on climate change the public has been exposed to in recent years. 
Research has also shown that climate change is perceived as a moral issue (Poortinga and 
Pidgeon, 2003) and so the pro-social nature of related decisions maybe more salient. Linking 
specific personal decisions directly to climate change may have the potential to increase 
people’s awareness of the conflict between personal and collective outcomes and transform 
the perceived decision problem into a social dilemma.
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8.2. Consideration of the collective outcome 
The conditions under which awareness of a conflict between personal and collective 
outcomes increases are important because chapters four, five, six and seven clearly show that 
a salient collective outcome (as opposed to a focus solely on the personal outcome) is linked 
to increased actions to address climate change. In chapters five and six I found that people 
who respond with cooperative considerations which relate to the long term collective 
outcome show higher levels of action on climate change and approval of climate change 
policies. In line with these findings chapter seven found that personality characteristics 
reflecting a predisposition to focus on the collective outcome in a social dilemma are 
associated with increased cooperation. Chapters four and seven also show that making the 
collective outcome salient in online framing experiments increased actions to address climate 
change. These findings are in line with theories on behaviour in social dilemmas as well as 
pro-environmental behaviour. As outlined in chapter three, a focus on the collective outcome 
and consequences for others is linked to increased cooperation and pro-environmental 
behaviour in these theories and forms the basis for motivational approaches to increase 
cooperation. Nevertheless I did find a divergent result in a field study conducted in a 
shopping mall (chapter seven). Here the collective interest and fairness framing messages had 
a negative effect on actions to address climate change and approval of climate change 
policies (compared to a control message). Possible explanations for this finding, which is 
contrary to the overall conclusion that can be drawn from literature review and the remaining 
empirical chapters of this thesis, are outlined in chapter seven. 
The overall conclusion is as follows: there is strong indication that a focus on the 
collective outcome has a positive effect on actions on climate change. However, this positive 
effect cannot be achieved unconditionally by climate change communication. Although 
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messages relating to the collective outcome have caused an increase in actions in some of the 
studies, this was not the case for the field study experiment. Communication messages have 
to be viewed in their context: although a focus on the collective outcome can generally 
increase actions on climate change, the audience and situation in which the message is 
communicated plays an important role.
 
8.3. Considerations of personal costs and benefits 
Apart from the positive link between cooperative considerations and a focus on the 
collective outcome and actions on climate change, I also looked at a potentially discouraging 
effect of the social dilemma structure. One of the obvious reasons for a lack of cooperation in 
the mitigation dilemma is a focus on personal costs and benefits, as predicted by Rational 
Choice Theory. This focus is reflected in two of the non-cooperative considerations: 
immediate self-interest and temptation to free-ride. These are indeed empirically linked to a 
decrease in action on climate change as demonstrated in chapter five. Additionally a desire to 
increase personal benefits was named as a strong driver of decision making in answers to the 
open ended questions in chapter four. This is especially true for decision making situations 
that are not of an obvious pro-social nature. If a pro-social nature was more salient, personal 
benefits were less frequently named as drivers for decisions. Results in chapter four and five 
further show that in discussions about climate change mitigation, immediate self-interest and 
the temptation to free-ride were more frequently mentioned in relation to other people’s 
behaviour or corporations than in relation to one’s own behaviour. This could be an 
indication of a social desirability bias. People may feel reluctant to admit to these drivers, 
when they could be judged on that basis. In the qualitative interviews people refer to an 
egocentric or social desirability bias when talking about other people’s reasoning: the three 
183 
8. Discussion 
non-cooperative considerations fear of being a sucker, hopelessness and personal 
insignificance are frequently referred to as excuses others make when the true motivation is 
to increase personal benefits.
 
8.4. Strategies to increase cooperation in the climate change mitigation dilemma 
Based on the findings discussed above, a potential strategy to increase cooperation in 
the climate change mitigation dilemma is to increase individuals’ consideration of collective 
outcomes. This means clearly linking specific decisions, such as meat consumption or 
transport decisions, to their collective costs with regards to climate change. Generally, 
increasing people’s awareness that these decisions have emission consequences might already 
have a positive effect. But findings from chapter four suggest that this awareness has to go 
further to increase cooperation; the emission consequences have to be clearly linked to 
outcomes for the collective and others. This finding underlines the viability of moralization, a 
motivational approach for ensuring socially optimum outcomes introduced in chapter two. In 
line with this strategy Horton and Doron have advocated making people more aware of the 
social context of climate change mitigation and related personal decisions (Horton and 
Doron, 2011). 
As outlined in chapter two, another way of increasing the consideration of collective 
outcomes is to strengthen group identity. In the case of climate change mitigation that means 
strengthening of global citizenship. Global citizenship is understood as “a concept which 
signifies the way in which one’s identity and ethical responsibility is not limited to their 
“local” community (i.e. family, nation)” (Jefferess, 2008, p.27). Chapter seven confirms that 
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this could be a viable approach, as identifying with the human race as a whole was linked to 
increased action to address climate change in the empirical studies. 
All non-cooperative considerations showed a clear link to reduced actions to address 
climate change. This is a very clear result from both quantitative and qualitative data. Thus 
while strengthening a focus on the collective outcome and cooperative considerations is a 
viable strategy to increase cooperation, weakening the effect of non-cooperative 
considerations might be another important approach. In chapter five interviewees reported a 
number of reasonings to counteract this discouraging effect of non-cooperative 
considerations, for example the desire to act as a role model. These countering strategies can 
be interpreted as people’s own motivational approaches which make it more likely for them 
personally to cooperate. As outlined in chapter two, motivational approaches increase the 
valuation of the collective outcome. The countering strategies of wanting to be one of the 
‘good ones’ and acting as a role model can also be interpreted as a strategic approach. People 
may hope that their cooperation is reciprocated by others, either for interpersonal long-term 
benefit or to achieve the aim of mutual cooperation and thus achieve to tackle climate change. 
Such strategies might be more broadly applied to address people’s fears and worries about 
climate change in a direct way. 
Chapter two introduced a number of structural approaches, such as incentives or 
disincentives and rules and regulations, to increase cooperation in social dilemmas. These 
approaches are often applied by governments in the form of policies, but are difficult to 
implement if they lack public support. Thus in order to increase the effectiveness and 
viability of these approaches, ways to increase public approval need to be found. Findings 
from the empirical chapters suggest that the same strategies to increase cooperation can be 
used to increase public approval of climate change policies. Conversely results suggest that 
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eliciting the non-cooperative considerations fear of being a sucker, personal insignificance 
and hopelessness are not a viable strategies to increase demand for policy solutions.
 
8.5. Methodological contributions 
In addition to the empirical insights, this thesis makes an important methodological 
contributions: the finding that the assessment method (and thus the framing contained in 
questions) can lead to differences in findings. Chapter four highlights that making social 
dilemma characteristics salient in the questions (through closed ended response options) leads 
to slightly more frequent reports of these characteristics being considered in decision making. 
This sort of increased salience is a common characteristic of questionnaire based research. 
Empirical findings should be interpreted in the light of the fact that assessment methods do 
influence research outcomes.
 
8.6. Field study material not included in this thesis 
Findings from one part of my research related to the framing manipulation in chapter 
seven, are not reported in the empirical part of this thesis due to a very small sample size. In 
order to further increase the external validity of the framing manipulation reported in chapter 
seven I implemented an experiment based on flyers. 10,000 flyers were printed, containing 
the different experimental messages. The flyers showed the logo of Cambridge Carbon 
Footprint, the respective experimental message, and an invitation to a talk about motivating 
oneself to act on climate change. The talk was co-organised by Cambridge Carbon Footprint 
and the topic of the talk was chosen to entail a clear intention from attendees to change 
behaviour. The flyer asked people to book a place at the event via email. Every experimental 
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message was assigned a different email address for booking. Thus I was able to assess the 
effect of the different messages on the number of people booking a place at the event. The 
flyers were distributed through two different means: 8,000 flyers were distributed via the 
Cambridge Crier, a free newspaper, and a further 2,000 flyers were delivered by hand. While 
the event was very well attended and considered a success, only ten people from the 10,000 
households who received flyers booked via email. Thus the sample size was too small to 
draw any conclusion on the effectiveness of different messages. One of the problems was 
discovered by a sampled door-knock after the distribution date of the Cambridge Crier. 
People reported very frequently that either the whole newspaper or at least the flyer inlays 
were not read, but thrown straight into the bin. A lot of time and energy went into organizing 
this field experiment. The fact that the data could not be used underlines the difficulties that 
can be encountered when moving from a controlled laboratory experiment to a field 
experiment. Nevertheless, learning about the time scales required and the many potential 
difficulties encountered in a field experiment of this scale, as well as the positive experience 
of the co-designed event, made the flyer experiment an important part of my personal and 
professional development.
 
8.7. Outlook and further research 
Further research is needed to address the question of how cooperative considerations, 
related to the desirability of collective outcomes, can be strengthened and how a global 
citizenship identity can be promoted. Further research is also needed into effective ways of 
making salient the reasonings that people use to counteract non-cooperative considerations. 
Communication campaigns are one way of increasing cooperative considerations, global 
citizenship, and counter reasonings to non-cooperative considerations. The findings from this 
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thesis indicate that communication messages may present a way to elicit cooperative 
considerations, but careful attention has to be paid to the context and the audience. To test the 
effect of different contexts and audiences, similar experiments to the one reported in chapter 
seven could be run in different places and with different target audiences. The channel 
through which the message is communicated might further play an important role. The 
experiment in chapter seven used posters and questionnaire items to deliver the respective 
communication messages. Another possibility would be to use the researcher in contact with 
participants to deliver different messages orally when inviting participants to the research 
study. This method could potentially strengthen the manipulations. A second option has been 
demonstrated in other studies (e.g. Horton and Doron, 2011): engaging people in the social 
context of climate change mitigation through group discussions may form an important 
component to achieve the strengthening of cooperative considerations. In Horton and Doron’s 
study prompts described the emission budget as a scarce resource and therefore framed 
emission behaviour as a social dilemma. The effects of discussions following this prompt 
versus discussions not using this and other social dilemma prompts could be tested through 
questionnaires which can be administered at the end of a group discussion or the use of a 
behavioural measure, such as the option to donate money or sign up to a group working on 
climate change. If found to be successful in achieving a change in emission behaviour, such 
group discussions could, for example, be included in adult and child education programs. 
Public and political debate could also help increase the salience of collective outcomes and 
global citizenship as opposed to a focus on personal outcomes and national or local identity. 
Environmental groups and politicians could include the collective cost explicitly in their 
narratives and arguments around climate change. 
Findings from chapter six show that future generations are the most important 
conceptualization of others affected by climate change. The temporal dimension of climate 
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change mitigation means that the collective stretches beyond the lifetime of the decision 
maker. As outlined in chapter two this can lead to social and temporal discounting and thus 
decrease cooperation. This research however suggests that a concern for future generations 
can be a strong driver for action. Thinking about potential consequences for future 
generations was reported as a strong motivation to take actions on climate change in the 
interview study reported in chapter six. One explanation for this positive effect is the 
existence of a legacy motive. Legacy can be defined as “an enduring meaning attached to 
one’s identity and manifested in the impact that one has on others beyond the temporal 
constraints of the lifespan”(Fox et al., 2010, p.153). Research is needed to further determine 
the effect of considerations of future generations. Do these considerations encourage social 
and temporal discounting? Or do they encourage a legacy or other motive which fosters 
actions on climate change? Initial findings suggest that a positive legacy could be a strong 
motivator for pro-environmental actions (Zaval et al., 2015). The research by Zaval and 
colleagues suggests that people who report a higher legacy motive are more likely to display 
pro-environmental behaviour and that priming a legacy motive can have a positive effect on 
donations to an environmental NGO and self-reported intentions to act in a pro-
environmental way. Expanding this research through a field study similar to the one reported 
in chapter seven, but using a legacy framing, could increase confidence in these initial 
findings. Such a legacy framing could, for example, be a text explicitly raising the question of 
how we will be remembered by future generations. Future research could test the effect of a 
legacy priming in a classic social dilemma game to explore its potential to encourage 
cooperation. Using different social dilemma games, both related and unrelated to 
environmental issues, could shed light on whether the legacy motive increases cooperation 
only in situation related to environmental issues or has a broader effect on different social 
dilemma situations. Further exploration of the origin of the legacy motive is needed as well. 
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Gathering a number of demographic data and data on other beliefs would enable future 
research to determine associations between the legacy and other motives. It would further 
shed light on who displays a strong legacy motive and whether it is more pronounced in 
people with children and of older age.
 
8.8. Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis is to understand people’s considerations in response to the 
social dilemma structure of climate change mitigation and how these considerations affect 
people’s actions on climate change. The dominant argument in the literature is that the social 
dilemma structure elicits non-cooperative considerations which explain a lack of personal 
actions on climate change. The findings of this thesis challenge two key elements of this 
argument. 
Firstly, this argument assumes that people are aware of the social dilemma structure 
of a situation when making decisions with emission consequences. Objective one of this 
thesis addresses this assumption. Objective one is: To determine people’s awareness of the 
social dilemma structure of climate change mitigation. Findings reported in chapter four 
show that we cannot assume people’s awareness of social dilemma characteristics in decision 
making situations. Education, the salience of the collective or the prosocial nature of the 
situation and the amount of deliberation involved are factors that influence people’s 
awareness of these social dilemma characteristics. 
Secondly, the dominant argument in the literature assumes that the social dilemma 
structure of climate change mitigation elicits only non-cooperative considerations associated 
with decreased actions on climate change. Objectives two and three of this thesis address this 
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assumption. Objective two is: To determine people’s cooperative and non-cooperative 
considerations in response to the social dilemma structure of climate change mitigation. 
Objective three is: To determine how cooperative and non-cooperative considerations in 
response to the social dilemma structure of climate change mitigation affect personal actions 
to address climate change. Findings reported in chapter four, five and six of this thesis 
support the evidence of non-cooperative considerations and their association with decreased 
actions. However there was also evidence of a second set of cooperative considerations which 
are associated with an increase in action. Especially the consideration of collective interest 
(mitigation of climate change as the socially optimum outcome) shows a clear link to 
people’s personal actions on climate change and approval of climate change policies. 
Additionally, people demonstrate reasoning strategies to overcome the discouraging effect of 
the social dilemma structure. 
Evidence of this second set of cooperative considerations and their association with 
increased actions on climate change opens up the potential to use these considerations as a 
way to promote personal mitigation efforts. This possibility is reflected in objective four of 
this thesis. Objective four is: To determine whether communication based on cooperative 
considerations can increase personal actions to address climate change. Findings reported in 
chapter four and seven indicate that while there is potential for a positive effect of 
communications based on cooperative considerations, such approaches need to carefully 
consider the context and audience of the communication and require thorough piloting to 
avoid adverse effects. 
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Part 1 – open-ended questions: 
The following questions present a number of decision making situations. Please imagine 
you are the one making these decisions. We are interested in the things you weigh up when 
making a decision. There are no right or wrong answers; this is simply about how you 
personally make decisions. 
1. Imagine you are at a restaurant with the people from one of your courses. You have 
agreed that after dinner you will split the bill equally between you. Please list up to 
three things you weigh up when deciding what food and drink to have from the 
menu. 
2. Imagine you need to travel to Aberdeen, Scotland (about 500 miles from Norwich) 
for a couple of days. You need to decide how to get there. Please list up to three 
things you weigh up when deciding on a mode of transport. 
3. Imagine you are trying to decide whether or not to participate in a climate change 
campaign by handing out leaflets. What things might you weigh up in your mind 
when making this decision? Please list up to three things you weigh up. 
4. Imagine you are trying to decide whether or not to actively support public sector 
strikes by joining a demonstration. What things might you weigh up in your mind 
when making this decision? Please list up to three things you weigh up. 
5. Imagine you are trying to decide whether or not to watch a movie streamed online 
for free. What things might you weigh up in your mind when making this decision? 
Please list up to three things you weigh up. 
Part 2 – closed-ended questions (hierarchy task) 
The following questions are about a similar set of decisions. This time we have 
provided a selection of things other people might weigh up when making these decisions. 
These are listed in a box marked 'Items'. Please rank these things IN ORDER OF 
IMPORTANCE TO YOUR DECISION by dragging them into the box marked 'Ranking in 
order of importance'. 
If any of these things have no relevance at all to how you make the decision, please leave 
them in the "Items" box. 
1. Decision: whether or not to participate in a climate change campaign by handing out 
leaflets Please rank the following things in order of importance to your decision: 
Whether or not it is convenient 
Whether or not I believe climate change is a threat 
Whether or not a stable climate is important to me 
Whether or not we can make a difference if enough people participate 
Whether or not it is time consuming 
Whether or not participating in climate change campaigns is worthwhile 
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Whether or not other people will suffer under climate change 
Whether or not I am responsible for climate change 
2. Decision: whether or not to actively support public sector strikes by joining a 
demonstration Please rank the following things in order of importance to your 
decision: 
Whether or not supporting strikes is worthwhile 
Whether or not other people will suffer as a result of cuts in the public sector 
Whether or not we can make a difference if enough people support the strikes 
Whether or not I believe the public sector needs improving 
Whether or not a healthy public sector is important to me 
Whether or not it is convenient 
Whether or not it is time consuming 
Whether or not I am responsible for cuts in the public sector 
3. Decision: whether or not to watch a movie streamed online for free Please rank the 
following things in order of importance to your decision: 
Whether or not cinema-goers will have to pay more as a result 
Whether or not I am responsible for negative impacts on the film industry 
Whether or not we can make a difference if enough people pay for movies 
Whether or not a good cultural event is important to me 
Whether or not it involves a lot of effort 
Whether or not it is convenient 
Whether or not I believe it has a negative impact on the film industry 
Whether or not watching movies online for free is worthwhile 
Part 3 – manipulation 
Participants are presented either with no text or one of the three experimental manipulation 
texts outlined in Table 4.5. The manipulation texts had the following introduction: 
Below you will find some information about the environmental consequences of meat 
consumption. (In this context, meat does not include fish). Please read the text carefully 
before you move on to the next section. It is really important for our research that you read 
through the text and don’t skip it. 
Outcome variables associated with cooperation 
The last section of the study aims to find out about your opinion on issues around meat 
consumption. (In this context, meat does not include fish). 
1. The following questions ask you to rate what you think about eating meat on a 
number of scales. Each scale has two opposite poles. For each scale, indicate what 
you think about eating meat by choosing the appropriate tick box on the scale 
between these opposite poles. (Remember that, in this context, meat does not 
include fish). If you're unsure of where to tick on any particular scale, you may 
leave it blank. 
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bad - good 
unpleasant – pleasant 
environmentally unfriendly - environmentally friendly 
tasteless – tasty 
unhealthy – healthy 
immoral – moral 
unsafe – safe 
detrimental – beneficial 
inconvenient – convenient 
unfavourable – favourable 
insipid – appetizing 
negative- positive 
2. Do you intend to change the amount of meat you eat in the next month? 
Intend to eat much more meat 
Intend to eat more meat 
Intend to eat the same amount of meat 
Intend to eat less meat 
Intend to eat much less meat 
Don’t know 
            How willing are you to cut down the amount of meat you eat? 
Very willing 
Fairly willing 
Neither willing nor unwilling 
Not very willing 
Not at all willing 
Don’t know 
3. Please now exit the survey by clicking on one of the two buttons below. 
EXIT to website with tips on how to eat less meat 
EXIT to google homepage 
Note: Further demographic variables such as age, gender and education were also assessed. 
Table 4.1: Items used in the online questionnaire of chapter four. 
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Framing manipulation text ’facts group’: 
Meat production responsible for 18% of annual global greenhouse gas emissions 
Greenhouse gases cause the vast majority of global warming. Raising animals for food is 
one of the largest sources of greenhouse gas emissions. Producing one calorie from animal 
protein requires on average 11 times as much fossil fuel input as producing one calorie 
from plant protein - and so releases 11 times as much of the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide. 
Farmed animals also produce large amounts of methane, and the meat industry is 
responsible for the majority of nitrous oxide emissions. Both methane and nitrous oxide are 
highly potent global warming gases. 
Framing manipulation text ‘SD group’: 
The collective costs of eating meat 
When we choose to eat meat, we do not only have the enjoyment of eating meat ourselves, 
we also create negative consequences for everyone by contributing to global warming. 
Often when we make a choice about what to eat, we only think about things like price, 
taste, appetite and so on. We seldom take into account that the global consumption of meat 
imposes high costs on us all in the form of a changing climate, both today and in the future. 
We can reduce these collective costs by personally deciding to eat less meat. 
Framing manipulation text ‘facts and SD group’: 
Meat production responsible for 18% of annual global greenhouse gas emissions 
Greenhouse gases cause the vast majority of global warming. Raising animals for food is 
one of the largest sources of greenhouse gas emissions. Producing one calorie from animal 
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protein requires on average 11 times as much fossil fuel input as producing one calorie 
from plant protein - and so releases 11 times as much of the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide. 
Farmed animals also produce large amounts of methane, and the meat industry is 
responsible for the majority of nitrous oxide emissions. Both methane and nitrous oxide are 
highly potent global warming gases. 
The collective costs of eating meat 
When we choose to eat meat, we do not only have the enjoyment of eating meat 
ourselves, we also create negative consequences for everyone by contributing to global 
warming. Often when we make a choice about what to eat, we only think about things like 
price, taste, appetite and so on. We seldom take into account that the global consumption of 
meat imposes high costs on us all in the form of a changing climate, both today and in the 
future. We can reduce these collective costs by personally deciding to eat less meat. 
Table 4.5: Texts presented in the different experimental conditions. 
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 Categorisation of coded open-ended answers 
Dilemma situation 
Personal 
outcomes 
Social dilemma 
interpretation 
possible 
Social dilemma 
characteristics 
Other/ 
ambiguous 
Restaurant -4.3 -6.0 10.9 5.8 
Transport 7.3 -7.1 -3.0 -6.8 
Campaign -4.1 10.1 -4.0 2.9 
Strike -4.0 14.2 -3.9 -.5 
Movie 3.4 -4.2 -4.0 -.8 
Table 4.6: Standardised residuals for cells displaying the relation between dilemma situation 
and categories of coded open-ended answers.
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Items assessing more detailed characteristics of personal actions to address climate change: 
How much financial cost is involved in these actions? 
How much time is required for these actions? 
How much effort is required for these actions? 
How much inconvenience is involved in these actions? 
Items assessing future actions on climate change: 
I will find it hard to take actions to address climate change. 
I will be prepared to take actions that involve some financial costs to address climate 
change. 
I will be prepared to take actions that require some amount of time to address climate 
change. 
I will be prepared to take actions that require some amount of effort to address climate 
change. 
I will be prepared to take actions that involve some amount of inconvenience to address 
climate change. 
I intend to take actions to address climate change. 
Items assessing current approval of climate change policies: 
I approve of policies which ensure that everyone takes action to address climate change. 
I approve of strict enforcement of policies that help address climate change. 
Policies that help address climate change might be unpleasant, but they are necessary. 
I approve of groups and institutions that try to implement policies to address climate 
change. 
Items assessing future approval of climate change policies: 
I will approve of policies which ensure that everyone takes actions to address climate 
change. 
I will approve of strict enforcement of policies that help address climate change. 
Policies that help address climate change might be unpleasant, but they are necessary. 
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I will approve of groups and institutions that try to implement policies to address climate 
change. 
Items assessing demographics: 
How did you hear about the survey? 
Drop-down items assessing age, gender, highest level of education and yearly personal 
income 
Are you a member of any group/ institution/ political party working (amongst other things 
or solely) on climate change? 
Please name the group/ institution/ political party. 
Table 5.1: Items used in the online questionnaire of chapter five. 
 
Item name Wording 
Collective interest1 Even though it's not in my narrow self-interest, I think about 
what is best for the greater good, for the human race as a 
whole. 
 
Collective interest2 We would all be better off with a stable climate. 
 
Collective interest3 We need to do something, otherwise we will all be negatively 
affected by climate change. 
 
Enlightened self-interest1 It would be better for me, if we addressed climate change. 
 
Enlightened self-interest2 Ultimately, I would be negatively affected by climate change. 
 
Externalities1 Everyone who does not take actions is increasing the 
likelihood of dangerous climate change and therefore the 
likelihood that others are negatively affected by climate 
change. 
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Externalities2 By taking actions, I can reduce the negative consequences 
(resulting from climate change) for others. 
Fairness1 Not taking actions would be unfair to those that do take actions 
to address climate change. 
Fairness2 Everyone has to change his or her lifestyle to some degree in 
order to address climate change. 
Fairness3 We in the West are responsible for the highest emissions, we 
should be the ones taking actions. 
Temptation to free-ride1 Others could take actions and address climate change without 
my help. 
Temptation to free-ride2 I would rather have others take care of climate change so I 
don't have to take actions. 
Personal insignificance1 I am just one in billions, my actions will not make a significant 
difference. 
Personal insignificance2 It doesn't matter if I don't take actions, the outcome will be the 
same anyway. 
Personal insignificance3 My efforts won't affect the outcome of climate change. 
Hopelessness1 Voluntarily most people won't take actions and we won't be 
able to tackle climate change. 
Hopelessness2 It's not worth me taking actions to address climate change if 
others don't do the same. 
Fear of being a sucker1 Even if I take actions to address climate change, others will 
start emitting more. 
Fear of being a sucker2 Why should I do my bit, if my next door neighbour doesn't. 
Fear of being a sucker3 It is unfair that I should bear the burden of taking actions 
whilst others do not. 
Immediate self-interest1 I don't want considerations of climate change to affect my life. 
Immediate self-interest2 Taking actions to address climate change would restrict my 
personal freedom. 
Immediate self-interest3 I am more concerned about the immediate consequences of my 
actions for my own life, than about the consequences of my 
actions for climate change. 
Note: The statements are derived from existing scales for non-cooperative cognitive 
responses, focus group and interview research on climate change mitigation and social 
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dilemma literature (Horton and Doron, 2011, Lorenzoni et al., 2007), existing 
questionnaires (Aitken et al., 2011, DEFRA, 2009) and prior conducted research. 
 
Table 5.2: Item names and wordings of the 23 statements representing cooperative and non-
cooperative cognitive responses to the climate change mitigation dilemma. 
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 Importance ratings in relation 
to personal actions to address 
climate change 
Importance ratings in relation 
to approval of climate change 
policies 
Item name M SD M SD 
Collective interest1 4.04 .918 4.10 1.065 
Collective interest2 4.17 1.000 4.23 1.029 
Collective interest3 4.07 1.029 4.12 1.140 
Enlightened self-interest1 3.63 1.179 3.69 1.265 
Enlightened self-interest2 3.56 1.200 3.54 1.240 
Externalities1 3.75 1.162 3.74 1.173 
Externalities2 3.70 1.016 3.83 1.108 
Fairness1 3.63 1.134 3.68 1.254 
Fairness2 3.94 1.067 4.12 1.073 
Fairness3 3.55 1.286 3.63 1.301 
Temptation to free-ride1 3.06 1.249 2.80 1.227 
Temptation to free-ride2 1.99 1.058 2.01 1.099 
Personal insignificance1 2.46 1.281 2.52 1.341 
Personal insignificance2 2.46 1.153 2.39 1.191 
Personal insignificance3 2.66 1.248 2.46 1.213 
Hopelessness1 3.13 1.241 3.59 1.221 
Hopelessness2 2.42 1.326 2.65 1.379 
Fear of being a sucker1 2.97 1.317 3.00 1.375 
Fear of being a sucker2 2.19 1.179 2.27 1.298 
Fear of being a sucker3 2.47 1.242 2.59 1.283 
Immediate self-interest1 2.54 1.182 2.49 1.213 
Immediate self-interest2 2.39 1.130 2.82 1.275 
Immediate self-interest3 2.68 1.193 2.72 1.239 
    
Table 5.3: Average importance ratings of the 23 statements representing cooperative and non-
cooperative considerations in relation to personal actions to address climate change and 
approval of climate change policies. 
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Predictor B SE B Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Non-cooperation 
factor 
-.078 .028 8.000 .005 .925 
Cooperation 
factor 
.099 .033 8.761 .003 1.104 
Constant .847 1.592 .283 .595 2.332 
Note: All variables were entered simultaneously; Cox & Snell R2 = .152; χ2 (2, N = 133) = 
22.004, p < .001 
Table 5.6: Summary of logistic regression analysis for factors predicting whether or not 
participants take any actions to address climate change. 
 
Predictor B SE B Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Non-cooperation 
factor 
-.031 .025 1.589 .208 .969 
Cooperation 
factor 
-.003 .032 .006 .937 .997 
Constant -.506 1.643 .095 .758 .603 
Note: All variables were entered simultaneously; Cox & Snell R2 = .013; χ2 (2, N = 133) = 
1.693, p = .429 
Table 5.7: Summary of logistic regression analysis for factors predicting participants’ 
membership in a group working on climate change. 
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Predictor B SE B Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Non-cooperation 
factor 
-.047 .021 5.071 .024 .954 
Cooperation 
factor 
.054 .029 3.442 .064 1.056 
Constant -1.198 1.462 .672 .413 .302 
Note: All variables were entered simultaneously; Cox & Snell R2 = .091; χ2 (2, N = 129) = 
12.312, p =.002 
Table 5.8: Summary of logistic regression analysis for factors predicting participants 
donating half of the potential cash prize. 
 
Predictor B SE B Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Non-cooperation 
factor 
-.053 .021 6.485 .011 .948 
Cooperation 
factor 
.077 .029 6.869 .009 1.080 
Constant -1.142 1.424 .644 .422 .319 
Note: All variables were entered simultaneously; Cox & Snell R2 = .091; χ2 (2, N = 123) = 
19.060, p < .001 
Table 5.9: Summary of logistic regression analysis for factors predicting participants exiting 
to an environmental homepage. 
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Predictor B SE B β t Sig. 
Constant 13.350 2.204  6.056 .000 
Non-cooperation 
factor 
-.024 .031 -.078 -.777 .439 
Cooperation 
factor 
.005 .045 .011 .106 .916 
Note: All variables were entered simultaneously; n=104; R2 = .007; F (2, 102) = .334, p 
= .717 
Table 5.10: Summary of linear regression analysis for factors predicting more detailed 
characteristics of reported actions. 
 
Predictor B SE B β t Sig. 
Constant 17.863 2.663  6.707 .000 
Non-cooperation 
factor 
-.220 .038 -.356 -.356 .000 
Cooperation 
factor 
.470 .052 .555 8.985 .000 
Note: All variables were entered simultaneously; n=132; R2 = .538; F (2, 130) = 75.695, 
p < .001 
Table 5.11: Summary of linear regression analysis for factors predicting willingness and 
intention to act on climate change in the future. 
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Predictor B SE B Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Externalities .114 .245 .218 .641 1.121 
Collective interest .243 .212 1.312 .252 1.275 
Enlightened self-interest -.080 .192 .175 .676 .923 
Fairness -.005 .163 .001 .973 .995 
Immediate self-interest -.205 .145 1.994 .158 .814 
Fear of being a sucker -.012 .148 .007 .934 .988 
Personal insignificance -.215 .153 1.975 .160 .807 
Hopelessness .146 .201 .530 .466 1.157 
Temptation to free-ride -.007 .190 .001 .971 .993 
Constant 1.425 2.222 .411 .521 4.159 
Note: All variables were entered simultaneously; Cox & Snell R2 = .177; χ2 (9, N = 133) = 
25.887, p =.002 
Table 5.13: Summary of logistic regression analysis for considerations predicting whether or 
not participants take any actions to address climate change. 
Predictor B SE B Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Externalities .113 .182 .385 .535 1.119 
Collective interest .289 .170 2.906 .088 1.335 
Enlightened self-interest -.226 .138 2.663 .103 .798 
Fairness .048 .118 .165 .684 1.049 
Immediate self-interest -.049 .114 .185 .667 .952 
Fear of being a sucker -.300 .118 6.426 .011 .741 
Personal insignificance -.049 .113 .189 .664 .952 
Hopelessness .119 .145 .677 .410 1.126 
Temptation to free-ride .393 .155 6.435 .011 1.481 
Constant -3.712 2.113 3.086 .079 .024 
Note: All variables were entered simultaneously; Cox & Snell R2 = .139; χ2 (9, N = 133) = 
31.991, p < .001 
Table 5.14: Summary of logistic regression analysis for considerations predicting 
membership in a group working on climate change. 
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Predictor B SE B Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Externalities .080 .218 .134 .714 1.083 
Collective interest .305 .220 1.917 .166 1.357 
Enlightened self-interest -.198 .147 1.801 .180 .821 
Fairness -.103 .140 .549 .459 .902 
Immediate self-interest -.274 .136 4.037 .045 .760 
Fear of being a sucker .120 .136 .782 .377 1.128 
Personal insignificance .388 .140 7.706 .006 1.474 
Hopelessness -.444 .189 5.538 .019 .642 
Temptation to free-ride -.105 .176 .357 .550 .900 
Constant -2.592 2.234 1.345 .246 .075 
Note: All variables were entered simultaneously; Cox & Snell R2 = .220; χ2 (9, N = 129) = 
19.946, p = .018 
Table 5.15: Summary of logistic regression analysis for considerations predicting donating 
half of the potential cash prize. 
 
Predictor B SE B Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Externalities .232 .173 1.792 .181 1.261 
Collective interest .093 .159 .340 .560 1.097 
Enlightened self-interest -.144 .142 1.030 .310 .866 
Fairness .087 .114 .581 .446 1.090 
Immediate self-interest -.063 .110 .331 .565 .939 
Fear of being a sucker -.124 .106 1.375 .241 .883 
Personal insignificance -.172 .110 2.422 .120 .842 
Hopelessness .107 .141 .574 .448 1.113 
Temptation to free-ride .156 .140 1.241 .265 1.169 
Constant -1.439 1.847 .607 .436 .237 
Note: All variables were entered simultaneously; Cox & Snell R2 = .192; χ2 (9, N = 123) = 
26.150, p = .002 
Table 5.16: Summary of logistic regression analysis for considerations predicting participants 
exiting to an environmental homepage. 
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Predictor B SE B β t Sig. 
Constant 9.632 1.999  4.819 .000 
Externalities .355 .181 .273 1.967 .052 
Collective interest -.094 .176 -.086 -.536 .593 
Enlightened self-interest .031 .128 .027 .239 .811 
Fairness -.113 .119 -.128 -.947 .346 
Immediate self-interest .052 .111 .061 .465 .643 
Fear of being a sucker .057 .121 .071 .472 .638 
Personal insignificance -.020 .113 -.026 -.180 .858 
Hopelessness -.334 .145 -.326 -2.299 .024 
Temptation to free-ride .096 .146 .074 .657 .513 
Note: All variables were entered simultaneously; n=109; R2 = .094; F (9, 100) = 1.155, p 
= .333 
Table 5.17: Summary of linear regression analysis for considerations predicting more 
detailed characteristics of reported actions. 
Predictor B SE B β t Sig. 
Constant 17.351 2.474  7.013 .000 
Externalities .228 .234 .090 .974 .332 
Collective interest .447 .220 .211 2.028 .045 
Enlightened self-interest .299 .166 .134 1.803 .074 
Fairness .117 .155 .067 .754 .452 
Immediate self-interest -.717 .142 -.424 -5.040 .000 
Fear of being a sucker .081 .148 .051 .546 .586 
Personal insignificance -.271 .147 -.173 -1.848 .067 
Hopelessness -.068 .189 -.032 -.357 .722 
Temptation to free-ride .296 .188 .112 1.574 .118 
Note: All variables were entered simultaneously; n=132; R2 = .580; F (9, 123) = 18.902, p 
< .001 
Table 5.18: Summary of linear regression analysis for considerations predicting willingness 
and intention to act on climate change in the future. 
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Predictor B SE B Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Policy cooperation 
factor 
.107 .036 8.891 .003 1.113 
Why me factor -.039 .050 .619 .431 .961 
Personal costs/ 
insignificance factor 
-.123 .052 5.671 .017 .884 
Constant -2.221 1.921 1.338 .247 .108 
Note: All variables were entered simultaneously; Cox & Snell R2 = .264; χ2 (3, N = 127) = 
38.900, p < .001 
Table 5.21: Summary of logistic regression analysis for factors predicting whether or not 
participants exit to a petition for stricter climate change policies. 
 
Predictor B SE B β t Sig. 
Constant 3.491 1.471  2.373 .019 
Policy cooperation 
factor 
.325 .025 .736 13.141 .000 
Why me factor -.002 .047 -.003 -.051 .960 
Personal costs/ 
insignificance factor 
-.105 .046 -.150 -2.278 .024 
Note: All variables were entered simultaneously; n=137; R2 = .658; F (3, 134) = 85.869, 
p < .001 
Table 5.22: Summary of linear regression analysis for factors predicting current approval of 
climate change policies. 
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Predictor B SE B β t Sig. 
Constant 2.090 1.457  1.435 .154 
Policy cooperation 
factor 
.345 .024 .769 14.158 .000 
Why me factor .025 .047 .032 .537 .592 
Personal costs/ 
insignificance factor 
-.099 .046 -.138 -2.139 .034 
Note: All variables were entered simultaneously; n=133; R2 = .688; F (3, 130) = 95.342, 
p < .001 
Table 5.23: Summary of linear regression analysis for factors predicting future approval of 
climate change policies.
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Predictor B SE B Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Externalities -.361 .216 2.802 .094 .697 
Collective interest .375 .175 4.598 .032 1.455 
Enlightened self-interest .139 .142 .970 .325 1.150 
Fairness .267 .135 3.912 .048 1.307 
Immediate self-interest -.144 .103 1.956 .162 .866 
Fear of being a sucker .003 .098 .001 .976 1.003 
Personal insignificance .019 .105 .031 .860 1.019 
Hopelessness -.161 .133 1.458 .227 .851 
Temptation to free-ride -.292 .157 3.467 .063 .747 
Constant -3.047 2.333 1.706 .192 .047 
Note: All variables were entered simultaneously; Cox & Snell R2 = .312; χ2 (9, N = 127) = 
47.436, p < .001 
Table 5.25: Summary of logistic regression analysis for cognitive responses predicting 
participants exiting to a petition for stricter climate change policies. 
Predictor B SE B β t Sig. 
Constant 3.911 1.659  2.358 .020 
Externalities .255 .190 .131 1.339 .183 
Collective interest .401 .131 .274 3.055 .003 
Enlightened self-interest .192 .139 .103 1.385 .168 
Fairness .376 .121 .273 3.099 .002 
Immediate self-interest -.149 .098 -.112 -1.528 .129 
Fear of being a sucker .089 .089 .073 1.000 .319 
Personal insignificance -.244 .102 -.188 -2.404 .018 
Hopelessness .006 .125 .003 .051 .959 
Temptation to free-ride .229 .142 .106 .1613 .109 
Note: All variables were entered simultaneously; n=137;R2 = .668; F (9, 128) = 28.617, p 
< .001 
Table 5.26: Summary of linear regression analysis for cognitive responses predicting current 
approval of climate change policies. 
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Predictor B SE B β t Sig. 
Constant 1.173 1.648  .712 .478 
Externalities .073 .189 .037 .386 .700 
Collective interest .636 .130 .425 4.897 .000 
Enlightened self-interest .219 .138 .115 1.590 .114 
Fairness .351 .119 .251 2.946 .004 
Immediate self-interest -.071 .097 -.052 -.738 .462 
Fear of being a sucker .048 .089 .038 .534 .594 
Personal insignificance -.227 .100 -.172 -2.266 .025 
Hopelessness .212 .124 .100 1.704 .091 
Temptation to free-ride .122 .141 .054 .860 .391 
Note: All variables were entered simultaneously; n=133;R2 = .697; F (9, 124) = 31.689, p 
< .001 
Table 5.27: Summary of linear regression analysis for cognitive responses predicting future 
approval of climate change policies.
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Appendix C 
Main questions Probes/ Alerts 
Start  
Thank you. 
Your opinions and comments will be extremely valuable. I 
am solely interested in your opinion, in what you think. 
There is no right or wrong 
Do not frame climate change as a 
problem 
Emphasis on no expectation 
Go through consent form Emphasise ethics and 
confidentiality 
Sign form  
Ask again the permission to audiotape  
Any further questions before we start?  
Start recorder.  
  
Open questions  
Can you please briefly summarise your views on climate 
change for me? 
 
When you think about climate change, how does it make 
you feel? 
Why does it make you feel….? 
In general, what do you think are reasons why people do 
take actions to address climate change? 
Why would that lead people to 
take actions? 
In general, what do you think are reasons why people do 
NOT take actions to address climate change? 
Why would that discourage 
people to take actions? 
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Stress that they are 
understandable reasons and valid. 
  
Cognitive responses exploration  
We have talked a bit about the reasons why or why not 
people might act on climate change. I have noted down 
some of the things you said on these cards. 
Here I have some additional cards with different things 
people might consider. Some of the things might encourage 
people to take actions, others might discourage people to 
take actions. 
Have I missed any important 
things from our prior discussion? 
I would now like to talk about some of the things you 
personally consider or think about when it comes to your 
actions on climate change. 
Can you please sort all these cards for me in three groups: 
 This group is for all the things that you don’t 
consider, that have no influence on whether or not 
you take action on climate change. Things that are 
unimportant. 
 This group is for things that do cross your mind 
and that rather encourage you to take actions. 
 And this group is for things that do cross your mind 
and that rather discourage you to take actions. 
Cards with group headings. 
 
Further probe the why, if 
necessary 
Ok, let’s have a closer look at the things that rather 
encourage actions. 
 Can you sort them according to their importance? 
Which is the most encouraging thing? Why do you 
think this is the most encouraging thing? 
Are there any things that you would group together under 
a common heading? What heading would this be? 
Possibly keep addressing back to 
climate change. 
Now I would like to ask you to do the same exercise for the 
things that rather discourage actions to address climate 
change. 
 Can you sort them according to their importance? 
Which is the most encouraging thing? Why do you 
think this is the most encouraging thing? 
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 Are there any things that you would group together 
under a common heading? What heading would 
this be? 
  
Approval of policies  
One possible approach to address climate change is 
through policies. These policies require approval from 
citizens like yourself. 
Possibly give examples of 
policies: taxes, subsidies, 
restrictions, regulations. 
In general, what do you think are reasons why people do 
approve of policies that help address climate change? 
Why would that lead to approval? 
In general, what do you think are reasons why people do 
NOT approve of policies that help address climate 
change? 
Why would that lead to 
disapproval? 
Ok, let’s have another look at this group (show personal 
insignificance, fear of being a sucker and hopelessness). 
Can you please have a look through them again and tell 
me which ones would rather increase and which ones 
would rather decrease your approval of policies that help 
address climate change. 
Why do you think this decreases/ 
increases approval? 
Personal insignificance  does it 
translate to insignificance in 
political actions? 
  
End  
We are now at the end of the interview. Thank you. 
Is there anything you would like to add to what we have 
discussed? 
 
We have discussed a lot of topics today and you have 
offered very interesting and important thoughts and 
insights. In case I have any questions regarding the topics 
we discussed or any need for clarification, could I contact 
you via email? 
Likewise, if you have any further questions, comments or 
would like to request information on a topic we discussed, 
please feel free to contact me any time. 
 
 
 
 
 
Possibly give info material. 
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Pay and get form signed.  
Table 6.1: Interview guide for semi-structured interviews of chapter six. 
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Cognitive response Interview prompt 
Collective interest Collective interest – We would all be better off with a 
stable climate. 
 
Enlightened self-interest Enlightened self-interest – Ultimately it would be better 
for me if climate change was addressed. 
 
Externalities Consequences for others – Climate change will result in 
negative consequences for others. 
 
Fairness Fairness – A fair distribution of the burden to act on 
climate change. 
 
Temptation to free-ride Temptation to free-ride – Others can address climate 
change and I can profit from their efforts. 
 
Personal insignificance Personal insignificance – I am just one in billions, my 
actions will not make a difference. 
 
Hopelessness Hopelessness – Others just won’t take actions, the 
situation is hopeless. 
 
Fear of being a sucker Fear of being a sucker – Why should I be the sucker and 
address climate change, when others don’t? 
 
Immediate self-interest Immediate self-interest - Addressing climate change is 
expensive/ inconvenient etc. right now. 
Table 6.2: Prompts used during the qualitative interviews to introduce the nine cooperative 
and non-cooperative considerations.
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Appendix D 
Items assessing communitarianism: 
The government should do more to advance society’s goals, even if that means limiting the 
freedom and choices of individuals. 
Government should put limits on the choices individuals can make so they don’t get in the 
way of what’s good for society. 
The government interferes far too much in our everyday lives. 
The government should stop telling people how to live their lives. 
Items assessing Schwartz transcendence values: 
It is important that every person in the world should be treated equally and have equal 
opportunity in life. 
It is important to listen to people who are different from me. Even when I disagree with 
them, I still want to understand them. 
People should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to me. 
Items assessing collective identity: 
I identify with (feel a part of, feel love toward, have concern for) people in my community. 
I identify with (feel a part of, feel love toward, have concern for) people in Britain. 
I identify with (feel a part of, feel love toward, have concern for) all humans everywhere. 
Items assessing actions to address climate change (wording of control group): 
I intend to take actions on climate change. 
I am prepared to take actions on climate change in the future. 
I am willing to help address climate change. 
Items assessing approval of climate change policies: 
I will approve of policies which ensure that everyone takes actions to address climate 
change. 
Policies that help address climate change might be unpleasant, but they are necessary. 
Table 7.1: Items used in questionnaires of chapter seven. 
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Predictors B SE B β t Sig. 
Constant 5.786 1.420  4.075 .000 
Self-transcendence values .201 .089 .192 2.254 .026 
Collective identity community -.016 .228 -.007 -.069 .945 
Collective identity Britain .157 .259 .081 .606 .546 
Collective identity humans .611 .210 .349 2.909 .004 
Communitarianism .058 .060 .082 .980 .329 
Note: All variables were entered simultaneously; n = 120; R2= .250; F (5, 115) = 7.683, p 
< .001 
 
Table 7.2: Linear regression analysis predicting participants’ self-reported willingness and 
intention to take actions to address climate change (personality characteristics as predictors). 
Predictors B SE B β t Sig. 
Constant 6.364 1.506  4.226 .000 
Self-transcendence values .192 .089 .183 2.158 .033 
Collective identity community -.045 .230 -.021 -.197 .844 
Collective identity Britain .147 .258 .076 .572 .568 
Collective identity humans .587 .210 .336 2.802 .006 
Communitarianism .068 .060 .095 1.122 .264 
Collective interest manipulation -.749 .430 -.170 -1.743 .084 
Fairness manipulation -.332 .420 -.077 -.790 .431 
Note: All variables were entered simultaneously; n = 120; R2= .270; F (7, 113) = 5.977, p 
< .001 
 
Table 7.3: Linear regression analysis predicting participants’ self-reported willingness and 
intention to take actions to address climate change (personality characteristics and 
manipulation as predictors). 
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Predictors B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Self-transcendence values  .133 .183 .523 .469 1.142 
Collective identity community .353 .375 .885 .347 1.423 
Collective identity Britain -.536 .462 1.489 .222 .569 
Collective identity humans .790 .404 3.827 .050 2.202 
Communitarianism .243 .109 4.942 .026 1.275 
Constant -8.775 3.017 8.457 .004 .000 
Note: All variables are entered simultaneously, Cox & Snell R2 = .088; χ2 (5, N = 122) = 11.301, p = 
.046 
 
Table 7.5: Logistic regression analysis predicting whether or not participants donate to 
Cambridge Carbon Footprint (personality characteristics as predictors). 
 
Predictors B SE B β t Sig. 
Constant 2.591 1.145  2.262 .026 
Self-transcendence values .207 .072 .243 2.860 .005 
Collective identity community .023 .183 .013 .125 .901 
Collective identity Britain .250 .209 .160 1.197 .234 
Collective identity humans .316 .171 .223 1.847 .067 
Communitarianism .027 .048 .047 .570 .570 
Note: All variables were entered simultaneously; n = 121; R2= .240; F (5, 116) = 7.340, p 
< .001 
 
Table 7.7: Linear regression analysis predicting participants’ self-reported approval of 
climate change policies (personality characteristics as predictors). 
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Predictors B SE B β t Sig. 
Constant 3.586 1.207  2.971 .004 
Self-transcendence values .191 .071 .225 2.675 .009 
Collective identity community -.047 .183 -.027 -.258 .797 
Collective identity Britain .253 .206 .161 1.228 .222 
Collective identity humans .306 .169 .216 1.816 .072 
Communitarianism .024 .048 .042 .508 .612 
Collective interest manipulation -.760 .344 -.213 -2.213 .029 
Fairness manipulation -.685 .337 -.196 -2.031 .045 
Note: All variables were entered simultaneously; n = 121; R2= .278; F (7, 114) = 6.265, p 
< .001 
 
Table 7.8: Linear regression analysis predicting participants’ self-reported approval of 
climate change policies (personality characteristics and manipulation as predictors). 
 
 
